Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictHigh
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsElevated
Supply chains and chokepointsHigh
Energy and resourcesHigh
Technology and cyberNot yet set
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced, and no qualifying commitment carries a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0152 (Q-021)
A large exporter that can send part of its crude around the strait through the Gulf of Oman coast, but not its products or LNG. Own bypass capacity: 1.8 mb/d. Strature GPS, Strait of Hormuz Atlas, country card
General information, not advice.
Risks that reach the United Arab Emirates
Gulf war / HormuzMedium
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
No row on file in this case United Arab Emirates: Seller · 63% of its crude oil exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025); 96% of its LNG exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025) pass the strait. Not a finding that it is unaffected.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
When announced Any closing by a UAE state investor against the framework; none was found to 27 Sep 2026. Canada's capital projects
Apr 2027 Statistics Canada's next annual direct investment figures by country; the UAE held 0.58% of the inward stock in 2025. Canada's capital projects
31 Oct 2027 F-0151 and F-0152 resolve: a fund's build stake in Canada, with or without a government term. US tariffs and Canada
Monthly US aluminium imports by origin. US tariffs and Canada
30 Sep 2027 F-0173 resolves: US tariffs still above their 2024 level. US tariffs and Canada
Questions firms in this position often review
Which of our contracts depend on cargoes from the United Arab Emirates that pass the Strait of Hormuz, and which could load on another coast?
Which buyers of these cargoes reach a supply shortfall first in the case shown, and what do we sell to them?
Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in the United Arab Emirates, and which outcome would change them?
Government revenue from hydrocarbons that cross the strait (gross) · hydrocarbons: 28% of government revenueStrature calculation
exporter through HormuzFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where the UAE’s exports go, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: United Arab Emirates
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Scenario
Questions about the United Arab Emirates
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of the UAE’s exports cross the strait, and is there a way round?
63% of its crude oil exports cross Hormuz, 3.2 mb/d of oil in all. Pipelines round the strait can carry 1.8 mb/d.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of government revenue comes from hydrocarbons?
Hydrocarbons gave 53% of the UAE’s government revenue in 2024 (est.).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of the UAE’s energy is imported?
The UAE is a net energy exporter (2024).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
No approved block reading for the UAE yet; this section shows approved readings only.
Questions our briefs address
Questions our briefs address
The questions our published briefs address that touch the United Arab Emirates.
HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for United Arab EmiratesCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for United Arab Emirates
The UAE's US$50bn framework (C$69.9bn) is the largest pledge Q-021 tracks: pledged, not placed. Q-021 found no closing against it to 27 Sep 2026. Mubadala Capital bought CI Financial in Aug 2025, outside the framework.
Theme band High
C$69.9bn
Framework announced Nov 2025, C$bn: pledged, not placed
0
Closings by UAE state investors found to 27 Sep 2026
C$9.22bn
Existing UAE direct investment in Canada, C$bn, ultimate investor (2025)
C$4.6bn
Mubadala's CI Financial purchase price for the shares, C$bn (Aug 2025; enterprise value C$12.1bn)
Read the full panel
Risks
The Abu Dhabi announcement named sectors but no investor, project or timetable. A commentary piece in Sep 2026 reported no allocation or project list (commentary). Estimate from press or commentary
The amount reaches Q-021 only through government announcements: C$95bn of the C$180bn tracked was relayed by governments, not the pledgers' own figures.
Q-021 puts a standstill by 31 Oct 2027 at 27%. Our estimate, scored when it resolves. The 1 Oct 2026 listing order bears on this future (see What to watch).
The funds Q-021 tracks, UAE state investors among them, have put Canadian money mostly into operating assets: 12 of 14 counted deals since Sep 2020.
Opportunities
Mubadala Capital closed its C$4.6bn purchase of CI Financial's shares on 12 Aug 2025, an enterprise value of C$12.1bn. It is an asset manager, not a project.
Bloomberg reported in Sep 2026, citing unnamed sources, that ADNOC's XRG was in talks to take a stake in LNG Canada; no deal announcement was found in early Oct 2026 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
The governments aim to double two-way trade from C$3.4bn to C$7bn within a decade; an investment protection agreement was signed in Nov 2025.
Uncertainties
UAE direct investment in Canada rose C$0.25bn in 2025, the year CI Financial was bought. How Statistics Canada records the purchase is not known.
Whether a stake bought by XRG would count toward F-0151 or F-0152 is open. Q-021 counts a new commitment of C$1bn or more to an asset not yet in service. A stake in the joint venture after the expansion decision would include such an asset, and Q-021 does not define whether XRG (ADNOC) is among the UAE state investors it tracks. Estimate from press or commentary
Abu Dhabi put UAE investment in Canada at US$8.8bn for 2024, on a basis it did not state; Statistics Canada's figure, in Canadian dollars, is C$8.97bn.
What to watch
31 Oct 2027F-0151, F-0152 and F-0155 resolve. A tracked fund taking a C$1bn+ build stake is 43%. Our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Next consolidationSchedule 1 of the consolidated Act showing the 1 Oct 2026 order listing the West Coast Oil Pipeline (Pacific Link), published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, on 10 Oct 2026. The standstill (F-0155) includes no Schedule 1 listing; the order came after registration, and the forecast is scored as registered.
When announcedAny closing by a UAE state investor against the framework; none was found to 27 Sep 2026.
When announcedThe outcome of XRG's reported talks on LNG Canada, a plant of about 14 Mtpa.
Apr 2027Statistics Canada's next annual direct investment figures by country; the UAE held 0.58% of the inward stock in 2025.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Capital pledgedCapital and finance
C$69.9bn2025 FXUAE pledge in C$
High
High ≥C$10bn · Medium C$3–10bn · Low C$1–3bn
FDI stockCapital and finance
0.58%2025UAE share of Canada's inward FDI stock, ultimate investor basis
Below line
High ≥10% · Medium 3–10% · Low 2–3%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
UAE capital and Canada: promised and placed (C$bn)
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0433-01, Foreign direct investment in Canada by ultimate investor country (CSV download); CI Financial, CI Financial and Mubadala Capital announce completion of take-private transaction by Mubadala Capital (12 Aug 2025). * Our calculation from the cited figures.
Change in UAE ultimate-investor FDI stock in Canada, 2024 to 2025: C$0.25bn (= 2025 stock - 2024 stock)
F-0155 registered estimate: standstill (no airport terms, no Schedule 1 listing, no qualifying C$1bn+ build stake by a fund Q-021 tracks) by 31 Oct 2027: 27% (= registered estimate (forecast register row F-0155); months = resolution date - announcement date)
One qualifying C$1bn stake as a share of the UAE framework: 1.4% (= qualifying stake / framework in C$ × 100)
UAE framework as a multiple of the UAE's existing direct investment stock in Canada: 7.6 times (= framework in C$ / ultimate-investor FDI stock)
Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 16 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →
MediumUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for United Arab EmiratesUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada
Strature analysis, not from the brief
US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for United Arab Emirates
The UAE supplies 16% of US unwrought aluminium imports by weight and pledged up to US$50bn for Canada; Q-021 found no UAE state-investor closing to 27 Sep 2026.
Theme band Medium
16%
Share of US unwrought aluminium imports by weight (2025)
US$50bn
Investment framework with Canada, up to US$bn
0
UAE state-investor closings found by Q-021 (to 27 Sep 2026)
0.87
Pro-rata diversion ceiling, Mt a year, our calculation on USGS tonnage, an upper bound, not a forecast (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
The framework is up to US$50bn, but Q-021 found no closing by a UAE state investor to 27 Sep 2026.
The Oklahoma Attorney General was reported in Jun 2026 to have filed a lawsuit seeking to block the smelter's construction, citing pollution and natural-resource concerns (press report). We take no view on the claim. Estimate from press or commentary
The diversion ceiling of about 0.87 Mt a year is an upper bound; Q-022 finds no US customer switching away from Canadian supply.
Opportunities
EGA holds 60% of a planned 750,000-tonne-a-year smelter in Oklahoma, which would put UAE capital inside the US market, past the duties Canadian metal faces at the border.
If Canadian supply were replaced pro rata, the UAE could take about 0.87 Mt a year of Canada's US crude-aluminium sales: our illustration on USGS tonnage, an upper bound, not a forecast.
Abu Dhabi capital has also bought outside the framework: Mubadala's 2025 purchase of CI Financial, at about C$12.1bn of enterprise value (commentary source). Q-021 does not count it, as it is not infrastructure.
Uncertainties
UAE and Canadian aluminium pay the same 50% US metals duty; any edge from the dispute comes only from measures aimed at Canada alone.
UAE-controlled investment in Canada, C$9.2bn, exceeds the C$6.7bn booked to the UAE: UAE capital also enters through other countries.
What to watch
End 2026Construction start targeted for the EGA-Century smelter in Oklahoma.
31 Oct 2027F-0151 and F-0152 resolve: a fund's build stake in Canada, with or without a government term.
MonthlyUS aluminium imports by origin.
30 Sep 2027F-0173 resolves: US tariffs still above their 2024 level.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
US market rivalTrade
16% of US imports2025UAE share of US imports of aluminium crude metal and alloys (unwrought), by weight
Medium
High ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10% with ≥US$2bn
Capital in CanadaCapital and finance
US$50bn (up to)Nov 2025-Sep 2026UAE investment framework with Canada (pledge)
Low
High ≥C$100bn · Medium ≥C$25bn and <C$100bn · Low ≥C$10bn and <C$25bn, or a pledge with nothing found placed
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
UAE direct investment in Canada, booked vs controlled, 2025 (C$bn)
Immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. Ultimate investor: the country of the company that controls it.
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value); Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0433-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada by ultimate investor country, annual (book value).
Briefs and questions
Q-021F-0151, F-0152A fund's C$1bn-plus build stake, 16% / 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Q-022The 50% duty line by line; six redirect markets measured
C-006F-0173A lasting break: US tariffs still above their 2024 level, 92%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Pro-rata diversion ceiling by weight: the UAE's part of Canada's US crude-aluminium sales if Canadian supply were replaced pro rata: 0.87 Mt a year (= 1,940 × 478 / (3,010 - 1,940) kt = 867 kt)
Share of all foreign direct investment in Canada booked to the country (immediate basis): 0.42% of FDI in Canada (= immediate-investor position / all FDI in Canada × 100)
A single C$1bn build stake as a share of the UAE framework: 1.43% of the framework (= C$1bn / UAE framework in C$ × 100)
Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 29 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: US tariffs and Canada →
MediumGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for United Arab EmiratesGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for United Arab Emirates
The UAE gains on price and loses on volume: the Fujairah line carries crude around the Strait, but products and LNG cannot, so 58.5% of oil exports still depend on the Strait.
Theme band Medium
US$53bnest.
oil export revenue, Mar-Aug 2026 (press estimate)
58.5%
of oil exports still depend on the Strait (Strature calculation)
Does the Strait of Hormuz stay open to normal commercial traffic?
“Crude through Hormuz reached a seven-day average of 13.5 mb/d to 28 Sep 2026, matching the pre-war baseline, under US military escorts and ship-to-ship transfers (Kpler, via CNBC, 30 Sep 2026).”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +4
Does Gulf infrastructure stay inside the war's range?
“Airports, fuel tanks and at least one desalination plant were struck, the source recorded; the Saudi East-West pipeline was shut in September 2026 after a drone strike launched from Iraq (CNBC, 30 Sep 2026).”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +4
Theme Brief · T-003 · 3 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9
What it says about the United Arab EmiratesExposed: bears the effect
“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”
What it says about the United Arab EmiratesExposed: bears the effect
“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”
Which Gulf exporters have a way to ship oil around the Strait of Hormuz?
“Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have operating pipelines around the Strait, on EIA's record: the 5-million-barrel-a-day East-West line to the Red Sea and a 1.5-million line to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +5
What it says about the United Arab EmiratesExposed: bears the effect
“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”
Where the United Arab Emirates is a partner, supplier or route · 8 questions
Decision Brief · Q-021 · 3 questionsCan Canada turn promised capital into built projects?
Geoeconomic
Can Canada turn promised capital into built projects?
“Not quickly. A fund we track taking a C$1bn-plus build stake by 31 October 2027: 43% (16% with a government term, 27% without), our estimate, scored when it resolves.”
What it says about the United Arab EmiratesCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“The United Arab Emirates framework, worth up to US$50bn, has had about 10 months, and we found no closing by a UAE state investor to 27 September 2026.”
What it says about the United Arab EmiratesCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“The United Arab Emirates framework, worth up to US$50bn, has had about 10 months, and we found no closing by a UAE state investor to 27 September 2026.”
Do foreign managers and sovereign investors invest in Canadian infrastructure?
“Foreign fund managers already own and buy Canadian infrastructure, but we found no closing by a foreign sovereign investor from the pledges to 27 September 2026.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
What it says about the United Arab EmiratesCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“The United Arab Emirates framework, worth up to US$50bn, has had about 10 months, and we found no closing by a UAE state investor to 27 September 2026.”
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 3 questionsIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Japan +8
Which routes can Saudi crude take out with Hormuz closed?
“Each capacity is quoted on its own basis, and we never add them. The pipeline's nameplate is about 7 mb/d (Saudi Ministry of Energy), a ceiling, not a flow.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Oman +2
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Middle East · North America · South Asia
ISO 3166-1 name: United Arab Emirates (ARE). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
Published briefs
Briefs with the United Arab Emirates as their subject.
No published brief has the United Arab Emirates as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.
Forecast register
Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.
Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.
A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.
Registered forecasts attached to questions touching the United Arab Emirates: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
The summary sheet and the executive read are free.
The full brief is supplied to organisations through the request form on the brief’s page: they accept its terms and confirm a work email, and it is free during the introductory period.
For organisations. About two minutes to request; the download link comes by email.
General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.
Sources and licences
[1] Crude oil: share of exports through the Strait of Hormuz. IEA (Kpler data), 2025
Cite this page Strature, “United Arab Emirates”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/are/, 17 Nov 2026.
Notes and limits
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
General research, not advice.
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