Your exposure · Country · Asia-Pacific

China

The largest buyer of oil that crosses Hormuz, including Iranian crude declared under other origins (as reported by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy); large stocks cushion it. Approved reading

This page answers: What does China depend on, and which of our questions concern it?

Using this page
  1. Read the Dependency profile: the country card and where supply comes from.
  2. Tap In scenarios to see how each closed strait reaches China.
  3. Scroll to the questions. Filter them, then open any brief.
  • Briefs 60 questions in 13 briefs
  • Region Asia-Pacific · East Asia
  • Readings updated
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Your exposure

China in our readings

China is in 4 of our country readings; High in 3.

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Elevated
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Elevated
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Elevated
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Elevated
  • Regulation and compliance Elevated
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare China on the outlook map

Key questions (19)
The other side: 14 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach China

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Our reading · Strait of Hormuz

Show all 4 risks that reach China
  • US tariffs and Canada High
    • F-0169 · China's tariff relief on Canadian peas, canola meal and seafood lapses at the end of 2026 · 30%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 1 Jan 2027 · Open · brief C-006

    Our reading · US tariffs and Canada

  • Canada's capital projects High
    • F-0151 · A build with a government term · 16%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    • F-0152 · A build on private contracts only · 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    Our reading · Canada’s capital projects

  • Chipmaking in Taiwan Medium

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

    Our reading · Taiwan

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for China

Six of China's 23 risks share one score pair: Impact 5, Likelihood 4.

326332The US puts Graham Actsecondary tariffs on Chinesegoods over Russian oilAllies publicly blame Chinafor a new break-in to criticalinfrastructure1234567891012345678910LowLowElevatedElevatedHighHighSevereSevereImpactLikelihood

Area is the count.

Solid arc: share under way. Dashed arc: share low confidence.

Tint and lines are the card counts smoothed, each line double the last. They follow the cards; they are not a score.

Every card is in the list below, with its scores.

SourceStrature world-risk cards, approved, as of 17 Nov 2026. Scores are judgements, not probabilities. The two scores are never multiplied.
Exhibit R-5 · CHINA · strature.net

All world risks that touch China

If the Strait of Hormuz closes

Who runs short first

China nothing short on file

Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.

nothing short on file: stocks cover the cargo lost

Good by good (1)
  • Crude oil nothing short on file nothing short on file: stocks cover the cargo lost

Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.

Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

The Stock Clock in the Network map: every case, as clocks, lanes or a table

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much China makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Mid-Nov 2026 Customs crude imports for October; 9.03 mb/d in September, 21.5% below a year earlier. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Iranian arrivals under the US blockade; 534 kb/d in August. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Fuel export volumes; 6 Mt in August. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • 1 Jan 2027 F-0169 resolves: China's relief on canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs lapses or is renewed. US tariffs and Canada
  • Monthly, mid-month Canadian canola seed exports to China; 2.30 Mt in Jan-Jul 2026. US tariffs and Canada
  • Ongoing Any US tariff action tied to Canada's trade with China. US tariffs and Canada

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, reach China through the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could come another way?
  • How many days of stock do we hold in China against the day a supply shortfall begins there in the case shown?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in China, and which outcome would change them?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Dependency profileWhere supply comes from, the map, and how each case reaches China
Dependency profile

Country card · China, importer through the straits

Three themes; no combined score.

Chokepoints

Crude oil via Hormuz
47% of imports (1Q 2025 / 2025)
Refined fuels via Hormuz
40% of imports (2025)
LNG via Hormuz
33% of imports (1H 2025)
Sulphur via Hormuz
40% of imports (2025)
Strategic oil inventories incl. directed commercial (EIA est.) (measured)
1 492 million barrels (2Q 2026)
Crude imports, 2Q 2026 (EIA) (measured)
8.10 mb/d (2Q 2026)
Oil stocks (nominal days of crude imports)
120 days (late 2025)

Energy

Oil imported, share of use
67% (2024)
Gas imported, share of use
39% (2024)
All energy imported, share of use
23% (2024)
Renewables, share of electricity (Ember)
37% (2025)
Renewables, share of all energy (EIA)
7.5% (2024)

The Energy theme, centred on China ›

Value chains

Gallium supply, share of world
99% (2025) 65%+
Manganese refining, share of world
95% (2024) 65%+
Battery precursors, share of world
95% (2024) 65%+
Permanent magnets, share of world
94% (2025) 65%+

The Value chains theme, centred on China ›

The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.

More measures (4, each its own unit; never added)
  • Share of national use that passes the strait · crude oil: 31–34% of crude supply Strature calculation
  • Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 276 days Strature calculation
  • Share of the exposed supply actually lost in 2Q 2026 · crude oil: 65% Strature calculation
  • Share passing two straits on one voyage (range) · crude oil: 16–47% of crude imports crossing both Strature calculation

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where China’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

In scenarios: China

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

Questions about China

Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.

How much of China’s supply crosses Hormuz?

On file, 47% of its crude oil imports; 40% of its refined fuels imports; 33% of its LNG imports cross the strait.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

Who supplies China’s crude oil?

Russia is China’s largest crude supplier, about a fifth (2024, EIA); Saudi Arabia about 14% (2024, EIA); Iraq is among its five largest (EIA).

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How much of China’s energy is imported?

China imported 23% of the energy it used in 2024, and 67% of its oil.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

Does China hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?

Yes: gallium supply 99% of world (2025); manganese refining 95% of world (2024). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How many days of oil stocks does China hold?

China held 120 days (late 2025), counted as nominal days of crude imports (Baker Institute, from EIA's strategic-stock estimate); working cover lower.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

What this means

No approved block reading for China yet; this section shows approved readings only.

Questions our briefs address

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch China.

HighUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for ChinaUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada

Strature analysis, not from the brief

US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for China

China takes 4.83% of Canada's exports excluding gold; Canada supplied nearly all its canola seed in 2024. Its relief on meal, peas and shellfish expires end-2026 unless renewed.est.

Theme band High

4.83%

Share of Canada's goods exports, excl. gold (2025)

95.9%est.

Canada's share of China's canola seed imports (2024, customs data as reported)

C$42.7bn

Canada's exports to China, year to Aug 2026 (up 32.3%)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • China's relief on Canadian canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs is set only to the end of 2026. Under the 2025 duties, Canada's exports of these goods to China halved, from C$2.0bn to C$1.0bn (Statistics Canada).
  • The US President said in a 24 Jan 2026 social-media post that he would impose a 100% tariff on Canadian goods if Canada made a trade deal with China (as reported). No such tariff was found in force to 6 Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Russia, not Canada, leads China's canola oil imports: over half by value in Jan-Oct 2025 (China customs data via Agroexport). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Canada is a small outlet for China. A Canadian move to align outside tariffs with US policy (F-0176) would reach C$90.19bn of Canadian imports from China a year.

Opportunities

  • Canadian canola seed shipments to China reached 2.30 Mt in Jan-Jul 2026. China took 36.6% of Canada's seed exports.
  • Canada's exports to China rose 32.3% to C$42.71bn in the year to Aug 2026.
  • China held 6.6% of US auto parts imports in 2025 (US Census, all parts, a wider basket than the band table's HS 8708 line). A pro-rata diversion ceiling from Canadian parts supply is about US$1.4bn, an upper bound, not a forecast.

Uncertainties

  • Nothing is published on the relief after 2026.
  • US duties on Chinese goods limit diversion: one estimate put the trade-weighted rate at 29.7% in Feb 2026. The rate in force in Oct 2026 is not recorded here. Estimate from press or commentary
  • China's direct investment in Canada is C$24.6bn, of which C$13.76bn is debt, down from C$27.95bn in 2022. Holdings routed through other places are not counted.
  • The High wheat band rests on one volatile year: Canada shipped 3.2 Mt of wheat to China in 2025 (Statistics Canada), against China's total wheat imports of 3.9 Mt (customs data via Platts). Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • 1 Jan 2027F-0169 resolves: China's relief on canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs lapses or is renewed.
  • Monthly, mid-monthCanadian canola seed exports to China; 2.30 Mt in Jan-Jul 2026.
  • OngoingAny US tariff action tied to Canada's trade with China.
  • 30 Sep 2027F-0176 resolves: whether Canada aligns its outside tariffs with US policy.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Supply from Canada (canola)Dependence95.9% of imports of the goodest. 2024Canada's share of China's canola seed importsHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Supply from Canada (wheat)Dependence83.3% of the country's imports of the good 2025Canada's share of China's wheat imports, mirror basis (Canadian exports to China over China's customs imports)HighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Supply from Canada (canola meal)Food and farming0.95 Mt in 2025, down 52.96% on 2024 (customs data as reported); 2025 share of all meal imports not in open dataest. 2025China's imports of Canadian rapeseed (canola) meal, 2025MediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Diversification marketTrade4.83% of Canada's exports excl. gold 2025Share of Canada's goods exports going to the country, excluding goldHighHigh ≥3% · Medium 1–3% · Low 0.5–1% (growth or brief-named)
US market rival (plastics)Tradenot in open US tables (HS 39 by country needs the Census API) 2025China's share of US imports of plastics (HS 39)MediumHigh ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10% with ≥US$2bn
US market rival (parts)Trade6.6% of US imports 2025China's share of US imports of motor vehicle parts (end-use category)LowHigh ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10% with ≥US$2bn
Sales to CanadaTradeC$90.2bn Sep 2025-Aug 2026Canada's imports from the countryLowHigh ≥5% · Medium 2–5% · Low <2% but on a money line
Capital in CanadaCapital and financeC$24.6bn 2025Direct investment position in Canada (book value, immediate investor country)LowHigh ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Canada's exports to China of goods under the 2025 duties, 2025 (C$ million, Statistics Canada)
Canada's canola meal (HS 230641) exports to China: C$288.25m (2025)Canola meal288.2Canada's live lobsters (HS 030632) exports to China: C$286.15m (2025)Live lobsters286.1Canada's dried peas (HS 071310) exports to China: C$251.97m (2025)Dried peas252.0

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian International Merchandise Trade (CIMT), total exports by HS6 and country, annual 2024 and 2025 (open data, ODPFN019).

Briefs and questions

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Canada's share of China's wheat imports, mirror basis (Canadian exports to China over China's customs imports): 83.3% of the country's imports of the good (= 3.24 / 3.89)
  • China's share of Canadian canola seed exports: 36.6% of Canada's canola seed exports (= exports to China / exports to all markets)
  • Growth of Canada's goods exports to the country, 12 months to Aug 2026 on the prior 12 months: 32.3% (= exports Sep 2025-Aug 2026 / exports Sep 2024-Aug 2025 - 1)
  • Pro-rata share of Canada's US sales of motor vehicle parts (illustrative diversion ceiling): US$1.42bn (= 19141 × 12386 / (186306 - 19141))
  • Canada's exports to China of the relief goods, before the duties, in US$: US$1.46bn (= 1999.27 / 1.3698)
  • Fall in Canada's exports to China of the relief goods, 2025 on 2024, in US$: US$0.74bn (= 1999.27 / 1.3698 - 1001.2 / 1.3978)
  • Probability-weighted loss on the relief goods if the relief lapses: US$0.22bn (= 0.30 × 0.743)

Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 1 Nov 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →

HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for ChinaGulfGulf war / Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for China

China's oil stocks cover 324 days of pre-war Hormuz crude. The war hits prices and inputs: four Gulf states supplied about 35% of sulphur imports (2025) and Qatar over half of helium (H1 2025).

Theme band High

39.7%

Crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (2025)

324

Days of the pre-war Hormuz crude flow covered by oil stocks

35%

Sulphur imports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait (2025, by volume)

534est.

Iranian crude, kb/d, Aug 2026 (1.4 mb/d in 2025)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Crude imports fell to a decade low of 7.1 mb/d in June and were still 23.4% down in August. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Independent refiners lost discounted Iranian crude and paid up to US$18 over Brent for Iraqi grades. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Chemical inputs rely on the Gulf: 84% of Middle East polyethylene capacity ships through Hormuz. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Cars are exposed: 16.7% of car exports went to Gulf countries in 2025.
  • Saudi Arabia is one of China's two main ammonia suppliers, with Indonesia (87.7% together by volume, 2023, industry data). Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Chinese buyers resold 17-19 Mt of LNG in 2025 and made an estimated US$4.6bn profit from resales since 2021.
  • Fuel exports rose 29% in August to 6 Mt. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Russian seaborne crude reached 1.68 mb/d in August, replacing part of the Gulf loss. Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • How much stock China has drawn is not published; state stocks were reported nearly flat to June.
  • Iran's share of methanol imports is 57% in one estimate and about 60% in another. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Whether 7.9 Mt of Gulf LNG due in 2026 arrives next year is open.

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran.
  • Mid-Nov 2026Customs crude imports for October; 9.03 mb/d in September, 21.5% below a year earlier.
  • MonthlyIranian arrivals under the US blockade; 534 kb/d in August.
  • MonthlyFuel export volumes; 6 Mt in August.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
SulphurSupply chain35% 2025Share of sulphur imports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and KuwaitMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
HeliumSupply chain54.6% H1 2025Share of helium imports from QatarHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Crude oilDependence39.7% 2025Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (derived)MediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
LNGDependence29%est. 2025Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAEMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Fertiliser (urea)Food and farmingSaudi Arabia one of two main suppliers, with Indonesia; no open Gulf shareest. 2023 low confidenceGulf role in China's nitrogen (liquid ammonia) importsMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

China's Gulf dependence by input (%; sulphur: four Gulf states, by volume; helium: H1 2025)
Share of helium imports from Qatar: 54.6% (H1 2025)Helium54.6Share of crude imports from Hormuz Gulf producers (derived): 39.7% (2025)Crude39.7Share of sulphur imports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait: 35% (2025)Sulphur35.0Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAE: 29% (2025)LNG29.0

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: SMM (Shanghai Metals Market): [SMM Analysis] Decoding China's H1 2026 Sulphur and Sulphuric Acid Customs Data; SunSirs - China sees rise in Russian helium imports; IEA Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026); S&P Global Commodity Insights (China GAC customs data) - Chinese LNG traders eye Hormuz risk.

Briefs and questions

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Strategic and commercial oil stocks (crude and products, EIA) as days of the pre-war Hormuz crude flow to China: 324 days (= 1492 / 4.6)
  • Gulf share of car exports: 16.7% (= 1.39 / 8.32)
  • Scenario: extra crude import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$12.3bn per quarter (= 8.93 × 92 × 15 / 1000 (low × 10, high × 20))
  • Scenario: that draw as a share of oil stocks (crude and products, EIA): 3.6% of oil stocks (= 54.3 / 1492)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 29 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for ChinaCapitalCanada's capital projects

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for China

China takes the second-largest share of Kitimat LNG cargo records, 29.5%, and PetroChina owns 15% of LNG Canada. Canada's stated policy approves state-owned investment in critical minerals only exceptionally (law-firm summary).

Theme band High

29.5%

Share of Kitimat LNG cargo records (Jun 2025-Jul 2026)

C$4.8bn

PetroChina's LNG Canada Phase 1 equity, C$bn (Strature estimate from a press figure)

C$4.95bn

PetroChina's pro rata share of the C$33bn Phase 2 cost: an upper bound, not equity (Strature calculation)

2.71%

China's share of inward FDI stock, ultimate investor (2025); immediate investor 1.54%

Read the full panel
MediumChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for ChinaChipsChipmaking in Taiwan

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for China

Taiwan is China's largest chip supplier: more than a third of chip imports in 2025 and 36.2% in 2024, ahead of South Korea.est.

Theme band Medium

36.2%

of chip imports from Taiwan (2024)

over 60%est.

of goods exports were machinery and electrical products (2025, Ministry of Commerce)

5%

of TSMC revenue from China-based customers (Q3 2026)

Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for ChinaHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

China: what passes the strait

The largest buyer of oil that crosses Hormuz, including Iranian crude declared under other origins (as reported by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy); large stocks cushion it.

Share through the strait

  • Crude oil 46.6%
  • Refined fuels (petrol, diesel/gasoil, jet, fuel oil) 40%

Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

Filter the questions Domain · Series · Topic
Domain Series Topic

About China: the brief’s subject

Country Outlook · C-005 · 7 questionsChina: Borrowing for the Past

Geoeconomic
Do Chinese households stop paying down debt by mid-2027, or are they still repaying loans in the January-May 2027 credit figures?

“Beijing is putting money into bank capital and housing, not cheaper credit, so households get no new reason to borrow.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Geoeconomic
Does the yuan keep strengthening against the dollar through end-2026, or does Beijing hold it while the surplus is argued at the G20?

“The yuan rises only as fast as Beijing allows, and that pace is what partners most want to set.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Country Outlook · C-003 · 19 questionsIs exposure to China three risks or one?

Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Is exposure to China three risks or one?

“One in practice: revenue, supply and compliance exposure answer to the same dated decisions; their shared hinge, as announced on 24 September, moved to 10 January 2027.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Affected United States

Where China acts · 6 questions

Decision Brief · Q-030 · 1 questionWhat the President can still do before 3 January, and what Congress can limit
Geoeconomic
Can he raise or cut the main tariff programmes alone before 3 January?

“The firm puts a cut to the Canada duty or its lists before 3 January at 33%, our estimate, set by the firm, scored when it resolves.”

On the register: F-0325 33%, open. The forecast register

Primary United States Affected Canada

What it says about ChinaActor: takes the action

“Rates of 100% apply to patented medicines and large drones under Section 232 and to Chinese electric vehicles under Section 301”

From the brief
Decision Brief · Q-029 · 2 questionsWill the new Congress roll back the tariffs? Most stay through 2027
Geoeconomic
Which duty rises and decision points fall before July 2027?

“The calendar to July 2027 holds proclaimed duty rises beside the dates on which a cut could come.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary United States

What it says about ChinaActor: takes the action

“The Section 301 duty on older-generation Chinese chips rises from 0% on 23 June”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
How have imports from Mexico and China moved since 2025?

“US imports from Mexico rose 20.7% in January to September 2026 against the same months of 2025, while China's fell.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary United States Affected Mexico

What it says about ChinaActor: takes the action

“US imports from Mexico rose 20.7% in January to September 2026 against the same months of 2025, while China's fell.”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-006 · 1 questionCanada: Access by List
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Do the Section 338 duties and the 29 Sep bans widen into the auto tariffs threatened from 1 January 2027, or narrow in a deal before then?

“A 50% duty now reaches named Canadian goods whatever their treaty origin; in 2025, before it took effect, duty was imposed on only about one-eighth of US imports from Canada (CRS)”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Canada Affected United States

What it says about ChinaActor: takes the action

“China's tariff relief on Canadian peas, canola meal and seafood lapses at the end of 2026”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-004 · 1 questionIs the main US risk for business now US policy itself?
Geotechnology
Is cyber pre-positioning in US infrastructure a closed incident?

“The source carried these as facts side by side, not as a proven causal chain: whether the staffing cuts weakened the wartime response is contested and was not adopted.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary United States Affected Iran

What it says about ChinaActor: takes the action

“Chinese state-sponsored access in US communications, energy, transport and water systems”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Could the largest strategic oil stocks behind the Strait be released?

“The two largest strategic holders behind the Strait were not part of it. EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected India +3

What it says about ChinaActor: takes the action

“EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”

From the brief

Where China is exposed · 2 questions

Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?

“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Japan +8

What it says about ChinaExposed: bears the effect

“nothing a buyer could still buy was on file to arrive within six weeks in Japan, Korea, China or India”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic
Who bears the economic cost of a Hormuz closure?

“On the Kiel Institute's model of a full closure, US welfare falls by 0.07 per cent while losses in South Asia and Africa are 10 to 20 times larger in percentage terms.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United States +4

What it says about ChinaExposed: bears the effect

“The same short-run simulation puts India's welfare loss at 1.78 per cent, Korea's at 1.37, Japan's at 0.65 and China's at 0.64.”

From the brief

Where China is a partner, supplier or route · 26 questions

Country Outlook · C-006 · 1 questionCanada: Access by List
Geotechnology · Geopolitical
Does Canada keep its US controlled-technology access after the 19 Oct 2026 ITAR amendment while tightening its screening of Chinese technology investment?

“Screening of Chinese technology investment now bites - extended national-security reviews have risen sharply - and Washington has threatened 100% tariffs over any Canada-China deal”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Canada Affected United States

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Screening of Chinese technology investment now bites”

From the brief
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
When could a new buyer's first shuttle cargo reach Asian ports?

“Adding the shortest timed voyage (Ulsan 21 days, Zhanjiang 18, Sikka 3), the first cargo reaches Korea after 58 days, China after 55 and India after 40 at the earliest.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Saudi Arabia Affected South Korea +1

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“nothing a buyer could still buy was on file to arrive within six weeks in Japan, Korea, China or India”

From the brief
Scenario Brief · S-001 · 1 questionIran, the Strait of Hormuz, and a renewed strike
Geoeconomic
Who owns the traffic that still crossed the strait?

“Iran 26%, Greece 17%, China 9% of 111 counted transits; the rest unattributed”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Iran Affected Greece

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Iran 26%, Greece 17%, China 9% of 111 counted transits”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-001 · 4 questionsCan Canada become a material energy supplier beyond the United States?
Geoeconomic
Can Canada become a material energy supplier beyond the United States?

“It has started, but small: in 12 months to July 2026, 11.3 of 96.8 bcm of gas exports and 32.6 of 256.0 million m³ of crude went beyond the US.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected United States +6

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
Where did Canada's LNG export cargoes go?

“122 export cargo records, June 2025 to July 2026: Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, three others 5.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected South Korea +5

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-001 · 6 questionsIs exposure to Vietnam a demand exposure?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Is exposure to Vietnam a demand exposure?

“No. The more concentrated side is supply: China supplied 40.9 per cent of Vietnam's 2025 imports, against a 32.2 per cent US share of exports, for as long as assembly runs on imported components.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Vietnam Affected United States

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“China supplied 40.9 per cent of Vietnam's 2025 imports”

From the brief
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Are Vietnam's largest customer and largest supplier the same power?

“The United States took 32.2% of what Vietnam sold and supplied 4.2% of what it bought. China supplied 40.9% of what it bought and took 14.8% of what it sold.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Vietnam Affected United States

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“China supplied 40.9% of what it bought”

From the brief
Exposure Brief · X-001 · 6 questionsTSMC's geopolitical exposure sits on one island, not in its China sales
Geopolitical · Geotechnology
Where does TSMC's geopolitical exposure sit: in its China sales or on one island?

“Mainly a Taiwan continuity exposure, not a China-demand one: Taiwan-only nodes earned 33 per cent of second-quarter 2026 wafer revenue, China-based customers 6 per cent, until leading-edge volume starts elsewhere.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Taiwan

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Customers based in China accounted for 12% of net revenue in 2023, 11% in 2024 and 9% in 2025 (Form 20-F), then 7% in 1Q26 and 6% in 2Q26 (TSMC, 16 Jul 2026).”

From the brief
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Is TSMC's geopolitical exposure mainly its China sales?

“No. China-based customers were 6% of 2Q26 revenue, down from 12% in 2023.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Taiwan

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Customers based in China accounted for 12% of net revenue in 2023, 11% in 2024 and 9% in 2025 (Form 20-F), then 7% in 1Q26 and 6% in 2Q26 (TSMC, 16 Jul 2026).”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-002 · 1 questionIs any single future for Iran likely?
Geopolitical
Will any great power protect Iran?

“The source's central judgement on Iran's external position was that the leading powers now manage Iran rather than balance it.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United States +1

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“China was Iran's economic lifeline”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-004 · 5 questionsIs the main US risk for business now US policy itself?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
Is the main US risk for business now US policy itself?

“Yes. In 2026 US exposure was rule-set exposure, written in Washington; the next dated tests are the 3 November midterm and a China truce end announced for 10 January 2027.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary United States

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“a China truce end announced for 10 January 2027”

From the brief
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
When does the US-China truce now end?

“On 24 September 2026 the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, said on Fox News that the truce would be extended to 10 January 2027, as CNBC reported the same day.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary United States

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“the expiry of the US-China tariff truce on 10 November”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?

“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9

What it says about ChinaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“The IEA records that China and India together received 44 per cent of the crude exported through the Strait in 2025 and that Japan and Korea are particularly reliant on it”

From the brief

Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.

Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Europe · Indo-Pacific · Middle East · North America · South Asia · Southeast Asia

ISO 3166-1 name: China (CHN). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Published briefs

Briefs with China as their subject.

Forecast register

Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.

Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.

A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.

Registered forecasts attached to questions touching China: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
IDForecastOur estimateIssuedResolves byStatus
F-0325Canada duty cut by proclamationOur estimate 33%Issued 6 Nov 2026Resolves by 3 Jan 2027Status Open

The forecast register

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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.

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    Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.

    Sources and licences

    1. [1] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Strature calculation from EIA, 2025
    2. [2] Refined fuels: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy Intelligence, 2025
    3. [3] LNG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. US Energy Information Administration, 2025
    4. [4] Sulphur: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. SMM (Shanghai Metals Market), 2025
    5. [5] Methanol: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Jiemian via East Money, 2025
    6. [6] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Malacca. Strature calculation from EIA (Vortexa data), 2025

    Cite this page Strature, “China”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/chn/, 17 Nov 2026.

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