Your exposure · Country · Middle East and North Africa

Saudi Arabia

The largest exporter through the strait, and the only one with a large pipeline to the Red Sea. Approved reading

This page answers: What does Saudi Arabia depend on, and which of our questions concern it?

Using this page
  1. Read the Dependency profile: the country card and where supply comes from.
  2. Tap In scenarios to see how each closed strait reaches Saudi Arabia.
  3. Scroll to the questions. Filter them, then open any brief.
  • Briefs 19 questions in 4 briefs
  • Region Middle East and North Africa · the Gulf
  • Readings updated
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Your exposure

Saudi Arabia in our readings

Saudi Arabia is in 3 of our country readings; High in 2.

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict High
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints High
  • Energy and resources High
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Saudi Arabia on the outlook map

The other side: 8 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Saudi Arabia

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Our reading · Strait of Hormuz

Show all 3 risks that reach Saudi Arabia

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for Saudi Arabia

See Saudi Arabia's 12 risks on a chart

Three of Saudi Arabia's 12 risks share one score pair: Impact 3, Likelihood 4.

3Urea prices spike againThe war budget forces Riyadhto shelve or shrink agiga-project1234567891012345678910LowLowElevatedElevatedHighHighSevereSevereImpactLikelihood

Area is the count.

Solid arc: share under way. Dashed arc: share low confidence.

Tint and lines are the card counts smoothed, each line double the last. They follow the cards; they are not a score.

Every card is in the list below, with its scores.

SourceStrature world-risk cards, approved, as of 17 Nov 2026. Scores are judgements, not probabilities. The two scores are never multiplied.
Exhibit R-5 · SAUDI ARABIA · strature.net
Show all 12 world risks for Saudi Arabia

All world risks that touch Saudi Arabia

If the Strait of Hormuz closes

Who runs short first

Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.

No row on file in this case Saudi Arabia: Seller · 82% of its crude oil exports (US Energy Information Administration, Q2 2024) pass the strait. Not a finding that it is unaffected.

Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

The Stock Clock in the Network map: every case, as clocks, lanes or a table

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Saudi Arabia makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Dec 2026 FY2027 budget: this year's outturn, against SAR1,202bn of revenue planned for next year. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • 4 Dec 2026 FAO Food Price Index for November. Food and fertiliser
  • 10 Dec 2026 USDA WASDE and PSD update. Food and fertiliser
  • Early 2027 FIPA negotiations due to conclude. Canada's capital projects
  • 31 Oct 2027 F-0155 resolves. Canada's capital projects
  • Annual (spring) Statistics Canada FDI by country; Saudi Arabia held 0.2% of the stock in 2025. Canada's capital projects

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of our contracts depend on cargoes from Saudi Arabia that pass the Strait of Hormuz, and which could load on another coast?
  • Which buyers of these cargoes reach a supply shortfall first in the case shown, and what do we sell to them?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Saudi Arabia, and which outcome would change them?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Dependency profileWhere exports go, the map, and how each case reaches Saudi Arabia
Dependency profile

Country card · Saudi Arabia, exporter through Hormuz

Two themes; no combined score.

Chokepoints

Crude oil via Hormuz
82% of exports (Q2 2024)
Exports through Hormuz (crude and products)
6.2 mb/d (2025)
Pipeline to the Red Sea coast, capacity
3.0–5.0 mb/d (early 2026)
Hydrocarbons, share of government revenue
55% (2Q 2026)
Red Sea coast crude loadings, March 2026 (measured)
4.07 mb/d (Mar 2026)
Liquids production, 2Q 2026 (EIA) (measured)
7.84 mb/d (2Q 2026)

Energy

Oil imported, share of use
net exporter (2024)
Gas imported, share of use
0% (2024)
All energy imported, share of use
net exporter (2024)
Renewables, share of electricity (Ember)
2.2% (2024)
Renewables, share of all energy (EIA)
0.1% (2024)

The Energy theme, centred on Saudi Arabia ›

Dashed underline = low confidence.

More measures (2, each its own unit; never added)
  • Government revenue from hydrocarbons that cross the strait (gross) · hydrocarbons: 43% of government revenue Strature calculation
  • Added loadings at the Red Sea coast · crude oil: 2.07 mb/d (before 28 Feb 2026 to Mar 2026) observed

exporter through HormuzFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where Saudi Arabia’s exports go, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

In scenarios: Saudi Arabia

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

Questions about Saudi Arabia

Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.

How much of Saudi Arabia’s exports cross the strait, and is there a way round?

82% of its crude oil exports cross Hormuz, 6.2 mb/d of oil in all. Its pipeline to the Red Sea coast carries part of the rest: capacity 3.0–5.0 mb/d.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How much of government revenue comes from hydrocarbons?

Hydrocarbons gave 55% of Saudi Arabia’s government revenue in 2Q 2026.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How much of Saudi Arabia’s energy is imported?

Saudi Arabia is a net energy exporter (2024).

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

What this means

No approved block reading for Saudi Arabia yet; this section shows approved readings only.

Questions our briefs address

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Saudi Arabia.

HighFood and fertiliser: what is at stake for Saudi ArabiaFoodFood and fertiliser

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Food and fertiliser: what is at stake for Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia imports 88.7% of the grain it eats. Russia supplied 38% of wheat imports in 2024/25 and the EU 48% (USDA, Trade Data Monitor data).

Theme band High

88.7%

of grain use met by imports (2024/25)

38%

of wheat imports from Russia (2024/25, USDA, Trade Data Monitor data)

100%

of rice use met by imports (2024/25)

4.99%

of world phosphate fertiliser output (2024)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Wheat comes mainly from two origins: the EU 48% and Russia 38% in 2024/25; Russia's share was 42% in 2025/26 to date (USDA, Trade Data Monitor data). A Russian export curb could cut a large part of supply.
  • Rice is all imported in USDA's balance. India shipped 1,173 kt of basmati to Saudi Arabia in 2024-25 (reported), so an Indian export curb could hit supply. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Barley for feed is almost all imported: 4,000 kt of imports against 4,025 kt of use in 2024/25.
  • In the 2022 shock the wheat benchmark averaged US$430.0/t, 36% above 2021, and the Thai rice benchmark rose from US$436.8/t in 2022 to US$553.7/t in 2023 (World Bank).
  • Imported wheat lands at four Red Sea ports and one Gulf port (USDA); a disruption on either sea could slow arrivals.

Opportunities

  • Strategic wheat reserves have been estimated at more than six months of demand, above a four-month target, with 3.5 million t of silo space (USDA).
  • The state bought 3.258 million t of wheat in six tenders in 2025/26 and lets sellers choose among approved origins (USDA).
  • Saudi Arabia made 2,345,914 t of phosphate (P2O5) in 2024 against 200,959 t used at home, 4.987% of world output (FAOSTAT; our calculation).
  • It also made 3,539,966 t of nitrogen against 258,330 t used (2024).

Uncertainties

  • USDA's origin table rests on Trade Data Monitor and industry data; 2025/26 covers only part of the season.
  • Origins are known only at shipment, because tenders let the seller choose among approved suppliers (USDA).
  • The basmati figure is press-reported, covers India's fiscal year and leaves out other rice. Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • 6 Nov 2026FAO Food Price Index for October: the cereals and vegetable oils sub-indices.
  • 10 Nov 2026USDA WASDE and PSD update: new-season estimates.
  • 4 Dec 2026FAO Food Price Index for November.
  • 10 Dec 2026USDA WASDE and PSD update.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Cereal import dependenceDependence88.7% 2024/25Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley)HighHigh ≥70% · Medium 40–70% · Low 25–40%
Staple import billRevenue0.36% of GDP 2024/25 volumes, 2024 pricesStaple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥4% of GDP · Medium 2–4% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP
Fertiliser (producer)Procurement4.99% 2024Share of world P2O5 fertiliser production (unrounded, three decimals)LowHigh ≥10% · Medium 5–10% · Low 3–5%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Share of use met by imports, 2024/25 (%)
Milled rice imports as a share of domestic consumption: 100% (2024/25) (our calculation)Milled rice imports a…*100.0Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley): 88.7% (2024/25) (our calculation)Cereal imports as a*88.7Wheat imports as a share of domestic consumption: 64.7% (2024/25) (our calculation)Wheat imports as a*64.7

Drawn to scale from zero. * Our calculation from the cited figures.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley): 88.7% (= 100 × sum of imports / sum of domestic consumption, four grains, capped at 100)
  • Milled rice imports as a share of domestic consumption: 100% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)
  • Share of world P2O5 fertiliser production (unrounded, three decimals): 4.99% (= 100 × 2,345,914 / 47,039,458)
  • Staple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDP: 0.36% of GDP (= sum(PSD imports × Pink Sheet 2024 annual price) / GDP 2024)
  • Wheat imports as a share of domestic consumption: 64.7% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Saudi ArabiaGulfGulf war / Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the largest user of the Strait, 6.23 mb/d in 2025, but owns the largest bypass. Prices offset lost volume: Q2 2026 oil revenue was SAR185.1bn, 54.6% of revenue.

Theme band High

6.23

oil shipped through the Strait, 2025 (mb/d)

SAR185.1bn

oil revenue, Q2 2026 (54.6% of total)

14.9–39.2%

of oil exports cannot bypass the Strait even with the pipeline (Strature calculation)

-3.6%

real GDP 2026, preliminary (oil activities about -21.8%)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • We rate the band High, one step above the published line, because of the September 2026 strikes on the East-West pipeline. One producer test is met: oil was 54.6% of Q2 2026 revenue. The other is not: once the bypass is used, 14.9-39.2% of oil exports still pass through the Strait, below 50%.
  • The bypass is now the exposure: drones were reported to have hit East-West pumping stations, and Yanbu loadings stopped from about 10 Sep to about 22 Sep 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Attacks have also reached civilian sites. On 10 Oct 2026 an attack on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport, claimed by the Houthis, killed 12 people and injured more than 300 (as reported). Red Sea cargoes bound for Asia still pass Bab el-Mandeb, so a second front would hit both export routes at once. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Output has not recovered. Crude output fell from about 10.5 mb/d in February to about 6.5 mb/d in Apr 2026 (EIA estimates). In September it was 8.001 mb/d on OPEC secondary sources, and the EIA estimates 7.48 mb/d for Q3. The OPEC+ required level is 10.5 mb/d; on our reading, the gap is output shut in by the war, not spare capacity. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Growth and the budget: the IMF's October forecast, as reported, is for real GDP to fall 3.3% in 2026, against 1.7% growth in its July forecast. The finance ministry's preliminary estimate is a 3.6% fall, with oil activities down about 21.8%. The ministry's revised 2026 deficit, as summarised by the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, is SAR245bn, 4.9% of GDP, against SAR165bn budgeted. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Aramco's Q2 2026 net income rose 41.9% to SAR121.51bn as prices outweighed lower volumes.
  • Bypass owners gained share: about 40% of Gulf crude went by pipeline (the Saudi and UAE lines) in Sep 2026, against 17% before the war. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Red Sea ports carry trade that used to leave through the Gulf: Ma'aden rerouted phosphate exports to Yanbu and to Duqm in Oman.

Uncertainties

  • Whether the East-West line holds its stated rate. The Energy Minister said it was pumping 5.8 mb/d on 6 Oct 2026; Al Jazeera reported the line's maximum as 7 mb/d. The rate is an official statement, not a measured flow, and Yanbu loading limits may keep exports below the pipeline's rate. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The current breakeven: IMF tables give US$90.94 for 2025 (2024 vintage); commentary puts 2026 near US$80; the newest IMF tables could not be checked. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Usable spare bypass capacity depends on Yanbu loading limits and Red Sea refinery needs, so the share that cannot bypass the Strait is a range, 14.9-39.2%.

What to watch

  • Weekly to 23 Nov 2026Yanbu loadings and East-West throughput. Q-028 watches for the line back near its pre-strike rate of roughly 4 mb/d by 23 Nov, a date from one trade page. The minister's stated 5.8 mb/d on 6 Oct is above that level.
  • 1 Nov 2026OPEC+ meets again. Saudi Arabia's required level for November is 10.5 mb/d, against 8.001 mb/d produced in September.
  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed strike raises the risk to the pipeline as well as to the Strait.
  • Late Oct 2026Q3 budget performance report: oil revenue and the deficit.
  • Dec 2026FY2027 budget: this year's outturn, against SAR1,202bn of revenue planned for next year.
  • MonthlyHouthi activity at Bab el-Mandeb, and claimed attacks on Saudi airports.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Gulf producerRevenueSAR185.1bn oil; SAR153.7bn non-oil Q2 2026Oil revenue, Q2 2026 (+22% y/y); non-oil revenueHighHigh hydrocarbons ≥50% of revenue and ≥50% of exports transit the Strait · Medium one of the two · Low neither

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Oil through the Strait and bypass capacity (mb/d)
Oil exports transiting Hormuz (crude+products): 6.23 mb/d (2025)Oil exports transit…6.23East-West (Petroline) bypass design capacity: 5 mb/d (early 2026)East-West (Petrolin…5.00Crude rerouted through the East-West pipeline to Yanbu during the closure: 4 mb/d (about) (Mar-Sep 2026)Crude rerouted thro…4.00

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: IEA Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (Feb 2026); Reuters via US News, Saudi Arabia restarts East-West oil pipeline (22 Sep 2026).

Briefs and questions

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Share of Saudi oil exports that must transit the Strait once the East-West bypass is used: 14.9–39.2% (= (Hormuz oil flows 6.23 mb/d - spare East-West capacity 3 to 5 mb/d) / (6.23 + 2 mb/d already piped pre-war))
  • Gap between the November 2026 OPEC+ target and September 2026 output (secondary sources): 2.5 mb/d (= Nov 2026 required production - Sep 2026 output (OPEC secondary sources))
  • Strature registered probability of a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 (F-0074): 61% (= Registered forecast F-0074)
  • Scenario: gross export value at risk if a renewed strike takes about 4 mb/d off the East-West line for six weeks, at US$105: US$17.6bn (= 4 mb/d × 42 days × US$105 = US$17.64bn)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 25 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

LowCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for Saudi ArabiaCapitalCanada's capital projects

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and Canada signed 13 two-way agreements and MOUs worth over C$1bn in July 2026; no Saudi investment amount is stated. Investment-treaty (FIPA) negotiations were announced as due to conclude by early 2027.

Theme band Low

over C$1bnest.

Agreements and MOUs, both directions (C$bn, estimate)

C$600m

Agreements on the January 2026 trade mission, both directions, no Saudi amount stated (C$ million)

0.2%

Share of inward FDI stock, immediate investor (2025)

Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for Saudi ArabiaHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Saudi Arabia: what passes the strait

The largest exporter through the strait, and the only one with a large pipeline to the Red Sea.

Share through the strait

  • Crude oil 82%

Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

Filter the questions Domain · Series · Topic
Domain Series Topic

About Saudi Arabia: the brief’s subject

Decision Brief · Q-023 · 11 questionsIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?

Where Saudi Arabia acts · 1 question

Decision Brief · Q-028 · 1 questionUS gasoline below $3.50 by June 2027: possible, but not on the official path
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Does supply around the strait add crude before the winter low?

“OPEC's spare capacity averages 0.025 million barrels a day from October to March in the official outlook. For a fuel buyer, this means barrels that avoid the strait are not on course to deliver a winter dip on their own.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary United States

What it says about Saudi ArabiaActor: takes the action

“drone strikes on 11 September stopped exports through Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline for 17 days”

From the brief

Where Saudi Arabia is exposed · 7 questions

Country Outlook · C-002 · 4 questionsIs any single future for Iran likely?
Geopolitical
How did the 2026 war change Iran's neighbourhood?

“No year since 1979 reordered the Gulf and the Levant as fast as 2026, and it did so mainly by taking things away from Iran.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United Arab Emirates +8

What it says about Saudi ArabiaExposed: bears the effect

“the Saudi East-West pipeline was shut in September 2026 after a drone strike launched from Iraq”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
Where does exposure to Iran sit?

“The largest Iran exposure most firms carry sits outside Iran: the strait, the oil price, the compliance chain, Gulf assets.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United Arab Emirates +5

What it says about Saudi ArabiaExposed: bears the effect

“the Saudi East-West pipeline was shut in September 2026 after a drone strike launched from Iraq”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 3 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?

“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United Arab Emirates +9

What it says about Saudi ArabiaExposed: bears the effect

“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
How much did each cargo through the Strait of Hormuz fall in 2026?

“Crude kept 23.3 per cent of its late-2025 flow, products 19.3 per cent and LNG 7.6 per cent.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United Arab Emirates +5

What it says about Saudi ArabiaExposed: bears the effect

“Saudi Arabia shipped 6.23 million barrels a day through the Strait, Iraq 3.63, the United Arab Emirates 3.24, Iran 2.41, Kuwait 2.37, Qatar 1.43 and Bahrain 0.21”

From the brief

Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.

Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Middle East · North America · South Asia

ISO 3166-1 name: Saudi Arabia (SAU). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Published briefs

Briefs with Saudi Arabia as their subject.

Forecast register

Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.

Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.

A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.

No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.

The forecast register

Free downloads

The summary sheet and the executive read are free.

The full brief is supplied to organisations through the request form on the brief’s page: they accept its terms and confirm a work email, and it is free during the introductory period.

General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.

Show the list

    Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.

    Sources and licences

    1. [1] Crude oil: share of exports through the Strait of Hormuz. US Energy Information Administration, 2024

    Cite this page Strature, “Saudi Arabia”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/sau/, 17 Nov 2026.

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