Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictElevated
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsNot yet set
Supply chains and chokepointsHigh
Energy and resourcesHigh
Technology and cyberElevated
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
The index reads Low, at 1.3. No registered Strature question names South Korea or North Korea, and UCDP records no interstate battle deaths on South Korean territory in 2023-2025; Taiwan, 991 km away, is just inside the 1,000 km line and adds almost nothing. How the index is built
Samsung Heavy Industries builds the floating LNG unit for Cedar LNG and was reported to be selected for Ksi Lisims LNG, which has not taken its investment decision (press report). Cedar LNG's total estimated cost is about US$4.0bn, not Samsung Heavy's contract value. Strature country reading: South Korea, Canada capital projects (approved 2026-10-06)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced, and no qualifying commitment carries a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0152 (Q-021)
General information, not advice.
Risks that reach South Korea
Gulf war / HormuzHigh
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
F-0167 · The threatened 50% US tariff on Canadian vehicles takes effect · 40%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file
Good by good (1)
Crude oilsupply shortfall begins: day 21first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file
Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.
First to run short in this case: India, day 4.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.
More measures (7, each its own unit; never added)
Share of national use that passes the strait · crude oil: 68% of crude supplyStrature calculation
Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one · crude oil: 4 893–5 136 on an index from 0 to 10 000Strature calculation
Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one (ratio to the ordinary index) · crude oil: 2.82 times the ordinary indexStrature calculation
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 40.6 daysStrature calculation
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait (national basis) · crude oil: 309 days of the supply through the straitStrature calculation
Change in supplier share since the disruption · crude oil: −7.70 percentage points change in Middle East share (2025 to 1H 2026)observed
Share of the exposed supply actually lost in 2Q 2026 · crude oil: 12%Strature calculation
importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where South Korea’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: South Korea
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
What this means · In scenarios Approved reading
For South Korea, 83-87 million barrels of oil do not arrive after a 30-day Hormuz closure and its recovery, and 160-163 million after a 90-day closure. Adding Bab el-Mandeb leaves that unchanged but makes 66-70 million barrels late, counting all its crude on file, about 12 million of it from outside the Gulf, as Saudi crude piped to the Red Sea coast goes north round Africa. A Malacca closure loses nothing on file; in its 14-day closure 30 million barrels arrive late. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.
Scenario
Questions about South Korea
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of South Korea’s supply crosses Hormuz?
On file, 68% of its crude oil imports; 50% of its refined fuels imports; 20% of its LNG imports cross the strait.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Who supplies South Korea’s crude oil?
Saudi Arabia 34% (2025), United States 17% (2025), United Arab Emirates 11% (2025) of its crude imports, with 1 more on the map. Each share is its own figure; they are not added.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of South Korea’s energy is imported?
South Korea imported 83% of the energy it used in 2024, and 96% of its oil.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Does South Korea hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?
Yes: DRAM chip fabrication (by company headquarters) 67% of world (1Q 2026); memory chip design 60% of world (2022). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How many days of oil stocks does South Korea hold?
South Korea held 210 days (22 Dec 2025), counted as government plus private, IEA net-import basis (ministry), before the March 2026 release.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
What this means · How fast stocks would run down Approved reading
At an assumed draw pace of 0.25-0.35 mb/d, South Korea's stocks do not reach zero in any Hormuz case in the library, on the IEA basis (588 million barrels, government plus private) or on government stocks alone (100 million). On both bases they cover only part of the gap: in a 90-day closure, 40-55 million barrels are drawn and 112-132 million are not covered. The pace is the gross rate of reserve loans to refiners, a Strature assumption with low confidence; the net draw is lower. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.
What this means · Goods: LNG Approved reading
All of South Korea's gas arrives as LNG. Qatar supplied 14.9% of it in 2025, through Hormuz, and Australia 31.4%. The gas utility's mandatory stock is 7 days of average daily sales (IEA, 2023 policy).
What this means · Goods: naphtha Approved reading
South Korea imports 45% of the naphtha it uses, and over 50% of its naphtha supply comes from the Middle East. Half of its naphtha imports, 50%, crossed Hormuz in 2025. Naphtha is the main feedstock of its petrochemical plants.
What this means · Goods: coal and uranium Approved reading
South Korea imports 99.5% of its coal (2024), but no listed strait is on file for its coal suppliers. For nuclear fuel, about 30% of its enrichment services come from Russia, as stated by the President in October 2025 (as reported).
What this means · Energy: make-up and dependence Approved reading
Counting nuclear as domestic, South Korea imported 82.9% of its energy in 2024, including 95.5% of its oil and all of its gas. Nuclear made 29.6% of its electricity in 2025 (part year), the largest home-grown source.
What this means · Value chains: batteries and cars Approved reading
South Korea made 4.3% of the world's motor vehicles in 2025 and supplied 14% of US graphite anode imports in January-August 2025. Its battery industry relies on China for most processing: 90% of world anode material (2025) and 65% of lithium refining (2023).
What this means · Both ways Approved reading
Others rely on South Korean supply: it provided 71.1% of US jet fuel imports and 51% of New Zealand's refined product imports in 2025, and 20.8% of Japan's refined product imports. With Saudi Arabia, the buyer and seller dependence ratio is 2.30: Korea takes 33.8% of its crude from Saudi Arabia, which sends 14.7% of its crude sales to Korea. Each figure is a cited share or a calculation from cited shares, not a view.
What this means · Goods: naphtha, the plants Approved reading
Two of South Korea's naphtha crackers fell to 55% and 62% on 1 April 2026, when Gulf naphtha stopped. 12
Chips and chip-making tools exposure
Chips: High
Chip-making tools: High
Source: Korea Customs Service, Trade Statistics (tradedata.go.kr), import/export by HS and country, 2025.
The questions our published briefs address that touch South Korea.
HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for South KoreaGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for South Korea
South Korea depends on the Middle East for the inputs of its refiners, petrochemical plants and chip fabs: 69.9% of crude, over 50% of naphtha supply and 64.7% of helium.
Theme band High
69.9%
Crude imports from the Middle East (2025)
62.3%est.
Middle East share of crude, H1 2026
over 50%est.
Naphtha supply from the Middle East (as reported)
64.7%
Helium imports from Qatar (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
Refiners' mandatory stocks were cut from 40 to 20 days, leaving a thinner buffer for a second shock. Estimate from press or commentary
A long stop in Qatar's helium output could outlast the chipmakers' reported 4-6 months of stocks. Estimate from press or commentary
Two of South Korea's naphtha crackers fell to 55% and 62% on 1 April 2026, when Gulf naphtha stopped. Estimate from press or commentary
Construction orders from the Middle East fell 77.2% in the first half of 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
South Korea's Cheongung-II air defence, sold to the UAE under a US$3.5bn contract, was reported to have intercepted Iranian missiles in March. Estimate from press or commentary
Korean builders are named among candidates to rebuild Gulf plants after the war. Estimate from press or commentary
US crude reached 20.12% of imports in January-August, easing the Middle East concentration. Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
Reports of chipmakers' helium stocks range from a few months to six months. Estimate from press or commentary
How much private stock refiners released after the floor cut is not public. Estimate from press or commentary
The Bank of Korea's war scenarios assumed oil prices below those seen since (aggregator report, low confidence). Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran.
Late Oct 2026KNOC crude imports for September; the Middle East share was 62.3% in the first half.
1 Nov 2026October exports to the Middle East; US$20.4bn in 2025.
MonthlyQatar's helium output (as reported): about a quarter of capacity in August.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Crude oilDependence
69.9%2025Share of crude imports from the Middle East
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
HeliumSupply chain
64.7%2025Share of helium imports from Qatar
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Refined productsSupply chain
over 50%est.2026Middle East share of naphtha supply
High
High ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
LNGDependence
14%2025-2026Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAE
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
AluminiumSupply chain
Russia largest; Australia, China nextest.2025Largest aluminium suppliers to South Korea
Below line
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
South Korea's Gulf dependence by input (%)
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: MEES: Korea Crude Imports: Mideast Volumes & Share Drop To 3-Year Low (23 Jan 2026); TrendForce - Under Qatar's shadow: helium crunch hits South Korea harder; Kpler - Middle East conflict: gas market implications, a continuing assessment.
Scenario: Middle East crude to replace if a renewed strike stops Gulf supply for 3 months: 170.7 million barrels (= 91.34 × 0.623 × 3 = 170.7)
Scenario: that 3-month gap in days of national consumption: 66 days (= 170.7 / 2.6 = 65.7)
Scenario: extra crude import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$4.1bn per quarter (= 91.34 × 3 × 15 / 1000 (low × 10, high × 20))
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 31 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →
HighChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for South KoreaChipsChipmaking in Taiwan
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for South Korea
South Korea took 55.4% of its processor imports from Taiwan in 2025, up from 45.0% in 2023. It is also the main second source, with 31% of world sub-10nm logic capacity in 2022.
Theme band High
55.4%
Processor imports from Taiwan (2025)
US$24.3bn
Chip imports from Taiwan, US$bn, 39.4% of the total (2025)
US$27.1bn
Memory chip exports to Taiwan, US$bn (2025)
31%
World sub-10nm logic capacity in South Korea (2022)
Read the full panel
Risks
Dependence on Taiwan for processors is rising: 45.0% of imports in 2023, 53.1% in 2024 and 55.4% in 2025, worth US$18.61bn last year.
Chip supply leans on two origins. Taiwan supplied 39.4% of chip imports in 2025 and China 31.4%.
Chip-using industries carry a large share of exports. Electrical and electronic goods were 33.3% of 2025 goods exports; semiconductors alone 24.4% on South Korea's own export figures.
South Korea also sells into Taiwan's fabs and factories. Taiwan's imports from South Korea reached US$63.7bn in 2025, up 45.7%, and 15.9% of South Korea's chip-equipment exports went to Taiwan. An interruption of chip production in Taiwan would reduce these sales.
Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast: Bloomberg Economics' war scenario, in a 2026 update as reported in the press, puts South Korea's GDP loss in the first year at about 23%, the largest outside Taiwan. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
South Korea is the main alternative to Taiwan at the leading edge: 31% of world sub-10nm logic capacity in 2022, when Taiwan and South Korea together held all of it.
Memory sales to Taiwan nearly doubled, from US$14.46bn in 2024 to US$27.08bn in 2025, 28.6% of memory exports. Estimate from press or commentary
Samsung was reported to have won a contract worth at least US$16.5bn to make Tesla chips on its 2nm node at Taylor, Texas (press report). Samsung Foundry held 5.9% of world foundry revenue in Q2 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
HS 854231 also holds older microcontrollers, so the processor share overstates leading-edge dependence. No trade code isolates the newest nodes.
South Korea's sub-10nm share is a 2022 figure. The source projects Taiwan and South Korea together at 56% in 2032; no South Korea-only projection was found.
No Bloomberg Economics blockade figure for South Korea was found; the war figure comes from a 2026 update as reported in the press. Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
1 Nov 2026MOTIE export figures for October; semiconductor exports were US$173.4bn in 2025.
expected Jan 2027 (date not yet set)TSMC fourth-quarter results: the leading-edge supply behind South Korea's processor imports from Taiwan; 3nm made 33% of TSMC's wafer revenue and 2nm 8% in the third quarter.
H2 2027Small-volume 2nm production planned at Samsung's Taylor fab (press report).
Mid-2027The next annual trade data release: whether the processor share from Taiwan stays above 55.4%.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Advanced logicDependence
55.4%2025Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from Taiwan
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Chip importsDependence
39.4%2025Share of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) imports from Taiwan
High
High ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
Chip-using industryTrade
33.3% of goods exports2025Electrical and electronic goods (HS 85 plus computers HS 8471) as share of goods exports
Medium
High ≥40% · Medium 20–40%
Equipment and materialsTrade
15.9%2025Share of machines for making semiconductors and wafers (HS 8486) exports going to Taiwan
Medium
High ≥25% · Medium 15–25%
Alternative capacity (gain)Procurement
31%2022Korea share of world sub-10nm logic capacity
High
High ≥20% of sub-10nm capacity · Medium ≥5% of foundry revenue or ≥10% of assembly-packaging-test · Low ≥3% of foundry revenue or an expected ≥10% of sub-10nm capacity
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Share of South Korea's processor imports from Taiwan, 2023-2025 (%)
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Korea Customs Service, trade statistics portal (tradedata.go.kr): exports and imports by item and country.
Semiconductors as share of goods exports: 24.4% (= semiconductor exports / total goods exports)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 31 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Chipmaking in Taiwan →
HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for South KoreaCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for South Korea
South Korea takes the largest share of Kitimat LNG cargo records, 37.7%. KOGAS's LNG Canada stake was reported at about C$1.6bn. Hanwha announced a hydrogen plan of over C$3.1bn: pledged, not placed.
Theme band High
37.7%
Share of Kitimat LNG cargo records, the largest (Jun 2025-Jul 2026)
C$1.6bnest.
South Korea's investment in LNG Canada (KOGAS 5%), press report
C$3.1bn
Hanwha Project Beaver, announced Jun 2026, under evaluation: pledged, not placed
16est.
Expected crude imports from Canada, million barrels (2026)
Read the full panel
MediumUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for South KoreaUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada
Strature analysis, not from the brief
US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for South Korea
South Korea's 2025 US car sales were 1.25 times Canada's; its cars now pay 15%. A 50% Canadian vehicle tariff would put up to US$4.88bn in play: an upper bound, our calculation, not a forecast.
Theme band Medium
17.1%
Share of US passenger-car imports (2025, US Census)
US$4.88bn
Pro-rata car diversion ceiling, US$bn (Strature calculation), an upper bound, not a forecast
C$14.4bn
Direct investment in Canada, C$bn (2025)
46
Kitimat LNG cargo records to South Korea, of 122
Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for South KoreaHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
South Korea: what passes the strait
About seven-tenths of its crude comes from the Middle East and most of it crosses the strait; it relies on Qatar for helium.
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
How have Japan and Korea changed their refiners' legal oil stock floors?
“Korea cut 40 days of average sales to 20 from 29 May, until separately lifted, as reported by The Korea Times and Newspim; no restoring notice was found in searches to 30 September 2026.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Could the largest strategic oil stocks behind the Strait be released?
“The two largest strategic holders behind the Strait were not part of it. EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected China +3
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Japan +8
Theme Brief · T-003 · 2 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9
What it says about South KoreaExposed: bears the effect
“The IEA records that China and India together received 44 per cent of the crude exported through the Strait in 2025 and that Japan and Korea are particularly reliant on it”
“On the Kiel Institute's model of a full closure, US welfare falls by 0.07 per cent while losses in South Asia and Africa are 10 to 20 times larger in percentage terms.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected United States +4
Where South Korea is a partner, supplier or route · 7 questions
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
When could a new buyer's first shuttle cargo reach Asian ports?
“Adding the shortest timed voyage (Ulsan 21 days, Zhanjiang 18, Sikka 3), the first cargo reaches Korea after 58 days, China after 55 and India after 40 at the earliest.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected China +1
What else does Canada ship to the same Asian destinations?
“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Canada Affected China +1
What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”
Country Outlook · C-001 · 2 questionsIs exposure to Vietnam a demand exposure?
Geoeconomic
Which side of Vietnam's trade is more concentrated?
“Counterparty concentration, measured as a Herfindahl index over countries, was higher on imports than on exports in 2023, and highest of all inside chapter 85's imports.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Does Vietnam's inbound supply of components stay concentrated?
“An interruption in supply acts on the ability to produce, not only on revenue: where the outbound leg consists of assembling the inbound one, a supply shock stops output rather than scaling it.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Middle East · North America · South Asia · Southeast Asia
ISO 3166-1 name: Republic of Korea (KOR). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
Published briefs
Briefs with South Korea as their subject.
No published brief has South Korea as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.
Forecast register
Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.
Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.
A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.
No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.
Registered forecasts attached to questions touching South Korea: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
The summary sheet and the executive read are free.
The full brief is supplied to organisations through the request form on the brief’s page: they accept its terms and confirm a work email, and it is free during the introductory period.
For organisations. About two minutes to request; the download link comes by email.
General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.
Sources and licences
[1] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. EIA (Vortexa data)
[2] Refined fuels: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy Intelligence, 2025
[3] LNG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Zawya, 2025
[4] Helium: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Exiger, 2025
Cite this page Strature, “South Korea”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/kor/, 17 Nov 2026.
Notes and limits
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
General research, not advice.
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