Your exposure · Country · Asia-Pacific

Japan

Almost all of its crude comes from the Middle East and about two-thirds crosses the strait; deep stocks are its main buffer. Approved reading

This page answers: What does Japan depend on, and which of our questions concern it?

Using this page
  1. Read the Dependency profile: the country card and where supply comes from.
  2. Tap In scenarios to see how each closed strait reaches Japan.
  3. Scroll to the questions. Filter them, then open any brief.
  • Briefs 13 questions in 6 briefs
  • Region Asia-Pacific · East Asia
  • Readings updated
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Your exposure

Japan in our readings

Japan is in 4 of our country readings; High in 3.

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to October 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Elevated
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Elevated
  • Supply chains and chokepoints High
  • Energy and resources High
  • Technology and cyber Elevated
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Not yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Japan on the outlook map

The other side: 18 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Japan

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Our reading · Strait of Hormuz

Show all 4 risks that reach Japan

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for Japan

See Japan's 11 risks on a chart

Three of Japan's 11 risks share one score pair: Impact 5, Likelihood 4.

23G7 bond rout forces bond buyingThe Diet enacts aconsumption-tax cut1234567891012345678910LowLowElevatedElevatedHighHighSevereSevereImpactLikelihood

Area is the count.

Solid arc: share under way. Dashed arc: share low confidence.

Tint and lines are the card counts smoothed, each line double the last. They follow the cards; they are not a score.

Every card is in the list below, with its scores.

SourceStrature world-risk cards, approved, as of 17 Nov 2026. Scores are judgements, not probabilities. The two scores are never multiplied.
Exhibit R-5 · JAPAN · strature.net
Show all 11 world risks for Japan

All world risks that touch Japan

If the Strait of Hormuz closes

Who runs short first

Japan supply shortfall begins: day 20

Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.

first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file

Good by good (9)
  • Ammonia supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • Crude oil supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file
  • Helium supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • LNG supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • LPG supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • Methanol supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • Polyethylene and polypropylene supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • Refined fuels supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
  • Urea and nitrogen fertilisers supply shortfall begins: day 20 first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)

Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.

First to run short in this case: India, day 4.

Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

The Stock Clock in the Network map: every case, as clocks, lanes or a table

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Japan makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • 18 Nov 2026 Trade statistics for October; September's deficit was 536.6bn yen, the fifth monthly deficit in a row. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Trade data on Japan's LNG imports from Canada; Canada's share was 3.0% in Jan-Sep 2026 (MoF; September provisional). Canada's capital projects
  • Monthly Japan's trade statistics on chip imports by origin; Taiwan's share was 59.8% in 2025. Chipmaking in Taiwan
  • 4 Nov, 8 Dec 2026 Canadian trade data for September and October, early months under the US duty on listed Canadian goods in force since 22 Aug 2026. US tariffs and Canada
  • 30 Sep 2027 F-0167 resolves: the threatened US tariff on Canadian vehicles. US tariffs and Canada
  • Monthly US car imports by origin; Japan's share was 20.2% in 2025. US tariffs and Canada

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, reach Japan through the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could come another way?
  • How many days of stock do we hold in Japan against the day a supply shortfall begins there in the case shown?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Japan, and which outcome would change them?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Dependency profileWhere supply comes from, the map, and how each case reaches Japan
Dependency profile

Country card · Japan, importer through the straits

Three themes; no combined score.

Chokepoints

Crude oil via Hormuz
68% of imports (1Q 2025 / 2025)
Refined fuels via Hormuz
70% of imports (2025)
LPG via Hormuz
3.7% of imports (FY2024)
LNG via Hormuz
6.3% of imports (2025)
Crude imports, April 2026 (MOF) (measured)
0.94 mb/d (Apr 2026)
Crude imports, May 2026 (MOF) (measured)
0.96 mb/d (May 2026)
Oil stocks (IEA basis, days of net imports)
176 days (Jul 2026)

Energy

Oil imported, share of use
97% (2025)
Gas imported, share of use
98% (2024)
All energy imported, share of use
88% (2024)
Renewables, share of electricity (Ember)
24% (2025)
Renewables, share of all energy (EIA)
6.4% (2024)

The Energy theme, centred on Japan ›

Value chains

Photoresists (materials), share of world
80% (2023, approx.) 65%+
Silicon wafers (materials), share of world
55% (2020) watch
NAND chip fabrication, share of world
30% (2022)
Chipmaking equipment, share of world
26% (2022)

The Value chains theme, centred on Japan ›

The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.

More measures (10, each its own unit; never added)
  • Share of national use that passes the strait · crude oil: 68% of crude supply Strature calculation
  • Share of national use that passes the strait · LNG (all gas): 6.2% of gas supply Strature calculation
  • Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one · crude oil: 4 583–5 627 on an index from 0 to 10 000 Strature calculation
  • Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one (ratio to the ordinary index) · crude oil: 1.28 times the ordinary index Strature calculation
  • Helium via Hormuz: 37% of helium imports observed
  • Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 117 days Strature calculation
  • Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait (national basis) · crude oil: 260 days of the supply through the strait Strature calculation
  • Change in supplier share since the disruption · crude oil: −19.1 percentage points change in Middle East share (2025 to 2Q 2026) observed
  • Change in supplier share since the disruption · helium: 23.0 percentage points gain of US share in Japan helium imports (2025 to Jan-May 2026) observed
  • Share of the exposed supply actually lost in 2Q 2026 · crude oil: 70% (observed import loss / Hormuz share before 28 Feb 2026) Strature calculation

importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›

Where Japan’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way

DirectionYear

In scenarios: Japan

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

What this means · In scenarios Approved reading

For Japan, the length of a Hormuz closure drives the result: 59-65 million barrels of oil do not arrive after a 30-day closure, 117-123 million after 90 days and 204-210 million after 180 days, each with its recovery. Adding Bab el-Mandeb leaves that figure unchanged but makes 55-59 million barrels late instead of 7 million. Japan's stocks, drawn at an assumed 1.2-1.5 mb/d, stay above zero in every Hormuz case. Illustrative arithmetic, not a forecast.

Questions about Japan

Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.

How much of Japan’s supply crosses Hormuz?

On file, 68% of its crude oil imports; 70% of its refined fuels imports; 3.7% of its LPG imports cross the strait.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

Who supplies Japan’s crude oil?

United Arab Emirates 43% (2025), Saudi Arabia 39% (2025), Kuwait 6.2% (2025) of its crude imports, with 1 more on the map. Each share is its own figure; they are not added.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How much of Japan’s energy is imported?

Japan imported 88% of the energy it used in 2024, and 97% of its oil.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

Does Japan hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?

Yes: photoresists (materials) 80% of world (2023, approx.); silicon wafers (materials) 55% of world (2020). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

How many days of oil stocks does Japan hold?

Japan held 176 days (Jul 2026), counted as IEA basis, days of net imports (ANRE).

Written from the cited figures by fixed rules

What this means

What this means · Energy: stocks against detours Approved reading

Japan held 176 days of oil stocks in July 2026, counted in days of net imports as the IEA counts them. On its national basis it held 254 days at the end of 2025; the two bases differ and are not merged. In April 2026, the one full month observed, all Japanese oil stocks fell by 1.43 million barrels a day, net.

What this means · Goods: LNG Approved reading

In 2025, 6.3% of Japan's LNG came from Qatar and the UAE, which load inside the Gulf; Australia supplied 39.7%. LNG has no pipeline route round the strait, so the Gulf share has no bypass. Utilities held 2.02 million tonnes of LNG in late July 2026, near the five-year average.

What this means · Goods: helium Approved reading

Japan imports all of its helium, and 37.3% came from Qatar in 2025, through Hormuz. Qatar makes 33% of the world's helium. After the strait closed, the US share of Japan's imports rose above 83% in January-May 2026, according to a single press report (low confidence).

What this means · Goods: methanol, plastics, aluminium Approved reading

Saudi Arabia supplied 55.8% of Japan's methanol in 2025, on a modelled route through Hormuz. The UAE supplied 19.3% of its aluminium by the same strait. The largest plastics suppliers are Thailand and South Korea, outside the Gulf.

What this means · Value chains: batteries Approved reading

Japan made 8.7% of the world's vehicles in 2025. Its own shares of battery stages are not yet sourced. China holds most processing stages: 86% of battery cells in 2025, 87% of cathode material in 2024 and 90% of anode material in 2025.

What this means · Value chains: chips, Japan’s customs data Approved reading

Japan imported US$24.3bn of chips (integrated circuits) in 2025, and 59.8% came from Taiwan. China supplied 7.5% and South Korea 5.8%.

Taiwan's share of Japan's chip imports was between 58.8% and 62.1% in each year from 2023 to 2025. Processors are as concentrated: 59.0% of US$9.91bn came from Taiwan in 2025.

Chips also flow the other way. Japan exported US$35.1bn of chips in 2025; Taiwan took 27.2% and China 18.3%.

Taiwan's fabs buy Japanese tools and wafers. Taiwan took 24.4% of Japan's US$30.4bn chipmaking-equipment exports in 2025, up from 16.3% in 2024, and 38.0% of its US$4.72bn silicon-wafer exports.

Japan also buys tools abroad: the United States supplied 25.4% and the Netherlands 19.9% of its US$7.17bn chipmaking-equipment imports in 2025.

Things to watch · official statistics

  • 29 Oct 2026 Japan's detailed trade by commodity and country for September 2026: Taiwan's share of chip imports
  • 12 Nov 2026 Japan's Fixed trade figures for 2025, which may revise the 2025 values above
  • 27 Nov 2026 Japan's detailed trade for October 2026: chip, chipmaking-equipment and wafer trade with Taiwan

Dates from the Japan Customs release calendar 1.

What this means · Both ways Approved reading

Japan relies on the Gulf for fuel: the UAE supplied 43.3% of its crude and Saudi Arabia 55.8% of its methanol in 2025. Others rely on Japan for chip tools: Taiwan took 24.4% of Japan's US$30.4bn chipmaking-equipment exports in 2025. Each side is shown in its own unit; nothing is netted. 1 2 3

Chips and chip-making tools exposure

  • Chips: Medium
  • Chip-making tools: High

Source: Ministry of Finance Japan, Trade Statistics via e-Stat, 2025 Commodity by Country (Export Jan-Dec: Revised), Sections VI, XV, XVI.

Figures and sources

Gallium, germanium, rare earths and magnets exposure

  • Gallium and germanium: High (low confidence)
  • Rare earths and magnets: Medium

Source: Ministry of Finance Japan, Trade Statistics via e-Stat, 2025 Commodity by Country (Import Jan-Dec: Revised), Sections VI, XV, XVI.

Figures and sources

Questions our briefs address

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Japan.

HighGulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for JapanGulfGulf war / Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Japan

Japan took 94% of its crude from the Middle East in 2025. A 470m-barrel stockpile held supply; the risk now sits on the Saudi and UAE bypass routes.

Theme band High

94%est.

Crude imports from the Middle East (2025)

470est.

Emergency oil reserves, million barrels, 254 days (end-2025)

44.2%

Naphtha supply from the Middle East (2024)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two producers with pipelines that bypass the Strait (Yanbu, Fujairah), supplied 59.4% of crude in Aug 2026. No crude loaded at Yanbu from 11 Sep after the pipeline attack; loadings resumed later in September. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Two releases have already drawn on the stockpile: 80 million barrels from March and 20 more days from May. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Naphtha shortages hit plastics and chemicals. Ethylene plants ran at a record-low 67.3% in April. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Crude oil imports rose 58.7% in August, and the trade deficit, US$7.12bn, was the largest since January. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Two damaged Qatari LNG trains are expected to take about three years to repair (QatarEnergy, as reported). Chiyoda was reported in Apr 2026 to be considering a return to its Qatar project. Estimate from press or commentary
  • US crude rose to 33.7% of imports in August, a step toward diversification. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Naphtha purchases from outside the Middle East were expected to double to 900,000 kl in April. Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • No official figure was found for reserve days left after the two releases.
  • Qatar's share of helium imports is 33% by value in official trade data (MoF), which count other rare gases too, and 37% in a press report. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Whether the US share holds once Gulf grades return is open. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Gulf smelters supplied 28.2% of unwrought aluminium imports by value in 2025, but 15.5% in Jan-Sep 2026 (provisional).

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran.
  • Late Oct 2026METI crude imports for September by origin; the Arab share was 60.7% in August.
  • 18 Nov 2026Trade statistics for October; September's deficit was 536.6bn yen, the fifth monthly deficit in a row.
  • MonthlyLoadings at Yanbu and Fujairah after the September outage.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Crude oilDependence94%est. 2025Share of crude imports from the Middle East (METI)HighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Refined productsSupply chain73.6%est. 2024Middle East share of naphtha importsHighHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
HeliumSupply chain33% 2025Qatar's share of imports of rare gases other than argon (HS 280429, mainly helium), by valueMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
AluminiumSupply chain28.2% 2025GCC smelters' share of Japan's unwrought aluminium imports (HS 7601), by valueMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50%
LNGDependence5.3%est. 2025Share of LNG imports from QatarBelow lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Japan's crude imports, selected origins, Aug 2026 (%)
Saudi Arabia and UAE share of crude imports, August 2026: 59.4% (2026-08)Saudi Arabia and UAE59.4US share of crude imports, August 2026: 33.7% (2026-08)US33.7

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Saudi Arabia leads Japan's oil imports in August; U.S. share surges (Arab News Japan, METI data).

Briefs and questions

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Middle East share of total naphtha supply: 44.2% (= 60 × 0.736)
  • Scenario: Arab-origin crude to replace if a renewed strike also stops the bypass routes for 3 months: 141.5 million barrels (= 47.16 × 3)
  • Scenario: that 3-month gap as a share of end-2025 emergency reserves: 30.1% of reserves (= 141.5 / 470)
  • Scenario: extra crude import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$3.5bn per quarter (= 77.74 × 3 × 15 / 1000 (low × 10, high × 20))

Source: Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance; processed by Strature.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 31 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for JapanCapitalCanada's capital projects

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Japan

JGC holds about C$10.48bn (US$7.5bn) of the LNG Canada Phase 2 build contract, awarded 28 Sep 2026 (not from the brief); Mitsubishi owns 15%. Japan took 20.5% of Kitimat cargo records.

Theme band High

C$10.5bn

JGC's share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 build contract, C$bn (Sep 2026, not from the brief)

C$4.8bn

Mitsubishi's Phase 1 equity in LNG Canada, C$bn (Strature estimate from a press figure)

20.5%

Kitimat LNG cargo records to Japan, Jun 2025-Jul 2026

C$54.8bn

Japanese-owned direct investment in Canada, ultimate investor, C$bn (2025)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Canada supplied 0.85% of Japan's LNG imports in 2025: 554,648 tonnes of 64.98 Mt. The Kitimat route is a small part of Japan's supply.
  • JGC's share is set in US dollars at US$7.5bn. At the 2025 rate it is C$10.48bn, just above the C$10bn High line, so the band rests on the exchange rate.
  • JGC describes the Phase 2 contract as mainly lump-sum turnkey, with some cost-plus parts (JGC, 29 Sep 2026). The terms that allocate cost changes are not public.
  • Honda's C$15bn Ontario electric-vehicle supply-chain plan, announced in April 2024, was reported suspended indefinitely in May 2026 (press report). No placement against it was found in early Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Mitsubishi's pro rata share of LNG Canada output rises to 4.2 Mtpa when Phase 2 runs, expected from the early 2030s (Strature calculation).
  • Canada's share of Japan's LNG imports rose to 3.1% in Jan-Apr 2026, from 0.85% in 2025 (MoF).
  • GE Vernova Hitachi, a US-Japan alliance, supplies the BWRX-300 reactors for the Darlington new nuclear project. Hitachi's share of the vendor was not confirmed in a company filing. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Asahi Kasei's C$1.6bn battery separator plant at Port Colborne is reported to be going ahead despite Honda's suspension (press report). Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • Mitsubishi's Phase 1 equity, about C$4.8bn, is a Strature estimate scaled from a press figure for South Korea's stake. Its pro rata share of the C$33bn Phase 2 cost, up to C$4.95bn, is an upper bound, not equity. No partner discloses its outlay.
  • Japanese direct investment is C$54.8bn by ultimate investor (3.4%), the basis the band uses, and C$46.7bn by immediate investor (2.9%).
  • No contract value was found for the reactor vendor at Darlington.
  • Asahi Kasei's production start is 2027 in the company's 2024 release and the first half of 2029 in later press. Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • FY2026 (to Mar 2027)JGC said it recognises its US$7.5bn share of the Phase 2 contract in fiscal 2026 (JGC, 29 Sep 2026).
  • MonthlyTrade data on Japan's LNG imports from Canada; Canada's share was 3.0% in Jan-Sep 2026 (MoF; September provisional).
  • Early 2030sPhase 2 start-up lifts Mitsubishi's pro rata output to 4.2 Mtpa.
  • 26 Jun 2030Q-025's forecast F-0190 resolves: five or more projects listed for fast-track approval (Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act) and a court challenge under section 35 (Indigenous rights) begun; 36%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
ProcurementProcurementC$10.5bn 2025 FXJGC share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 EPC contract in C$HighHigh ≥C$10bn · Medium C$3–10bn · Low C$1–3bn
Project equityCapital and financeC$4.8bn 2026Mitsubishi Corporation equity in LNG Canada Phase 1 (pro rata from Korea's C$1.6bn for 5%)MediumHigh ≥C$5bn · Medium C$2–5bn · Low C$1–2bn
OfftakeTrade20.5% of cargo records Jun 2025-Jul 2026Share of Kitimat LNG export cargo records to JapanMediumHigh ≥4 Mtpa, or ≥C$5bn, or ≥25% of records · Medium ≥2 Mtpa, or ≥C$2bn, or 10-25% of records · Low ≥1 Mtpa, or ≥C$1bn
FDI stockCapital and finance3.4% 2025Japanese direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor)MediumHigh ≥10% · Medium 3–10% · Low 2–3%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Japanese direct investment stock in Canada, immediate investor (C$bn)
Japanese direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor, book value): C$46.7bn (2025)202546.7Japanese direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$45.8bn (2024)202445.8Japanese direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$31.5bn (2020)202031.5Japanese direct investment stock in Canada (immediate investor): C$26.5bn (2015)201526.5

By immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. The band uses the ultimate-investor basis, the country of the company that controls it: C$54.8bn (2025).

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01 (CSV); Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country (CSV).

Briefs and questions

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • JGC share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 EPC contract in C$: C$10.5bn (= US$ amount × BoC 2025 average USD/CAD)
  • Mitsubishi Corporation equity in LNG Canada Phase 1 (pro rata from Korea's C$1.6bn for 5%): C$4.8bn (= stake % × (KOGAS C$1.6bn / 5%))
  • Share of Kitimat LNG export cargo records to Japan: 20.5% of cargo records (= 25/122)
  • Japanese direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor): 3.4% (= Japan stock / all countries stock (ultimate investor))
  • Canada's share of Japan's LNG imports (by weight): 0.85% (= 554,648 / 64,977,043)
  • Mitsubishi Corporation share of LNG Canada output after Phase 2 (pro rata to equity): 4.2 Mtpa (= equity share × post-Phase 2 capacity)
  • Canada's share of Japan's LNG imports, January-April (by weight): 3.1% (= 679,413 / 22,202,329)
  • Mitsubishi Corporation pro rata share of the LNG Canada Phase 2 capital cost (15% of the announced investment): an upper bound, not equity: C$4.95bn capital-cost share (= stake % × announced Phase 2 private investment)
  • Japanese direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (immediate investor): 2.9% (= Japan stock / all countries stock)
  • Canada's share of Japan's LNG imports, January-September (by weight): 3% (= 1,376,946 / 45,662,343)
  • F-0190 registered estimate: by 26 Jun 2030, 5 or more projects listed in Schedule 1 of the Building Canada Act and a challenge under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Indigenous rights) commenced: 36% (= registered estimate (forecast register row F-0190))
  • Japanese contract value plus pro rata Phase 2 cost share in LNG Canada Phase 2 (JGC EPC share + Mitsubishi upper bound): C$15.4bn (= JGC EPC share in C$ + Mitsubishi pro rata Phase 2 cost share (upper bound))

Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product. Source: Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance; processed by Strature.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 29 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →

HighChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for JapanChipsChipmaking in Taiwan

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for Japan

Japan took 59.8% of its chip imports and 59.0% of its processor imports from Taiwan in 2025. It also hosts TSMC in Kumamoto and sends Taiwan 24.4% of its chip-making tool exports.

Theme band High

59.8%

Chip imports from Taiwan, of JPY 3.63 trillion (2025)

59%

Processor imports from Taiwan (2025)

24.4%

Chip-making equipment exports going to Taiwan (2025)

US$17bnest.

TSMC's planned Kumamoto fab 2, upgraded to 3nm, US$bn (press, 2026)

Read the full panel
MediumUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for JapanUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada

Strature analysis, not from the brief

US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for Japan

Japan's 2025 US car sales were 1.47 times Canada's; its cars now pay 15%. A 50% Canadian vehicle tariff would put up to US$5.75bn in play: an upper bound, our calculation, not a forecast.

Theme band Medium

20.2%

Share of US car imports (2025, US Census)

15%

US tariff on Japanese cars since 16 Sep 2025

C$46.7bn

Direct investment in Canada, C$bn (2025)

46.2%

Canola imports supplied by Canada (2024, by value)

Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for JapanHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz

Strature analysis, not from the brief

Japan: what passes the strait

Almost all of its crude comes from the Middle East and about two-thirds crosses the strait; deep stocks are its main buffer.

Share through the strait

  • Crude oil 67.7%
  • Refined fuels (petrol, diesel/gasoil, jet, fuel oil) 70%
  • LPG (propane, butane) 3.7%

Route shares are modelled estimates; each figure carries its source. General research, not advice.

Open on the Hormuz page The briefing

Filter the questions Domain · Series · Topic
Domain Series Topic

Where Japan acts · 2 questions

Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geoeconomic
How have Japan and Korea changed their refiners' legal oil stock floors?

“Korea cut 40 days of average sales to 20 from 29 May, until separately lifted, as reported by The Korea Times and Newspim; no restoring notice was found in searches to 30 September 2026.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary Saudi Arabia Affected South Korea

What it says about JapanActor: takes the action

“Japan cut the private floor from 70 days of consumption to 55 on 16 March”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 1 questionWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Could the largest strategic oil stocks behind the Strait be released?

“The two largest strategic holders behind the Strait were not part of it. EIA estimates China's strategic stock at 1,492 million barrels in the second quarter of 2026 and India's at 21 million; neither country is an IEA member.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected China +3

What it says about JapanActor: takes the action

“The United States contributed 172.2 million and Japan 79.8 million, together 59 per cent”

From the brief

Where Japan is exposed · 5 questions

Country Outlook · C-005 · 1 questionChina: Borrowing for the Past
Geoeconomic · Geotechnology
On what terms is the truce rolled at 10 January 2027 - free, at a price in China's exports or currency, or not at all?

“China ships fewer rare earths at higher prices, and supplies to Japan have run near zero: the lever works without a full block.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.

Primary China

What it says about JapanExposed: bears the effect

“supplies to Japan have run near zero”

From the brief
Decision Brief · Q-023 · 1 questionIf the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?
Geopolitical · Geoeconomic
If the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, how much Saudi crude can reach buyers, and for how long?

“74–196 million barrels could leave Saudi Arabia in six weeks with the shuttle running, but none bought on 25 September was on file to land that soon.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Saudi Arabia Affected South Korea +8

What it says about JapanExposed: bears the effect

“nothing a buyer could still buy was on file to arrive within six weeks in Japan, Korea, China or India”

From the brief
Country Outlook · C-003 · 1 questionIs exposure to China three risks or one?
Geopolitical
What could break the picture of exposure to China?

“The ten tails are kept as named ways the picture could break, each with its early sign; the structure of the axes is in the annex.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary China Affected Taiwan +1

What it says about JapanExposed: bears the effect

“at the Senkaku Islands or Second Thomas Shoal, involving Japan or the Philippines”

From the brief
Theme Brief · T-003 · 2 questionsWas the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
Was the Strait of Hormuz closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?

“Repriced cargo by cargo: by mid-2026 LNG kept under a tenth and crude under a quarter of their late-2025 flow through the Strait, and by 28 September crude, on Kpler's pre-war baseline, was back; products were not.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected Saudi Arabia +9

What it says about JapanExposed: bears the effect

“The IEA records that China and India together received 44 per cent of the crude exported through the Strait in 2025 and that Japan and Korea are particularly reliant on it”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
Who bears the economic cost of a Hormuz closure?

“On the Kiel Institute's model of a full closure, US welfare falls by 0.07 per cent while losses in South Asia and Africa are 10 to 20 times larger in percentage terms.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Iran Affected United States +4

What it says about JapanExposed: bears the effect

“The same short-run simulation puts India's welfare loss at 1.78 per cent, Korea's at 1.37, Japan's at 0.65 and China's at 0.64.”

From the brief

Where Japan is a partner, supplier or route · 6 questions

Theme Brief · T-001 · 4 questionsCan Canada become a material energy supplier beyond the United States?
Geoeconomic
Can Canada become a material energy supplier beyond the United States?

“It has started, but small: in 12 months to July 2026, 11.3 of 96.8 bcm of gas exports and 32.6 of 256.0 million m³ of crude went beyond the US.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected United States +6

What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
Where did Canada's LNG export cargoes go?

“122 export cargo records, June 2025 to July 2026: Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, three others 5.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected South Korea +5

What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
What does Canadian LNG supply offer Asian gas buyers?

“For this class the question is reliability, and the measured answer is: demonstrated, small and single-sourced.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected South Korea +5

What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“Korea 46, China 36, Japan 25, Taiwan 10, Viet Nam 3, Thailand 1 and the Philippines 1.”

From the brief
Geoeconomic
What else does Canada ship to the same Asian destinations?

“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Canada Affected China +1

What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“UN Comtrade records China, Japan and Korea as the largest 2025 destinations of Canadian coal and of ores, slag and ash; they are also the three largest destinations of the gas cargoes”

From the brief
Exposure Brief · X-001 · 2 questionsTSMC's geopolitical exposure sits on one island, not in its China sales
Geotechnology
Where are TSMC's newest nodes made?

“In Taiwan: Fab 18 (3nm) and Fabs 20 and 22 (2nm), on TSMC's table of 28 Feb 2026.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Taiwan Affected United States +2

What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“JASM in Kumamoto began volume production in December 2024 and started building a second facility in October 2025”

From the brief
Geoeconomic · Geopolitical
What does the overseas build-out cost, by TSMC's own guidance?

“2 to 3 points of gross margin early, 3 to 4 points later.”

The brief’s reading of the evidence; not a registered forecast.
Primary Taiwan Affected United States +1

What it says about JapanCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route

“The overseas sites in Arizona, Kumamoto and Dresden add US market access and mature-node capacity first.”

From the brief

Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.

Regions in these questions Asia · East Asia · Europe · Indo-Pacific · Middle East · North America · South Asia · Southeast Asia

ISO 3166-1 name: Japan (JPN). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Published briefs

Briefs with Japan as their subject.

No published brief has Japan as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.

Forecast register

Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.

Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.

A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.

No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.

The forecast register

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General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.

Sources in this profile

Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.

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    Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms

    Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.

    No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.

    Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.

    Sources and licences

    1. [1] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. US Energy Information Administration, 2025
    2. [2] Refined fuels: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Energy Intelligence, 2025
    3. [3] LPG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Argus, 2024
    4. [4] LNG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. METI (Japan), 2025
    5. [5] Helium: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Kyodo via Sakigake, 2025

    Cite this page Strature, “Japan”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/jpn/, 17 Nov 2026.

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