Your exposure · Country · Asia-Pacific

South Korea

About seven-tenths of its crude comes from the Middle East and most of it crosses the strait; it relies on Qatar for helium. Approved reading

This page answers: What does South Korea depend on, and which of our questions concern it?

Using this page
  1. Read the Dependency profile: the country card and where supply comes from.
  2. Tap In scenarios to see how each closed strait reaches South Korea.
  3. Scroll to the questions. Filter them, then open any brief.
  • Briefs 12 questions in 4 briefs
  • Region Asia-Pacific · East Asia
  • Readings updated
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Your exposure

South Korea in our readings

South Korea is in 4 of our country readings; High in 3.

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Elevated
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints High
  • Energy and resources High
  • Technology and cyber Elevated
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare South Korea on the outlook map

The other side: 14 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach South Korea

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Our reading · Strait of Hormuz

Show all 4 risks that reach South Korea
  • US tariffs and Canada Medium
    • F-0167 · The threatened 50% US tariff on Canadian vehicles takes effect · 40%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006

    Our reading · US tariffs and Canada

  • Canada's capital projects High
    • F-0151 · A build with a government term · 16%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    • F-0152 · A build on private contracts only · 27%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 31 Oct 2027 · Open · brief Q-021

    Our reading · Canada’s capital projects

  • Chipmaking in Taiwan High

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

    Our reading · Taiwan

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for South Korea

See South Korea's 8 risks on a chart

Three of South Korea's 8 risks share one score pair: Impact 5, Likelihood 4.

3World trade in AI-enablinggoods falls year on yearThe Bank of Korea raises itsrate to 3.25% by year end1234567891012345678910LowLowElevatedElevatedHighHighSevereSevereImpactLikelihood

Area is the count.

Solid arc: share under way. Dashed arc: share low confidence.

Tint and lines are the card counts smoothed, each line double the last. They follow the cards; they are not a score.

Every card is in the list below, with its scores.

SourceStrature world-risk cards, approved, as of 17 Nov 2026. Scores are judgements, not probabilities. The two scores are never multiplied.
Exhibit R-5 · SOUTH KOREA · strature.net
Show all 8 world risks for South Korea

All world risks that touch South Korea

If the Strait of Hormuz closes

Who runs short first

South Korea supply shortfall begins: day 21

Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.

first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file

Good by good (1)
  • Crude oil supply shortfall begins: day 21 first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file

Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.

First to run short in this case: India, day 4.

Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

The Stock Clock in the Network map: every case, as clocks, lanes or a table

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much South Korea makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Monthly Qatar's helium output (as reported): about a quarter of capacity in August. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Canada Energy Regulator LNG export records; South Korea had 46 of 122 Kitimat records to Jul 2026. Canada's capital projects
  • 31 Oct 2027 F-0152 resolves; KOGAS's own investment does not count toward it. Canada's capital projects
  • Mid-2027 The next annual trade data release: whether the processor share from Taiwan stays above 55.4%. Chipmaking in Taiwan
  • 4 Nov, 8 Dec 2026 Canadian trade data for September and October, early months under the new US duty. US tariffs and Canada
  • 30 Sep 2027 F-0167 resolves: the threatened US tariff on Canadian vehicles. US tariffs and Canada

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, reach South Korea through the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could come another way?
  • How many days of stock do we hold in South Korea against the day a supply shortfall begins there in the case shown?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in South Korea, and which outcome would change them?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Dependency profileWhere supply comes from, the map, and how each case reaches South Korea
Dependency profile

Country card · South Korea, importer through the straits

Three themes; no combined score.

Chokepoints

Crude oil via Hormuz
68% of imports (1Q25)
Refined fuels via Hormuz
50% of imports (2025)
LNG via Hormuz
20% of imports (2025)
Helium via Hormuz
65% of imports (2025)
Middle East share of crude imports, Jan-Aug 2026 (measured)
62% (Jan to Aug 2026)
Government stocks, end-Aug 2026 (KNOC) (measured)
100 million barrels (31 Aug 2026)
Oil stocks (government plus private, IEA net-import basis, before the March 2026 release)
210 days (22 Dec 2025)

Energy

Oil imported, share of use
96% (2025)
Gas imported, share of use
100% (2024)
All energy imported, share of use
83% (2024)
Renewables, share of electricity (Ember)
10% (2025)
Renewables, share of all energy (EIA)
2.2% (2024)

The Energy theme, centred on South Korea ›

Value chains

DRAM chip fabrication, share of world (by company headquarters)
67% (1Q 2026) 65%+
Memory chip design, share of world
60% (2022) watch
Logic chips below 10 nm (fabrication), share of world
31% (2022)
NAND chip fabrication, share of world
30% (2022)

The Value chains theme, centred on South Korea ›

The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.

More measures (7, each its own unit; never added)
  • Share of national use that passes the strait · crude oil: 68% of crude supply Strature calculation
  • Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one · crude oil: 4 893–5 136 on an index from 0 to 10 000 Strature calculation
  • Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one (ratio to the ordinary index) · crude oil: 2.82 times the ordinary index Strature calculation
  • Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 40.6 days Strature calculation
  • Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait (national basis) · crude oil: 309 days of the supply through the strait Strature calculation
  • Change in supplier share since the disruption · crude oil: −7.70 percentage points change in Middle East share (2025 to 1H 2026) observed
  • Share of the exposed supply actually lost in 2Q 2026 · crude oil: 12% Strature calculation

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where South Korea’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

In scenarios: South Korea

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

What this means · In scenarios Approved reading

For South Korea, 83-87 million barrels of oil do not arrive after a 30-day Hormuz closure and its recovery, and 160-163 million after a 90-day closure. Adding Bab el-Mandeb leaves that unchanged but makes 66-70 million barrels late, counting all its crude on file, about 12 million of it from outside the Gulf, as Saudi crude piped to the Red Sea coast goes north round Africa. A Malacca closure loses nothing on file; in its 14-day closure 30 million barrels arrive late. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.

Questions about South Korea

Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.

How much of South Korea’s supply crosses Hormuz?

On file, 68% of its crude oil imports; 50% of its refined fuels imports; 20% of its LNG imports cross the strait.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

Who supplies South Korea’s crude oil?

Saudi Arabia 34% (2025), United States 17% (2025), United Arab Emirates 11% (2025) of its crude imports, with 1 more on the map. Each share is its own figure; they are not added.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How much of South Korea’s energy is imported?

South Korea imported 83% of the energy it used in 2024, and 96% of its oil.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

Does South Korea hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?

Yes: DRAM chip fabrication (by company headquarters) 67% of world (1Q 2026); memory chip design 60% of world (2022). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How many days of oil stocks does South Korea hold?

South Korea held 210 days (22 Dec 2025), counted as government plus private, IEA net-import basis (ministry), before the March 2026 release.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

What this means

What this means · How fast stocks would run down Approved reading

At an assumed draw pace of 0.25-0.35 mb/d, South Korea's stocks do not reach zero in any Hormuz case in the library, on the IEA basis (588 million barrels, government plus private) or on government stocks alone (100 million). On both bases they cover only part of the gap: in a 90-day closure, 40-55 million barrels are drawn and 112-132 million are not covered. The pace is the gross rate of reserve loans to refiners, a Strature assumption with low confidence; the net draw is lower. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.

What this means · Goods: LNG Approved reading

All of South Korea's gas arrives as LNG. Qatar supplied 14.9% of it in 2025, through Hormuz, and Australia 31.4%. The gas utility's mandatory stock is 7 days of average daily sales (IEA, 2023 policy).

What this means · Goods: naphtha Approved reading

South Korea imports 45% of the naphtha it uses, and over 50% of its naphtha supply comes from the Middle East. Half of its naphtha imports, 50%, crossed Hormuz in 2025. Naphtha is the main feedstock of its petrochemical plants.

What this means · Goods: coal and uranium Approved reading

South Korea imports 99.5% of its coal (2024), but no listed strait is on file for its coal suppliers. For nuclear fuel, about 30% of its enrichment services come from Russia, as stated by the President in October 2025 (as reported).

What this means · Energy: make-up and dependence Approved reading

Counting nuclear as domestic, South Korea imported 82.9% of its energy in 2024, including 95.5% of its oil and all of its gas. Nuclear made 29.6% of its electricity in 2025 (part year), the largest home-grown source.

What this means · Value chains: batteries and cars Approved reading

South Korea made 4.3% of the world's motor vehicles in 2025 and supplied 14% of US graphite anode imports in January-August 2025. Its battery industry relies on China for most processing: 90% of world anode material (2025) and 65% of lithium refining (2023).

What this means · Both ways Approved reading

Others rely on South Korean supply: it provided 71.1% of US jet fuel imports and 51% of New Zealand's refined product imports in 2025, and 20.8% of Japan's refined product imports. With Saudi Arabia, the buyer and seller dependence ratio is 2.30: Korea takes 33.8% of its crude from Saudi Arabia, which sends 14.7% of its crude sales to Korea. Each figure is a cited share or a calculation from cited shares, not a view.

What this means · Goods: naphtha, the plants Approved reading

Two of South Korea's naphtha crackers fell to 55% and 62% on 1 April 2026, when Gulf naphtha stopped. 1 2

Chips and chip-making tools exposure

  • Chips: High
  • Chip-making tools: High

Source: Korea Customs Service, Trade Statistics (tradedata.go.kr), import/export by HS and country, 2025.

Figures and sources

Gallium, germanium, rare earths and magnets exposure

  • Gallium and germanium: Low
  • Rare earths and magnets: High

Source: Korea Customs Service, Trade Statistics (tradedata.go.kr), import/export by HS and country, 2025.

Figures and sources

Questions our briefs address

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch South Korea.

HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for South KoreaGulfGulf war / Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for South Korea

South Korea depends on the Middle East for the inputs of its refiners, petrochemical plants and chip fabs: 69.9% of crude, over 50% of naphtha supply and 64.7% of helium.

Theme band High

69.9%

Crude imports from the Middle East (2025)

62.3%est.

Middle East share of crude, H1 2026

over 50%est.

Naphtha supply from the Middle East (as reported)

64.7%

Helium imports from Qatar (2025)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Refiners' mandatory stocks were cut from 40 to 20 days, leaving a thinner buffer for a second shock. Estimate from press or commentary
  • A long stop in Qatar's helium output could outlast the chipmakers' reported 4-6 months of stocks. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Two of South Korea's naphtha crackers fell to 55% and 62% on 1 April 2026, when Gulf naphtha stopped. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Construction orders from the Middle East fell 77.2% in the first half of 2026. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • South Korea's Cheongung-II air defence, sold to the UAE under a US$3.5bn contract, was reported to have intercepted Iranian missiles in March. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Korean builders are named among candidates to rebuild Gulf plants after the war. Estimate from press or commentary
  • US crude reached 20.12% of imports in January-August, easing the Middle East concentration. Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • Reports of chipmakers' helium stocks range from a few months to six months. Estimate from press or commentary
  • How much private stock refiners released after the floor cut is not public. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The Bank of Korea's war scenarios assumed oil prices below those seen since (aggregator report, low confidence). Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran.
  • Late Oct 2026KNOC crude imports for September; the Middle East share was 62.3% in the first half.
  • 1 Nov 2026October exports to the Middle East; US$20.4bn in 2025.
  • MonthlyQatar's helium output (as reported): about a quarter of capacity in August.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Crude oilDependence69.9% 2025Share of crude imports from the Middle EastHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
HeliumSupply chain64.7% 2025Share of helium imports from QatarHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Refined productsSupply chainover 50%est. 2026Middle East share of naphtha supplyHighHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
LNGDependence14% 2025-2026Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAEMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
AluminiumSupply chainRussia largest; Australia, China nextest. 2025Largest aluminium suppliers to South KoreaBelow lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

South Korea's Gulf dependence by input (%)
Share of crude imports from the Middle East: 69.9% (2025)Crude69.9Share of helium imports from Qatar: 64.7% (2025)Helium64.7Share of LNG imports from Qatar and UAE: 14% (2025-2026)LNG14.0

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: MEES: Korea Crude Imports: Mideast Volumes & Share Drop To 3-Year Low (23 Jan 2026); TrendForce - Under Qatar's shadow: helium crunch hits South Korea harder; Kpler - Middle East conflict: gas market implications, a continuing assessment.

Briefs and questions

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Scenario: Middle East crude to replace if a renewed strike stops Gulf supply for 3 months: 170.7 million barrels (= 91.34 × 0.623 × 3 = 170.7)
  • Scenario: that 3-month gap in days of national consumption: 66 days (= 170.7 / 2.6 = 65.7)
  • Scenario: extra crude import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$4.1bn per quarter (= 91.34 × 3 × 15 / 1000 (low × 10, high × 20))

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 31 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

HighChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for South KoreaChipsChipmaking in Taiwan

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for South Korea

South Korea took 55.4% of its processor imports from Taiwan in 2025, up from 45.0% in 2023. It is also the main second source, with 31% of world sub-10nm logic capacity in 2022.

Theme band High

55.4%

Processor imports from Taiwan (2025)

US$24.3bn

Chip imports from Taiwan, US$bn, 39.4% of the total (2025)

US$27.1bn

Memory chip exports to Taiwan, US$bn (2025)

31%

World sub-10nm logic capacity in South Korea (2022)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Dependence on Taiwan for processors is rising: 45.0% of imports in 2023, 53.1% in 2024 and 55.4% in 2025, worth US$18.61bn last year.
  • Chip supply leans on two origins. Taiwan supplied 39.4% of chip imports in 2025 and China 31.4%.
  • Chip-using industries carry a large share of exports. Electrical and electronic goods were 33.3% of 2025 goods exports; semiconductors alone 24.4% on South Korea's own export figures.
  • South Korea also sells into Taiwan's fabs and factories. Taiwan's imports from South Korea reached US$63.7bn in 2025, up 45.7%, and 15.9% of South Korea's chip-equipment exports went to Taiwan. An interruption of chip production in Taiwan would reduce these sales.
  • Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast: Bloomberg Economics' war scenario, in a 2026 update as reported in the press, puts South Korea's GDP loss in the first year at about 23%, the largest outside Taiwan. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • South Korea is the main alternative to Taiwan at the leading edge: 31% of world sub-10nm logic capacity in 2022, when Taiwan and South Korea together held all of it.
  • Memory sales to Taiwan nearly doubled, from US$14.46bn in 2024 to US$27.08bn in 2025, 28.6% of memory exports. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Samsung was reported to have won a contract worth at least US$16.5bn to make Tesla chips on its 2nm node at Taylor, Texas (press report). Samsung Foundry held 5.9% of world foundry revenue in Q2 2026. Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • HS 854231 also holds older microcontrollers, so the processor share overstates leading-edge dependence. No trade code isolates the newest nodes.
  • South Korea's sub-10nm share is a 2022 figure. The source projects Taiwan and South Korea together at 56% in 2032; no South Korea-only projection was found.
  • No Bloomberg Economics blockade figure for South Korea was found; the war figure comes from a 2026 update as reported in the press. Outside estimate, not a Strature forecast. Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • 1 Nov 2026MOTIE export figures for October; semiconductor exports were US$173.4bn in 2025.
  • expected Jan 2027 (date not yet set)TSMC fourth-quarter results: the leading-edge supply behind South Korea's processor imports from Taiwan; 3nm made 33% of TSMC's wafer revenue and 2nm 8% in the third quarter.
  • H2 2027Small-volume 2nm production planned at Samsung's Taylor fab (press report).
  • Mid-2027The next annual trade data release: whether the processor share from Taiwan stays above 55.4%.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Advanced logicDependence55.4% 2025Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from TaiwanHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
Chip importsDependence39.4% 2025Share of electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) imports from TaiwanHighHigh ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
Chip-using industryTrade33.3% of goods exports 2025Electrical and electronic goods (HS 85 plus computers HS 8471) as share of goods exportsMediumHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40%
Equipment and materialsTrade15.9% 2025Share of machines for making semiconductors and wafers (HS 8486) exports going to TaiwanMediumHigh ≥25% · Medium 15–25%
Alternative capacity (gain)Procurement31% 2022Korea share of world sub-10nm logic capacityHighHigh ≥20% of sub-10nm capacity · Medium ≥5% of foundry revenue or ≥10% of assembly-packaging-test · Low ≥3% of foundry revenue or an expected ≥10% of sub-10nm capacity

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Share of South Korea's processor imports from Taiwan, 2023-2025 (%)
Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from Taiwan: 55.4% (2025)202555.4Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from Taiwan: 53.1% (2024)202453.1Share of processors and controllers (HS 854231, the advanced-logic proxy) imports from Taiwan: 45% (2023)202345.0

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Korea Customs Service, trade statistics portal (tradedata.go.kr): exports and imports by item and country.

Briefs and questions

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 31 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Chipmaking in Taiwan →

HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for South KoreaCapitalCanada's capital projects

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for South Korea

South Korea takes the largest share of Kitimat LNG cargo records, 37.7%. KOGAS's LNG Canada stake was reported at about C$1.6bn. Hanwha announced a hydrogen plan of over C$3.1bn: pledged, not placed.

Theme band High

37.7%

Share of Kitimat LNG cargo records, the largest (Jun 2025-Jul 2026)

C$1.6bnest.

South Korea's investment in LNG Canada (KOGAS 5%), press report

C$3.1bn

Hanwha Project Beaver, announced Jun 2026, under evaluation: pledged, not placed

16est.

Expected crude imports from Canada, million barrels (2026)

Read the full panel
MediumUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for South KoreaUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada

Strature analysis, not from the brief

US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for South Korea

South Korea's 2025 US car sales were 1.25 times Canada's; its cars now pay 15%. A 50% Canadian vehicle tariff would put up to US$4.88bn in play: an upper bound, our calculation, not a forecast.

Theme band Medium

17.1%

Share of US passenger-car imports (2025, US Census)

US$4.88bn

Pro-rata car diversion ceiling, US$bn (Strature calculation), an upper bound, not a forecast

C$14.4bn

Direct investment in Canada, C$bn (2025)

46

Kitimat LNG cargo records to South Korea, of 122

Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for South KoreaHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

South Korea: what passes the strait

About seven-tenths of its crude comes from the Middle East and most of it crosses the strait; it relies on Qatar for helium.

Share through the strait

  • Crude oil 68%
  • Refined fuels (petrol, diesel/gasoil, jet, fuel oil) 50%
  • LNG 20%

Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

Filter the questions Domain · Series · Topic
Domain Series Topic

Where South Korea acts · 2 questions

Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
How have Japan and Korea changed their refiners' legal oil stock floors?

“Korea cut 40 days of average sales to 20 from 29 May, until separately lifted, as reported by The Korea Times and Newspim; no restoring notice was found in searches to 30 September 2026.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Japan

What it says about South KoreaActor: takes the action

“Korea cut 40 days of average sales to 20 from 29 May”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Could the largest strategic oil stocks behind the Strait be released?

“The two largest strategic holders behind the Strait were not part of it. EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected China +3

What it says about South KoreaActor: takes the action

“Canada 23.6, Korea 22.5, Germany 19.5, France 14.6 and the United Kingdom 14.0 million led the other 28 members.”

From the brief

Where South Korea is exposed · 3 questions

Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?

“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Saudi Arabia Affected Japan +8

What it says about South KoreaExposed: bears the effect

“nothing a buyer could still buy was on file to arrive within six weeks in Japan, Korea, China or India”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 2 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?

“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9

What it says about South KoreaExposed: bears the effect

“The IEA records that China and India together received 44 per cent of the crude exported through the Strait in 2025 and that Japan and Korea are particularly reliant on it”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
Who bears the economic cost of a Hormuz closure?

“On the Kiel Institute's model of a full closure, US welfare falls by 0.07 per cent while losses in South Asia and Africa are 10 to 20 times larger in percentage terms.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United States +4

What it says about South KoreaExposed: bears the effect

“The same short-run simulation puts India's welfare loss at 1.78 per cent, Korea's at 1.37, Japan's at 0.65 and China's at 0.64.”

From the brief

Where South Korea is a partner, supplier or route · 7 questions

Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
When could a new buyer's first shuttle cargo reach Asian ports?

“Adding the shortest timed voyage (Ulsan 21 days, Zhanjiang 18, Sikka 3), the first cargo reaches Korea after 58 days, China after 55 and India after 40 at the earliest.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Saudi Arabia Affected China +1

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“nothing a buyer could still buy was on file to arrive within six weeks in Japan, Korea, China or India”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-001 · 4 questionsCan Canada become a material energy supplier beyond the United States?
Geoeconomic
Can Canada become a material energy supplier beyond the United States?

“It has started, but small: in 12 months to July 2026, 11.3 of 96.8 bcm of gas exports and 32.6 of 256.0 million m³ of crude went beyond the US.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected United States +6

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
Where did Canada's LNG export cargoes go?

“122 export cargo records, June 2025 to July 2026: Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, three others 5.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected China +5

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
What does Canadian LNG supply offer Asian gas buyers?

“For this class the question is reliability, and the measured answer is: demonstrated, small and single-sourced.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected China +5

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
What else does Canada ship to the same Asian destinations?

“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected China +1

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-001 · 2 questionsIs exposure to Vietnam a demand exposure?
Geoeconomic
Which side of Vietnam's trade is more concentrated?

“Counterparty concentration, measured as a Herfindahl index over countries, was higher on imports than on exports in 2023, and highest of all inside chapter 85's imports.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Vietnam Affected China

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“In the same chapter, China and South Korea were the two largest suppliers.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic · Geotechnology
Does Vietnam's inbound supply of components stay concentrated?

“An interruption in supply acts on the ability to produce, not only on revenue: where the outbound leg consists of assembling the inbound one, a supply shock stops output rather than scaling it.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Vietnam Affected China

What it says about South KoreaCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“In 2023 China and South Korea were the two largest suppliers of chapter 85's imports (UN Comtrade).”

From the brief

Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.

Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Middle East · North America · South Asia · Southeast Asia

ISO 3166-1 name: Republic of Korea (KOR). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Published briefs

Briefs with South Korea as their subject.

No published brief has South Korea as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.

Forecast register

Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.

Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.

A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.

No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.

The forecast register

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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.

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    Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.

    Sources and licences

    1. [1] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. EIA (Vortexa data)
    2. [2] Refined fuels: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy Intelligence, 2025
    3. [3] LNG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Zawya, 2025
    4. [4] Helium: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Exiger, 2025

    Cite this page Strature, “South Korea”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/kor/, 17 Nov 2026.

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