The largest buyer of oil that crosses Hormuz, including Iranian crude declared under other origins (as reported by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy); large stocks cushion it. Approved reading
This page answers: What does China depend on, and which of our questions concern it?
Using this page
Read the Dependency profile: the country card and where supply comes from.
Tap In scenarios to see how each closed strait reaches China.
Scroll to the questions. Filter them, then open any brief.
Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictElevated
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsElevated
Supply chains and chokepointsElevated
Energy and resourcesElevated
Technology and cyberElevated
Regulation and complianceElevated
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
China held 6.6% of US auto parts imports in 2025 (US Census, all parts, a wider basket than the band table's HS 8708 line). A pro-rata diversion ceiling from Canadian parts supply is about US$1.4bn, an upper bound, not a forecast. our calculationStrature country reading: China, US tariffs on Canada (approved 2026-10-06)
Happened if, on 10 Jan 2027, both suspensions are in effect and the earlier of their stated end dates falls after 10 Jan 2028, or neither carries an end date (including a permanent withdrawal of the suspended controls or of the rule). our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0192 (C-005)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced, and no qualifying commitment carries a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0152 (Q-021)
General information, not advice.
Risks that reach China
Gulf war / HormuzHigh
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
F-0169 · China's tariff relief on Canadian peas, canola meal and seafood lapses at the end of 2026 · 30%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 1 Jan 2027 · Open · brief C-006
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
nothing short on file: stocks cover the cargo lost
Good by good (1)
Crude oilnothing short on filenothing short on file: stocks cover the cargo lost
Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.
More measures (4, each its own unit; never added)
Share of national use that passes the strait · crude oil: 31–34% of crude supplyStrature calculation
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 276 daysStrature calculation
Share of the exposed supply actually lost in 2Q 2026 · crude oil: 65%Strature calculation
Share passing two straits on one voyage (range) · crude oil: 16–47% of crude imports crossing bothStrature calculation
importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where China’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: China
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Scenario
Questions about China
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of China’s supply crosses Hormuz?
On file, 47% of its crude oil imports; 40% of its refined fuels imports; 33% of its LNG imports cross the strait.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Who supplies China’s crude oil?
Russia is China’s largest crude supplier, about a fifth (2024, EIA); Saudi Arabia about 14% (2024, EIA); Iraq is among its five largest (EIA).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of China’s energy is imported?
China imported 23% of the energy it used in 2024, and 67% of its oil.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Does China hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?
Yes: gallium supply 99% of world (2025); manganese refining 95% of world (2024). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How many days of oil stocks does China hold?
China held 120 days (late 2025), counted as nominal days of crude imports (Baker Institute, from EIA's strategic-stock estimate); working cover lower.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
No approved block reading for China yet; this section shows approved readings only.
Questions our briefs address
Questions our briefs address
The questions our published briefs address that touch China.
HighUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for ChinaUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada
Strature analysis, not from the brief
US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for China
China takes 4.83% of Canada's exports excluding gold; Canada supplied nearly all its canola seed in 2024. Its relief on meal, peas and shellfish expires end-2026 unless renewed.est.
Theme band High
4.83%
Share of Canada's goods exports, excl. gold (2025)
95.9%est.
Canada's share of China's canola seed imports (2024, customs data as reported)
C$42.7bn
Canada's exports to China, year to Aug 2026 (up 32.3%)
Read the full panel
Risks
China's relief on Canadian canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs is set only to the end of 2026. Under the 2025 duties, Canada's exports of these goods to China halved, from C$2.0bn to C$1.0bn (Statistics Canada).
The US President said in a 24 Jan 2026 social-media post that he would impose a 100% tariff on Canadian goods if Canada made a trade deal with China (as reported). No such tariff was found in force to 6 Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Russia, not Canada, leads China's canola oil imports: over half by value in Jan-Oct 2025 (China customs data via Agroexport). Estimate from press or commentary
Canada is a small outlet for China. A Canadian move to align outside tariffs with US policy (F-0176) would reach C$90.19bn of Canadian imports from China a year.
Opportunities
Canadian canola seed shipments to China reached 2.30 Mt in Jan-Jul 2026. China took 36.6% of Canada's seed exports.
Canada's exports to China rose 32.3% to C$42.71bn in the year to Aug 2026.
China held 6.6% of US auto parts imports in 2025 (US Census, all parts, a wider basket than the band table's HS 8708 line). A pro-rata diversion ceiling from Canadian parts supply is about US$1.4bn, an upper bound, not a forecast.
Uncertainties
Nothing is published on the relief after 2026.
US duties on Chinese goods limit diversion: one estimate put the trade-weighted rate at 29.7% in Feb 2026. The rate in force in Oct 2026 is not recorded here. Estimate from press or commentary
China's direct investment in Canada is C$24.6bn, of which C$13.76bn is debt, down from C$27.95bn in 2022. Holdings routed through other places are not counted.
The High wheat band rests on one volatile year: Canada shipped 3.2 Mt of wheat to China in 2025 (Statistics Canada), against China's total wheat imports of 3.9 Mt (customs data via Platts). Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
1 Jan 2027F-0169 resolves: China's relief on canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs lapses or is renewed.
Monthly, mid-monthCanadian canola seed exports to China; 2.30 Mt in Jan-Jul 2026.
OngoingAny US tariff action tied to Canada's trade with China.
30 Sep 2027F-0176 resolves: whether Canada aligns its outside tariffs with US policy.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Supply from Canada (canola)Dependence
95.9% of imports of the goodest.2024Canada's share of China's canola seed imports
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Supply from Canada (wheat)Dependence
83.3% of the country's imports of the good2025Canada's share of China's wheat imports, mirror basis (Canadian exports to China over China's customs imports)
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Supply from Canada (canola meal)Food and farming
0.95 Mt in 2025, down 52.96% on 2024 (customs data as reported); 2025 share of all meal imports not in open dataest.2025China's imports of Canadian rapeseed (canola) meal, 2025
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Diversification marketTrade
4.83% of Canada's exports excl. gold2025Share of Canada's goods exports going to the country, excluding gold
High
High ≥3% · Medium 1–3% · Low 0.5–1% (growth or brief-named)
US market rival (plastics)Trade
not in open US tables (HS 39 by country needs the Census API)2025China's share of US imports of plastics (HS 39)
Medium
High ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10% with ≥US$2bn
US market rival (parts)Trade
6.6% of US imports2025China's share of US imports of motor vehicle parts (end-use category)
Low
High ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10% with ≥US$2bn
Sales to CanadaTrade
C$90.2bnSep 2025-Aug 2026Canada's imports from the country
Low
High ≥5% · Medium 2–5% · Low <2% but on a money line
Capital in CanadaCapital and finance
C$24.6bn2025Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country)
Low
High ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Canada's exports to China of goods under the 2025 duties, 2025 (C$ million, Statistics Canada)
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian International Merchandise Trade (CIMT), total exports by HS6 and country, annual 2024 and 2025 (open data, ODPFN019).
Canada's share of China's wheat imports, mirror basis (Canadian exports to China over China's customs imports): 83.3% of the country's imports of the good (= 3.24 / 3.89)
China's share of Canadian canola seed exports: 36.6% of Canada's canola seed exports (= exports to China / exports to all markets)
Growth of Canada's goods exports to the country, 12 months to Aug 2026 on the prior 12 months: 32.3% (= exports Sep 2025-Aug 2026 / exports Sep 2024-Aug 2025 - 1)
Pro-rata share of Canada's US sales of motor vehicle parts (illustrative diversion ceiling): US$1.42bn (= 19141 × 12386 / (186306 - 19141))
Canada's exports to China of the relief goods, before the duties, in US$: US$1.46bn (= 1999.27 / 1.3698)
Fall in Canada's exports to China of the relief goods, 2025 on 2024, in US$: US$0.74bn (= 1999.27 / 1.3698 - 1001.2 / 1.3978)
Probability-weighted loss on the relief goods if the relief lapses: US$0.22bn (= 0.30 × 0.743)
Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 1 Nov 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →
HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for ChinaGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for China
China's oil stocks cover 324 days of pre-war Hormuz crude. The war hits prices and inputs: four Gulf states supplied about 35% of sulphur imports (2025) and Qatar over half of helium (H1 2025).
Theme band High
39.7%
Crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (2025)
324
Days of the pre-war Hormuz crude flow covered by oil stocks
35%
Sulphur imports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait (2025, by volume)
534est.
Iranian crude, kb/d, Aug 2026 (1.4 mb/d in 2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
Crude imports fell to a decade low of 7.1 mb/d in June and were still 23.4% down in August. Estimate from press or commentary
Independent refiners lost discounted Iranian crude and paid up to US$18 over Brent for Iraqi grades. Estimate from press or commentary
Chemical inputs rely on the Gulf: 84% of Middle East polyethylene capacity ships through Hormuz. Estimate from press or commentary
Cars are exposed: 16.7% of car exports went to Gulf countries in 2025.
Saudi Arabia is one of China's two main ammonia suppliers, with Indonesia (87.7% together by volume, 2023, industry data). Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Chinese buyers resold 17-19 Mt of LNG in 2025 and made an estimated US$4.6bn profit from resales since 2021.
Fuel exports rose 29% in August to 6 Mt. Estimate from press or commentary
Russian seaborne crude reached 1.68 mb/d in August, replacing part of the Gulf loss. Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
How much stock China has drawn is not published; state stocks were reported nearly flat to June.
Iran's share of methanol imports is 57% in one estimate and about 60% in another. Estimate from press or commentary
Whether 7.9 Mt of Gulf LNG due in 2026 arrives next year is open.
What to watch
20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran.
Mid-Nov 2026Customs crude imports for October; 9.03 mb/d in September, 21.5% below a year earlier.
MonthlyIranian arrivals under the US blockade; 534 kb/d in August.
MonthlyFuel export volumes; 6 Mt in August.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
SulphurSupply chain
35%2025Share of sulphur imports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
HeliumSupply chain
54.6%H1 2025Share of helium imports from Qatar
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Crude oilDependence
39.7%2025Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (derived)
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
LNGDependence
29%est.2025Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAE
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Fertiliser (urea)Food and farming
Saudi Arabia one of two main suppliers, with Indonesia; no open Gulf shareest.2023low confidenceGulf role in China's nitrogen (liquid ammonia) imports
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
China's Gulf dependence by input (%; sulphur: four Gulf states, by volume; helium: H1 2025)
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: SMM (Shanghai Metals Market): [SMM Analysis] Decoding China's H1 2026 Sulphur and Sulphuric Acid Customs Data; SunSirs - China sees rise in Russian helium imports; IEA Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026); S&P Global Commodity Insights (China GAC customs data) - Chinese LNG traders eye Hormuz risk.
Strategic and commercial oil stocks (crude and products, EIA) as days of the pre-war Hormuz crude flow to China: 324 days (= 1492 / 4.6)
Gulf share of car exports: 16.7% (= 1.39 / 8.32)
Scenario: extra crude import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$12.3bn per quarter (= 8.93 × 92 × 15 / 1000 (low × 10, high × 20))
Scenario: that draw as a share of oil stocks (crude and products, EIA): 3.6% of oil stocks (= 54.3 / 1492)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 29 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →
HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for ChinaCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for China
China takes the second-largest share of Kitimat LNG cargo records, 29.5%, and PetroChina owns 15% of LNG Canada. Canada's stated policy approves state-owned investment in critical minerals only exceptionally (law-firm summary).
Theme band High
29.5%
Share of Kitimat LNG cargo records (Jun 2025-Jul 2026)
C$4.8bn
PetroChina's LNG Canada Phase 1 equity, C$bn (Strature estimate from a press figure)
C$4.95bn
PetroChina's pro rata share of the C$33bn Phase 2 cost: an upper bound, not equity (Strature calculation)
MediumChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for ChinaChipsChipmaking in Taiwan
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for China
Taiwan is China's largest chip supplier: more than a third of chip imports in 2025 and 36.2% in 2024, ahead of South Korea.est.
Theme band Medium
36.2%
of chip imports from Taiwan (2024)
over 60%est.
of goods exports were machinery and electrical products (2025, Ministry of Commerce)
5%
of TSMC revenue from China-based customers (Q3 2026)
Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for ChinaHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
China: what passes the strait
The largest buyer of oil that crosses Hormuz, including Iranian crude declared under other origins (as reported by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy); large stocks cushion it.
Country Outlook · C-003 · 19 questionsIs exposure to China three risks or one?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Is exposure to China three risks or one?
“One in practice: revenue, supply and compliance exposure answer to the same dated decisions; their shared hinge, as announced on 24 September, moved to 10 January 2027.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Country Outlook · C-006 · 1 questionCanada: Access by List
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Do the Section 338 duties and the 29 Sep bans widen into the auto tariffs threatened from 1 January 2027, or narrow in a deal before then?
“A 50% duty now reaches named Canadian goods whatever their treaty origin; in 2025, before it took effect, duty was imposed on only about one-eighth of US imports from Canada (CRS)”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Country Outlook · C-004 · 1 questionIs the main US risk for business now US policy itself?
Geotechnology
Is cyber pre-positioning in US infrastructure a closed incident?
“The source carried these as facts side by side, not as a proven causal chain: whether the staffing cuts weakened the wartime response is contested and was not adopted.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Could the largest strategic oil stocks behind the Strait be released?
“The two largest strategic holders behind the Strait were not part of it. EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected India +3
“EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Japan +8
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic
Who bears the economic cost of a Hormuz closure?
“On the Kiel Institute's model of a full closure, US welfare falls by 0.07 per cent while losses in South Asia and Africa are 10 to 20 times larger in percentage terms.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected United States +4
Where China is a partner, supplier or route · 26 questions
Country Outlook · C-006 · 1 questionCanada: Access by List
Geotechnology · Geopolitical
Does Canada keep its US controlled-technology access after the 19 Oct 2026 ITAR amendment while tightening its screening of Chinese technology investment?
“Screening of Chinese technology investment now bites - extended national-security reviews have risen sharply - and Washington has threatened 100% tariffs over any Canada-China deal”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
When could a new buyer's first shuttle cargo reach Asian ports?
“Adding the shortest timed voyage (Ulsan 21 days, Zhanjiang 18, Sikka 3), the first cargo reaches Korea after 58 days, China after 55 and India after 40 at the earliest.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected South Korea +1
Country Outlook · C-001 · 6 questionsIs exposure to Vietnam a demand exposure?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Is exposure to Vietnam a demand exposure?
“No. The more concentrated side is supply: China supplied 40.9 per cent of Vietnam's 2025 imports, against a 32.2 per cent US share of exports, for as long as assembly runs on imported components.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Are Vietnam's largest customer and largest supplier the same power?
“The United States took 32.2% of what Vietnam sold and supplied 4.2% of what it bought. China supplied 40.9% of what it bought and took 14.8% of what it sold.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Exposure Brief · X-001 · 6 questionsTSMC's geopolitical exposure sits on one island, not in its China sales
Geopolitical · Geotechnology
Where does TSMC's geopolitical exposure sit: in its China sales or on one island?
“Mainly a Taiwan continuity exposure, not a China-demand one: Taiwan-only nodes earned 33 per cent of second-quarter 2026 wafer revenue, China-based customers 6 per cent, until leading-edge volume starts elsewhere.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“Customers based in China accounted for 12% of net revenue in 2023, 11% in 2024 and 9% in 2025 (Form 20-F), then 7% in 1Q26 and 6% in 2Q26 (TSMC, 16 Jul 2026).”
What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“Customers based in China accounted for 12% of net revenue in 2023, 11% in 2024 and 9% in 2025 (Form 20-F), then 7% in 1Q26 and 6% in 2Q26 (TSMC, 16 Jul 2026).”
Country Outlook · C-004 · 5 questionsIs the main US risk for business now US policy itself?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
Is the main US risk for business now US policy itself?
“Yes. In 2026 US exposure was rule-set exposure, written in Washington; the next dated tests are the 3 November midterm and a China truce end announced for 10 January 2027.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
“On 24 September 2026 the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, said on Fox News that the truce would be extended to 10 January 2027, as CNBC reported the same day.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9
What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“The IEA records that China and India together received 44 per cent of the crude exported through the Strait in 2025 and that Japan and Korea are particularly reliant on it”
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Europe · Indo-Pacific · Middle East · North America · South Asia · Southeast Asia
ISO 3166-1 name: China (CHN). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.