Your exposure · Country · Middle East and North Africa
Qatar
About a fifth of the world's LNG is made at one site, and nearly all of it must cross the strait; it also supplies a third of world helium. Approved reading
This page answers: What does Qatar depend on, and which of our questions concern it?
Using this page
Read the Dependency profile: the country card and where supply comes from.
Tap In scenarios to see how each closed strait reaches Qatar.
Scroll to the questions. Filter them, then open any brief.
Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictHigh
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsNot yet set
Supply chains and chokepointsSevere
Energy and resourcesSevere
Technology and cyberLow
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Seller · 93% of its LNG exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025) pass the straitGood by good (3)
Refined fuelssupply shortfall begins: day 10first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Sulphursupply shortfall begins: day 10first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Wheatsupply shortfall begins: day 10first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.
First to run short in this case: India, day 4.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
Government revenue from hydrocarbons that cross the strait (gross) · hydrocarbons: 50–72% of government revenueStrature calculation
exporter through HormuzFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where Qatar’s exports go, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: Qatar
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Scenario
Questions about Qatar
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of Qatar’s exports cross the strait, and is there a way round?
93% of its LNG exports cross Hormuz, 1.4 mb/d of oil in all. It has no pipeline round the strait (cited).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of government revenue comes from hydrocarbons?
Hydrocarbons gave 53% of Qatar’s government revenue in 2024.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of Qatar’s energy is imported?
Qatar is a net energy exporter (2024).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
No approved block reading for Qatar yet; this section shows approved readings only.
Questions our briefs address
Questions our briefs address
The questions our published briefs address that touch Qatar.
HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for QatarGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Qatar
Qatar's LNG cannot bypass the Strait: oil and gas revenue fell 97.4% in Q2 2026, and two damaged Ras Laffan trains (12.8 Mt a year) are expected to stay offline three to five years.
Theme band High
-97.4%
oil and gas revenue, Q2 2026, year on year
12.8
LNG capacity damaged at Ras Laffan, about 17% of the total; repair expected to take 3-5 years
78.2%
oil and gas share of government revenue, 2025 budget (Ministry of Finance)
~US$494bnest.
sovereign net foreign assets (Fitch), 2025
Read the full panel
Risks
Force majeure now runs through Nov 2026 for Asian buyers and into early December for Europe. Estimate from press or commentary
Reopening the water does not restore lost capacity: QatarEnergy's chief executive put repair of the two trains at three years (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
The Q2 2026 budget deficit was QAR21.2bn, the widest in about a decade. Estimate from press or commentary
Urea and helium stop with the gas: QAFCO (5.6 Mt a year) was reported shut on 4 Mar 2026, and Qatar makes about a third of world helium. Estimate from press or commentary
The IMF's October 2026 outlook projects GDP to shrink 15.6% in 2026.
Opportunities
Qatar borrowed US$3.0bn in Sep 2026 at 55-65 basis points over US Treasuries, with orders of US$7.7bn. Estimate from press or commentary
Rebuilding Ras Laffan is a large contract channel: regional energy repairs cost at least US$25bn, and turbine backlogs run 2-4 years.
The Dolphin pipeline to the UAE and Oman kept running, earning US$125-200m a month.
Uncertainties
Repair time: 3-5 years in March estimates, three years in the September statement, up to 5 years on Rystad's view. Estimate from press or commentary
Whether September's first LNG transits (10 QatarEnergy carriers, Kpler) become regular exports. Estimate from press or commentary
QAFCO's restart status is not confirmed. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
Early Nov 2026QatarEnergy notices to Asian buyers: force majeure extended or lifted.
20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves.
WeeklyQatari LNG carrier transits of the Strait (Kpler).
Q1 2027The damaged gas-to-liquids line is due back.
QuarterlyMinistry of Finance budget statement.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Gulf producerRevenue
78.2%2025 budgetOil and gas share of government revenue, 2025 budget
High
High hydrocarbons ≥50% of revenue and ≥50% of exports transit the Strait · Medium one of the two · Low neither
Gulf producerDependence
93%2025Share of LNG exports transiting Hormuz
High
High hydrocarbons ≥50% of revenue and ≥50% of exports transit the Strait · Medium one of the two · Low neither
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Share of Qatar's LNG exports that transit the Strait, 2025
Gulf
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: IEA Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026).
Fall in oil and gas revenue, Q2 2026 y/y: -97.4% (= (0.874 - 34) / 34)
Oil and gas share of government revenue, 2025 budget: 78.2% (= 154 / 197)
Strature registered probability of a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 (F-0074): 61% (= Registered forecast F-0074)
Scenario: gross export revenue lost if LNG and oil exports stay near zero for 3 more months: US$18bn (= US$6bn × 3)
Scenario: annual export revenue lost to destroyed trains alone after the Strait reopens: US$12.2bn per year (= US$6bn × 12 × 17%)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →
MediumAI power: what is at stake for QatarAI powerAI power
Strature analysis, not from the brief
AI power: what is at stake for Qatar
A unit of Qatar's sovereign fund formed a US$20bn AI joint venture in Dec 2025, 9.28% of GDP if all spent at home. Advanced AI chips to Qatar (US Country Group D:4) need a licence.
Theme band Medium
US$20bn
US$bn AI venture for Qatar and other markets (Dec 2025)
9.28%
of GDP if all spent in Qatar (Strature calculation)
95.9%
of electricity from gas (2025)
56.18
TWh electricity demand (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
Advanced AI chips to Qatar need a US licence: Qatar is in Country Group D:4 (eCFR as of 28 Oct 2026).
Qatar's share of the US$20bn is not stated: the venture also covers select international markets.
Gas made 95.94% of Qatar's electricity in 2025, so data-centre load would run on gas-fired power.
The base is small: Qatar hosted five data centres in Dec 2025, by a bank's count (reported). Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Reuters described cheap power as Qatar's main draw for AI data centres (Dec 2025, reported). Estimate from press or commentary
A property consultant estimates 1.5 to 2 GW of data-centre capacity by 2030 if Qatar keeps cheap power and speeds development (reported). Estimate from press or commentary
The venture is backed by a sovereign fund with assets of US$526bn (reported). Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
A bank analyst said reaching 500 MW by 2029 would be notable (reported); a consultant's estimate for 2030 runs to 1.5 to 2 GW. Estimate from press or commentary
The 9.28% share assumes all of the US$20bn is spent in Qatar, against 2025 GDP of US$215.6bn.
What to watch
When announcedQatar's part of the US$20bn venture and its first capacity in megawatts.
2029Whether capacity nears the 500 MW benchmark a bank analyst set (reported).
YearlyEmber electricity data: Qatar's gas share and demand.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Ai investmentCapital and finance
9.28% of GDP2025-12Announced AI and data-centre investment as % of GDP
Medium
High ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP
Chip accessSecurity and policy
D:4: licence required for advanced AI chips (ECCN 3A090.b/4A090.b and related items)2026-10US export-licence status for advanced AI chips
Medium
High D:5 or Macau (presumption of denial; case-by-case for some China and Macau sales since 15 Jan 2026), stake by GDP ≥US$100bn or announced AI investment ≥US$1bn · Medium D:1, D:4 or named, with announced AI investment ≥US$1bn from an identified source
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
AI venture against GDP, if all spent in Qatar (Strature calculation)
Drawn to scale from zero. * Our calculation from the cited figures.
Announced AI and data-centre investment as % of GDP: 9.28% of GDP (= announced investment (US$) / GDP 2025 (current US$) × 100)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.
MediumChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for QatarChipsChipmaking in Taiwan
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for Qatar
Qatar's stake is helium: it produced about a third of the world's helium in 2025, and Taiwan's fabs took from 30% to 88% of their helium from Qatar, by conflicting press accounts.est.
Theme band Medium
63
million m3 of helium produced (2025)
33.2%
of world helium output (our calculation, 2025)
30–88%est.
of Taiwan's helium from Qatar, by conflicting sources
10.1
billion m3 of identified helium resources
Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for QatarHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Qatar: what passes the strait
About a fifth of the world's LNG comes from its Gulf coast and nearly all of it must cross the strait; it also supplies a third of world helium.
Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.
Does the Strait of Hormuz stay open to normal commercial traffic?
“Crude through Hormuz reached a seven-day average of 13.5 mb/d to 28 Sep 2026, matching the pre-war baseline, under US military escorts and ship-to-ship transfers (Kpler, via CNBC, 30 Sep 2026).”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +4
Does Gulf infrastructure stay inside the war's range?
“Airports, fuel tanks and at least one desalination plant were struck, the source recorded; the Saudi East-West pipeline was shut in September 2026 after a drone strike launched from Iraq (CNBC, 30 Sep 2026).”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +4
Theme Brief · T-003 · 5 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9
Which Gulf exporters have a way to ship oil around the Strait of Hormuz?
“Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have operating pipelines around the Strait, on EIA's record: the 5-million-barrel-a-day East-West line to the Red Sea and a 1.5-million line to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +5
How much warning came before the cost of a Hormuz transit changed?
“The longest formal notice found in the record read here is the UK P&I Club's 72 hours, and it ran from midnight GMT on 28 February 2026, the day the US and Israeli attacks on Iran began.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Bahrain +3
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Africa · Asia · Middle East
ISO 3166-1 name: Qatar (QAT). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
Published briefs
Briefs with Qatar as their subject.
No published brief has Qatar as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.
Forecast register
Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.
Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.
A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.
No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.
Registered forecasts attached to questions touching Qatar: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
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The full brief is supplied to organisations through the request form on the brief’s page: they accept its terms and confirm a work email, and it is free during the introductory period.
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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.
Sources and licences
[1] LNG: share of exports through the Strait of Hormuz. IEA (Kpler data), 2025
Cite this page Strature, “Qatar”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/qat/, 17 Nov 2026.
Notes and limits
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
General research, not advice.
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