Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictHigh
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsNot yet set
Supply chains and chokepointsHigh
Energy and resourcesHigh
Technology and cyberNot yet set
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
No row on file in this case Saudi Arabia: Seller · 82% of its crude oil exports (US Energy Information Administration, Q2 2024) pass the strait. Not a finding that it is unaffected.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
Government revenue from hydrocarbons that cross the strait (gross) · hydrocarbons: 43% of government revenueStrature calculation
Added loadings at the Red Sea coast · crude oil: 2.07 mb/d (before 28 Feb 2026 to Mar 2026)observed
exporter through HormuzFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where Saudi Arabia’s exports go, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: Saudi Arabia
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Scenario
Questions about Saudi Arabia
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of Saudi Arabia’s exports cross the strait, and is there a way round?
82% of its crude oil exports cross Hormuz, 6.2 mb/d of oil in all. Its pipeline to the Red Sea coast carries part of the rest: capacity 3.0–5.0 mb/d.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of government revenue comes from hydrocarbons?
Hydrocarbons gave 55% of Saudi Arabia’s government revenue in 2Q 2026.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of Saudi Arabia’s energy is imported?
Saudi Arabia is a net energy exporter (2024).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
No approved block reading for Saudi Arabia yet; this section shows approved readings only.
Questions our briefs address
Questions our briefs address
The questions our published briefs address that touch Saudi Arabia.
HighFood and fertiliser: what is at stake for Saudi ArabiaFoodFood and fertiliser
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Food and fertiliser: what is at stake for Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia imports 88.7% of the grain it eats. Russia supplied 38% of wheat imports in 2024/25 and the EU 48% (USDA, Trade Data Monitor data).
Theme band High
88.7%
of grain use met by imports (2024/25)
38%
of wheat imports from Russia (2024/25, USDA, Trade Data Monitor data)
100%
of rice use met by imports (2024/25)
4.99%
of world phosphate fertiliser output (2024)
Read the full panel
Risks
Wheat comes mainly from two origins: the EU 48% and Russia 38% in 2024/25; Russia's share was 42% in 2025/26 to date (USDA, Trade Data Monitor data). A Russian export curb could cut a large part of supply.
Rice is all imported in USDA's balance. India shipped 1,173 kt of basmati to Saudi Arabia in 2024-25 (reported), so an Indian export curb could hit supply. Estimate from press or commentary
Barley for feed is almost all imported: 4,000 kt of imports against 4,025 kt of use in 2024/25.
In the 2022 shock the wheat benchmark averaged US$430.0/t, 36% above 2021, and the Thai rice benchmark rose from US$436.8/t in 2022 to US$553.7/t in 2023 (World Bank).
Imported wheat lands at four Red Sea ports and one Gulf port (USDA); a disruption on either sea could slow arrivals.
Opportunities
Strategic wheat reserves have been estimated at more than six months of demand, above a four-month target, with 3.5 million t of silo space (USDA).
The state bought 3.258 million t of wheat in six tenders in 2025/26 and lets sellers choose among approved origins (USDA).
Saudi Arabia made 2,345,914 t of phosphate (P2O5) in 2024 against 200,959 t used at home, 4.987% of world output (FAOSTAT; our calculation).
It also made 3,539,966 t of nitrogen against 258,330 t used (2024).
Uncertainties
USDA's origin table rests on Trade Data Monitor and industry data; 2025/26 covers only part of the season.
Origins are known only at shipment, because tenders let the seller choose among approved suppliers (USDA).
The basmati figure is press-reported, covers India's fiscal year and leaves out other rice. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
6 Nov 2026FAO Food Price Index for October: the cereals and vegetable oils sub-indices.
10 Nov 2026USDA WASDE and PSD update: new-season estimates.
4 Dec 2026FAO Food Price Index for November.
10 Dec 2026USDA WASDE and PSD update.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Cereal import dependenceDependence
88.7%2024/25Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley)
High
High ≥70% · Medium 40–70% · Low 25–40%
Staple import billRevenue
0.36% of GDP2024/25 volumes, 2024 pricesStaple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDP
Below line
High ≥4% of GDP · Medium 2–4% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP
Fertiliser (producer)Procurement
4.99%2024Share of world P2O5 fertiliser production (unrounded, three decimals)
Low
High ≥10% · Medium 5–10% · Low 3–5%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Share of use met by imports, 2024/25 (%)
Drawn to scale from zero. * Our calculation from the cited figures.
Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley): 88.7% (= 100 × sum of imports / sum of domestic consumption, four grains, capped at 100)
Milled rice imports as a share of domestic consumption: 100% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)
Share of world P2O5 fertiliser production (unrounded, three decimals): 4.99% (= 100 × 2,345,914 / 47,039,458)
Staple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDP: 0.36% of GDP (= sum(PSD imports × Pink Sheet 2024 annual price) / GDP 2024)
Wheat imports as a share of domestic consumption: 64.7% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.
HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Saudi ArabiaGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the largest user of the Strait, 6.23 mb/d in 2025, but owns the largest bypass. Prices offset lost volume: Q2 2026 oil revenue was SAR185.1bn, 54.6% of revenue.
Theme band High
6.23
oil shipped through the Strait, 2025 (mb/d)
SAR185.1bn
oil revenue, Q2 2026 (54.6% of total)
14.9–39.2%
of oil exports cannot bypass the Strait even with the pipeline (Strature calculation)
-3.6%
real GDP 2026, preliminary (oil activities about -21.8%)
Read the full panel
Risks
We rate the band High, one step above the published line, because of the September 2026 strikes on the East-West pipeline. One producer test is met: oil was 54.6% of Q2 2026 revenue. The other is not: once the bypass is used, 14.9-39.2% of oil exports still pass through the Strait, below 50%.
The bypass is now the exposure: drones were reported to have hit East-West pumping stations, and Yanbu loadings stopped from about 10 Sep to about 22 Sep 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Attacks have also reached civilian sites. On 10 Oct 2026 an attack on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport, claimed by the Houthis, killed 12 people and injured more than 300 (as reported). Red Sea cargoes bound for Asia still pass Bab el-Mandeb, so a second front would hit both export routes at once. Estimate from press or commentary
Output has not recovered. Crude output fell from about 10.5 mb/d in February to about 6.5 mb/d in Apr 2026 (EIA estimates). In September it was 8.001 mb/d on OPEC secondary sources, and the EIA estimates 7.48 mb/d for Q3. The OPEC+ required level is 10.5 mb/d; on our reading, the gap is output shut in by the war, not spare capacity. Estimate from press or commentary
Growth and the budget: the IMF's October forecast, as reported, is for real GDP to fall 3.3% in 2026, against 1.7% growth in its July forecast. The finance ministry's preliminary estimate is a 3.6% fall, with oil activities down about 21.8%. The ministry's revised 2026 deficit, as summarised by the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, is SAR245bn, 4.9% of GDP, against SAR165bn budgeted. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Aramco's Q2 2026 net income rose 41.9% to SAR121.51bn as prices outweighed lower volumes.
Bypass owners gained share: about 40% of Gulf crude went by pipeline (the Saudi and UAE lines) in Sep 2026, against 17% before the war. Estimate from press or commentary
Red Sea ports carry trade that used to leave through the Gulf: Ma'aden rerouted phosphate exports to Yanbu and to Duqm in Oman.
Uncertainties
Whether the East-West line holds its stated rate. The Energy Minister said it was pumping 5.8 mb/d on 6 Oct 2026; Al Jazeera reported the line's maximum as 7 mb/d. The rate is an official statement, not a measured flow, and Yanbu loading limits may keep exports below the pipeline's rate. Estimate from press or commentary
The current breakeven: IMF tables give US$90.94 for 2025 (2024 vintage); commentary puts 2026 near US$80; the newest IMF tables could not be checked. Estimate from press or commentary
Usable spare bypass capacity depends on Yanbu loading limits and Red Sea refinery needs, so the share that cannot bypass the Strait is a range, 14.9-39.2%.
What to watch
Weekly to 23 Nov 2026Yanbu loadings and East-West throughput. Q-028 watches for the line back near its pre-strike rate of roughly 4 mb/d by 23 Nov, a date from one trade page. The minister's stated 5.8 mb/d on 6 Oct is above that level.
1 Nov 2026OPEC+ meets again. Saudi Arabia's required level for November is 10.5 mb/d, against 8.001 mb/d produced in September.
20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed strike raises the risk to the pipeline as well as to the Strait.
Late Oct 2026Q3 budget performance report: oil revenue and the deficit.
Dec 2026FY2027 budget: this year's outturn, against SAR1,202bn of revenue planned for next year.
MonthlyHouthi activity at Bab el-Mandeb, and claimed attacks on Saudi airports.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
High hydrocarbons ≥50% of revenue and ≥50% of exports transit the Strait · Medium one of the two · Low neither
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Oil through the Strait and bypass capacity (mb/d)
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: IEA Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026); Reuters via US News, Saudi Arabia restarts East-West oil pipeline (22 Sep 2026).
Share of Saudi oil exports that must transit the Strait once the East-West bypass is used: 14.9–39.2% (= (Hormuz oil flows 6.23 mb/d - spare East-West capacity 3 to 5 mb/d) / (6.23 + 2 mb/d already piped pre-war))
Gap between the November 2026 OPEC+ target and September 2026 output (secondary sources): 2.5 mb/d (= Nov 2026 required production - Sep 2026 output (OPEC secondary sources))
Strature registered probability of a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 (F-0074): 61% (= Registered forecast F-0074)
Scenario: gross export value at risk if a renewed strike takes about 4 mb/d off the East-West line for six weeks, at US$105: US$17.6bn (= 4 mb/d × 42 days × US$105 = US$17.64bn)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 25 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →
LowCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for Saudi ArabiaCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia and Canada signed 13 two-way agreements and MOUs worth over C$1bn in July 2026; no Saudi investment amount is stated. Investment-treaty (FIPA) negotiations were announced as due to conclude by early 2027.
Theme band Low
over C$1bnest.
Agreements and MOUs, both directions (C$bn, estimate)
C$600m
Agreements on the January 2026 trade mission, both directions, no Saudi amount stated (C$ million)
0.2%
Share of inward FDI stock, immediate investor (2025)
Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for Saudi ArabiaHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Saudi Arabia: what passes the strait
The largest exporter through the strait, and the only one with a large pipeline to the Red Sea.
Share through the strait
Crude oil82%
Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 11 questionsIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Affected Japan +9
Decision Brief · Q-028 · 1 questionUS gasoline below $3.50 by June 2027: possible, but not on the official path
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Does supply around the strait add crude before the winter low?
“OPEC's spare capacity averages 0.025 million barrels a day from October to March in the official outlook. For a fuel buyer, this means barrels that avoid the strait are not on course to deliver a winter dip on their own.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Theme Brief · T-003 · 3 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected United Arab Emirates +9
What it says about Saudi ArabiaExposed: bears the effect
“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”
What it says about Saudi ArabiaExposed: bears the effect
“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Middle East · North America · South Asia
ISO 3166-1 name: Saudi Arabia (SAU). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.