Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictElevated
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsElevated
Supply chains and chokepointsHigh
Energy and resourcesHigh
Technology and cyberElevated
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
The index's external-threat input is low. No registered Strature question names Japan as a party, and UCDP records no interstate battle deaths on its territory in 2023-2025; only Taiwan, 189 km away, and the Philippines, 426 km, add to it. How the index is built
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced, and no qualifying commitment carries a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0152 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2030-06-26, 5 or more projects are listed and no s.35 challenge is commenced our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0189 (Q-025)
Resolves if, by 2030-06-26, 5 or more projects are listed and a s.35 challenge is commenced our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0190 (Q-025)
General information, not advice.
Risks that reach Japan
Gulf war / HormuzHigh
F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001
Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.
F-0167 · The threatened 50% US tariff on Canadian vehicles takes effect · 40%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006
F-0190 · 5 or more projects are listed and a s.35 challenge is commenced · 36%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 26 Jun 2030 · Open · brief Q-025
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file
Good by good (9)
Ammoniasupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Crude oilsupply shortfall begins: day 20first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file
Heliumsupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
LNGsupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
LPGsupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Methanolsupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Polyethylene and polypropylenesupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Refined fuelssupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Urea and nitrogen fertiliserssupply shortfall begins: day 20first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.
First to run short in this case: India, day 4.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
How much Japan makes, buys and sells, good by good
Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).Reading the supply balance
Supply balance first, suppliers second.
One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.
Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.
Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).
Periods are marketing years, as published.
What to watch
18 Nov 2026 Trade statistics for October; September's deficit was 536.6bn yen, the fifth monthly deficit in a row. Gulf war / Hormuz
Monthly Trade data on Japan's LNG imports from Canada; Canada's share was 3.0% in Jan-Sep 2026 (MoF; September provisional). Canada's capital projects
Monthly Japan's trade statistics on chip imports by origin; Taiwan's share was 59.8% in 2025. Chipmaking in Taiwan
4 Nov, 8 Dec 2026 Canadian trade data for September and October, early months under the US duty on listed Canadian goods in force since 22 Aug 2026. US tariffs and Canada
30 Sep 2027 F-0167 resolves: the threatened US tariff on Canadian vehicles. US tariffs and Canada
Monthly US car imports by origin; Japan's share was 20.2% in 2025. US tariffs and Canada
Questions firms in this position often review
Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, reach Japan through the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could come another way?
How many days of stock do we hold in Japan against the day a supply shortfall begins there in the case shown?
Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Japan, and which outcome would change them?
The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.
More measures (10, each its own unit; never added)
Share of national use that passes the strait · crude oil: 68% of crude supplyStrature calculation
Share of national use that passes the strait · LNG (all gas): 6.2% of gas supplyStrature calculation
Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one · crude oil: 4 583–5 627 on an index from 0 to 10 000Strature calculation
Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one (ratio to the ordinary index) · crude oil: 1.28 times the ordinary indexStrature calculation
Helium via Hormuz: 37% of helium importsobserved
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 117 daysStrature calculation
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait (national basis) · crude oil: 260 days of the supply through the straitStrature calculation
Change in supplier share since the disruption · crude oil: −19.1 percentage points change in Middle East share (2025 to 2Q 2026)observed
Change in supplier share since the disruption · helium: 23.0 percentage points gain of US share in Japan helium imports (2025 to Jan-May 2026)observed
Share of the exposed supply actually lost in 2Q 2026 · crude oil: 70% (observed import loss / Hormuz share before 28 Feb 2026)Strature calculation
importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where Japan’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: Japan
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
What this means · In scenarios Approved reading
For Japan, the length of a Hormuz closure drives the result: 59-65 million barrels of oil do not arrive after a 30-day closure, 117-123 million after 90 days and 204-210 million after 180 days, each with its recovery. Adding Bab el-Mandeb leaves that figure unchanged but makes 55-59 million barrels late instead of 7 million. Japan's stocks, drawn at an assumed 1.2-1.5 mb/d, stay above zero in every Hormuz case. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.
Scenario
Questions about Japan
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of Japan’s supply crosses Hormuz?
On file, 68% of its crude oil imports; 70% of its refined fuels imports; 3.7% of its LPG imports cross the strait.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Who supplies Japan’s crude oil?
United Arab Emirates 43% (2025), Saudi Arabia 39% (2025), Kuwait 6.2% (2025) of its crude imports, with 1 more on the map. Each share is its own figure; they are not added.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of Japan’s energy is imported?
Japan imported 88% of the energy it used in 2024, and 97% of its oil.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Does Japan hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?
Yes: photoresists (materials) 80% of world (2023, approx.); silicon wafers (materials) 55% of world (2020). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How many days of oil stocks does Japan hold?
Japan held 176 days (Jul 2026), counted as IEA basis, days of net imports (ANRE).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
What this means · Energy: stocks against detours Approved reading
Japan held 176 days of oil stocks in July 2026, counted in days of net imports as the IEA counts them. On its national basis it held 254 days at the end of 2025; the two bases differ and are not merged. In April 2026, the one full month observed, all Japanese oil stocks fell by 1.43 million barrels a day, net.
What this means · Goods: LNG Approved reading
In 2025, 6.3% of Japan's LNG came from Qatar and the UAE, which load inside the Gulf; Australia supplied 39.7%. LNG has no pipeline route round the strait, so the Gulf share has no bypass. Utilities held 2.02 million tonnes of LNG in late July 2026, near the five-year average.
What this means · Goods: helium Approved reading
Japan imports all of its helium, and 37.3% came from Qatar in 2025, through Hormuz. Qatar makes 33% of the world's helium. After the strait closed, the US share of Japan's imports rose above 83% in January-May 2026, according to a single press report (low confidence).
What this means · Goods: methanol, plastics, aluminium Approved reading
Saudi Arabia supplied 55.8% of Japan's methanol in 2025, on a modelled route through Hormuz. The UAE supplied 19.3% of its aluminium by the same strait. The largest plastics suppliers are Thailand and South Korea, outside the Gulf.
What this means · Value chains: batteries Approved reading
Japan made 8.7% of the world's vehicles in 2025. Its own shares of battery stages are not yet sourced. China holds most processing stages: 86% of battery cells in 2025, 87% of cathode material in 2024 and 90% of anode material in 2025.
What this means · Value chains: chips, Japan’s customs data Approved reading
Japan imported US$24.3bn of chips (integrated circuits) in 2025, and 59.8% came from Taiwan. China supplied 7.5% and South Korea 5.8%.
Taiwan's share of Japan's chip imports was between 58.8% and 62.1% in each year from 2023 to 2025. Processors are as concentrated: 59.0% of US$9.91bn came from Taiwan in 2025.
Chips also flow the other way. Japan exported US$35.1bn of chips in 2025; Taiwan took 27.2% and China 18.3%.
Taiwan's fabs buy Japanese tools and wafers. Taiwan took 24.4% of Japan's US$30.4bn chipmaking-equipment exports in 2025, up from 16.3% in 2024, and 38.0% of its US$4.72bn silicon-wafer exports.
Japan also buys tools abroad: the United States supplied 25.4% and the Netherlands 19.9% of its US$7.17bn chipmaking-equipment imports in 2025.
Things to watch · official statistics
29 Oct 2026Japan's detailed trade by commodity and country for September 2026: Taiwan's share of chip imports
12 Nov 2026Japan's Fixed trade figures for 2025, which may revise the 2025 values above
27 Nov 2026Japan's detailed trade for October 2026: chip, chipmaking-equipment and wafer trade with Taiwan
Dates from the Japan Customs release calendar 1.
What this means · Both ways Approved reading
Japan relies on the Gulf for fuel: the UAE supplied 43.3% of its crude and Saudi Arabia 55.8% of its methanol in 2025. Others rely on Japan for chip tools: Taiwan took 24.4% of Japan's US$30.4bn chipmaking-equipment exports in 2025. Each side is shown in its own unit; nothing is netted. 123
Chips and chip-making tools exposure
Chips: Medium
Chip-making tools: High
Source: Ministry of Finance Japan, Trade Statistics via e-Stat, 2025 Commodity by Country (Export Jan-Dec: Revised), Sections VI, XV, XVI.
The questions our published briefs address that touch Japan.
HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for JapanGulfGulf war / Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Japan
Japan took 94% of its crude from the Middle East in 2025. A 470m-barrel stockpile held supply; the risk now sits on the Saudi and UAE bypass routes.
Theme band High
94%est.
Crude imports from the Middle East (2025)
470est.
Emergency oil reserves, million barrels, 254 days (end-2025)
44.2%
Naphtha supply from the Middle East (2024)
Read the full panel
Risks
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two producers with pipelines that bypass the Strait (Yanbu, Fujairah), supplied 59.4% of crude in Aug 2026. No crude loaded at Yanbu from 11 Sep after the pipeline attack; loadings resumed later in September. Estimate from press or commentary
Two releases have already drawn on the stockpile: 80 million barrels from March and 20 more days from May. Estimate from press or commentary
Naphtha shortages hit plastics and chemicals. Ethylene plants ran at a record-low 67.3% in April. Estimate from press or commentary
Crude oil imports rose 58.7% in August, and the trade deficit, US$7.12bn, was the largest since January. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Two damaged Qatari LNG trains are expected to take about three years to repair (QatarEnergy, as reported). Chiyoda was reported in Apr 2026 to be considering a return to its Qatar project. Estimate from press or commentary
US crude rose to 33.7% of imports in August, a step toward diversification. Estimate from press or commentary
Naphtha purchases from outside the Middle East were expected to double to 900,000 kl in April. Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
No official figure was found for reserve days left after the two releases.
Qatar's share of helium imports is 33% by value in official trade data (MoF), which count other rare gases too, and 37% in a press report. Estimate from press or commentary
Whether the US share holds once Gulf grades return is open. Estimate from press or commentary
Gulf smelters supplied 28.2% of unwrought aluminium imports by value in 2025, but 15.5% in Jan-Sep 2026 (provisional).
What to watch
20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran.
Late Oct 2026METI crude imports for September by origin; the Arab share was 60.7% in August.
18 Nov 2026Trade statistics for October; September's deficit was 536.6bn yen, the fifth monthly deficit in a row.
MonthlyLoadings at Yanbu and Fujairah after the September outage.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Crude oilDependence
94%est.2025Share of crude imports from the Middle East (METI)
High
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Refined productsSupply chain
73.6%est.2024Middle East share of naphtha imports
High
High ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
HeliumSupply chain
33%2025Qatar's share of imports of rare gases other than argon (HS 280429, mainly helium), by value
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
AluminiumSupply chain
28.2%2025GCC smelters' share of Japan's unwrought aluminium imports (HS 7601), by value
Medium
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
LNGDependence
5.3%est.2025Share of LNG imports from Qatar
Below line
High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Japan's crude imports, selected origins, Aug 2026 (%)
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Saudi Arabia leads Japan's oil imports in August; U.S. share surges (Arab News Japan, METI data).
Middle East share of total naphtha supply: 44.2% (= 60 × 0.736)
Scenario: Arab-origin crude to replace if a renewed strike also stops the bypass routes for 3 months: 141.5 million barrels (= 47.16 × 3)
Scenario: that 3-month gap as a share of end-2025 emergency reserves: 30.1% of reserves (= 141.5 / 470)
Scenario: extra crude import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$3.5bn per quarter (= 77.74 × 3 × 15 / 1000 (low × 10, high × 20))
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance; processed by Strature.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 31 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →
HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for JapanCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Japan
JGC holds about C$10.48bn (US$7.5bn) of the LNG Canada Phase 2 build contract, awarded 28 Sep 2026 (not from the brief); Mitsubishi owns 15%. Japan took 20.5% of Kitimat cargo records.
Theme band High
C$10.5bn
JGC's share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 build contract, C$bn (Sep 2026, not from the brief)
C$4.8bn
Mitsubishi's Phase 1 equity in LNG Canada, C$bn (Strature estimate from a press figure)
20.5%
Kitimat LNG cargo records to Japan, Jun 2025-Jul 2026
C$54.8bn
Japanese-owned direct investment in Canada, ultimate investor, C$bn (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
Canada supplied 0.85% of Japan's LNG imports in 2025: 554,648 tonnes of 64.98 Mt. The Kitimat route is a small part of Japan's supply.
JGC's share is set in US dollars at US$7.5bn. At the 2025 rate it is C$10.48bn, just above the C$10bn High line, so the band rests on the exchange rate.
JGC describes the Phase 2 contract as mainly lump-sum turnkey, with some cost-plus parts (JGC, 29 Sep 2026). The terms that allocate cost changes are not public.
Honda's C$15bn Ontario electric-vehicle supply-chain plan, announced in April 2024, was reported suspended indefinitely in May 2026 (press report). No placement against it was found in early Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
Mitsubishi's pro rata share of LNG Canada output rises to 4.2 Mtpa when Phase 2 runs, expected from the early 2030s (Strature calculation).
Canada's share of Japan's LNG imports rose to 3.1% in Jan-Apr 2026, from 0.85% in 2025 (MoF).
GE Vernova Hitachi, a US-Japan alliance, supplies the BWRX-300 reactors for the Darlington new nuclear project. Hitachi's share of the vendor was not confirmed in a company filing. Estimate from press or commentary
Asahi Kasei's C$1.6bn battery separator plant at Port Colborne is reported to be going ahead despite Honda's suspension (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
Mitsubishi's Phase 1 equity, about C$4.8bn, is a Strature estimate scaled from a press figure for South Korea's stake. Its pro rata share of the C$33bn Phase 2 cost, up to C$4.95bn, is an upper bound, not equity. No partner discloses its outlay.
Japanese direct investment is C$54.8bn by ultimate investor (3.4%), the basis the band uses, and C$46.7bn by immediate investor (2.9%).
No contract value was found for the reactor vendor at Darlington.
Asahi Kasei's production start is 2027 in the company's 2024 release and the first half of 2029 in later press. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
FY2026 (to Mar 2027)JGC said it recognises its US$7.5bn share of the Phase 2 contract in fiscal 2026 (JGC, 29 Sep 2026).
MonthlyTrade data on Japan's LNG imports from Canada; Canada's share was 3.0% in Jan-Sep 2026 (MoF; September provisional).
Early 2030sPhase 2 start-up lifts Mitsubishi's pro rata output to 4.2 Mtpa.
26 Jun 2030Q-025's forecast F-0190 resolves: five or more projects listed for fast-track approval (Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act) and a court challenge under section 35 (Indigenous rights) begun; 36%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
ProcurementProcurement
C$10.5bn2025 FXJGC share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 EPC contract in C$
High
High ≥C$10bn · Medium C$3–10bn · Low C$1–3bn
Project equityCapital and finance
C$4.8bn2026Mitsubishi Corporation equity in LNG Canada Phase 1 (pro rata from Korea's C$1.6bn for 5%)
Medium
High ≥C$5bn · Medium C$2–5bn · Low C$1–2bn
OfftakeTrade
20.5% of cargo recordsJun 2025-Jul 2026Share of Kitimat LNG export cargo records to Japan
Medium
High ≥4 Mtpa, or ≥C$5bn, or ≥25% of records · Medium ≥2 Mtpa, or ≥C$2bn, or 10-25% of records · Low ≥1 Mtpa, or ≥C$1bn
FDI stockCapital and finance
3.4%2025Japanese direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor)
Medium
High ≥10% · Medium 3–10% · Low 2–3%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Japanese direct investment stock in Canada, immediate investor (C$bn)
By immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. The band uses the ultimate-investor basis, the country of the company that controls it: C$54.8bn (2025).
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01 (CSV); Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country (CSV).
Q-021 · How likely is a new build stake by October 2027?F-0151, F-0152A tracked fund's new C$1bn+ build stake by 31 Oct 2027: 43%, our estimate, scored when it resolves. Japanese companies are not among the funds Q-021 tracks.
Mitsubishi Corporation pro rata share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 capital cost (15% of the announced investment): an upper bound, not equity: C$4.95bn capital-cost share (= stake % × announced Phase 2 private investment)
Japanese direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (immediate investor): 2.9% (= Japan stock / all countries stock)
F-0190 registered estimate: by 26 Jun 2030, 5 or more projects listed in Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act and a challenge under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Indigenous rights) commenced: 36% (= registered estimate (forecast register row F-0190))
Japanese contract value plus pro rata Phase 2 cost share in LNG Canada Phase 2 (JGC EPC share + Mitsubishi upper bound): C$15.4bn (= JGC EPC share in C$ + Mitsubishi pro rata Phase 2 cost share (upper bound))
Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product. Source: Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance; processed by Strature.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 29 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →
HighChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for JapanChipsChipmaking in Taiwan
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for Japan
Japan took 59.8% of its chip imports and 59.0% of its processor imports from Taiwan in 2025. It also hosts TSMC in Kumamoto and sends Taiwan 24.4% of its chip-making tool exports.
Theme band High
59.8%
Chip imports from Taiwan, of JPY 3.63 trillion (2025)
59%
Processor imports from Taiwan (2025)
24.4%
Chip-making equipment exports going to Taiwan (2025)
US$17bnest.
TSMC's planned Kumamoto fab 2, upgraded to 3nm, US$bn (press, 2026)
Read the full panel
MediumUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for JapanUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada
Strature analysis, not from the brief
US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for Japan
Japan's 2025 US car sales were 1.47 times Canada's; its cars now pay 15%. A 50% Canadian vehicle tariff would put up to US$5.75bn in play: an upper bound, our calculation, not a forecast.
Theme band Medium
20.2%
Share of US car imports (2025, US Census)
15%
US tariff on Japanese cars since 16 Sep 2025
C$46.7bn
Direct investment in Canada, C$bn (2025)
46.2%
Canola imports supplied by Canada (2024, by value)
Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for JapanHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Japan: what passes the strait
Almost all of its crude comes from the Middle East and about two-thirds crosses the strait; deep stocks are its main buffer.
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
How have Japan and Korea changed their refiners' legal oil stock floors?
“Korea cut 40 days of average sales to 20 from 29 May, until separately lifted, as reported by The Korea Times and Newspim; no restoring notice was found in searches to 30 September 2026.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Could the largest strategic oil stocks behind the Strait be released?
“The two largest strategic holders behind the Strait were not part of it. EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected China +3
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Saudi Arabia Affected South Korea +8
Theme Brief · T-003 · 2 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9
“The IEA records that China and India together received 44 per cent of the crude exported through the Strait in 2025 and that Japan and Korea are particularly reliant on it”
“On the Kiel Institute's model of a full closure, US welfare falls by 0.07 per cent while losses in South Asia and Africa are 10 to 20 times larger in percentage terms.”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Iran Affected United States +4
What else does Canada ship to the same Asian destinations?
“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”
The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.Primary Canada Affected China +1
What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Europe · Indo-Pacific · Middle East · North America · South Asia · Southeast Asia
ISO 3166-1 name: Japan (JPN). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
Published briefs
Briefs with Japan as their subject.
No published brief has Japan as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.
Forecast register
Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.
Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.
A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.
No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.
Registered forecasts attached to questions touching Japan: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
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Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
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Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.