Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.
Outlook to October 2027
Geopolitics and conflictNot yet set
Trade, tariffs and sanctionsElevated
Supply chains and chokepointsLow
Energy and resourcesNot yet set
Technology and cyberElevated
Regulation and complianceNot yet set
Finance and marketsNot yet set
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index
Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set
Geopolitics and conflict
Outlook
Not yet set
Index
1.4 /10range 0.0–2.8partial
First published October 2026: no earlier range to compare, so no arrow.
Data: European Commission Joint Research Centre (INFORM), INFORM Risk; Natural Earth; Strature, forecast register; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP battle deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP event data; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced with a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0151 (Q-021)
Resolves if, by 2027-10-31, a named allocator's new C$1bn+ equity commitment (agreed after 2026-09-27) to a to-be-built Canadian asset is announced, and no qualifying commitment carries a published or signed project-specific government term our estimate, scored when it resolvesStrature forecast register, F-0152 (Q-021)
General information, not advice.
Risks that reach Germany
US tariffs and CanadaMedium
F-0167 · The threatened 50% US tariff on Canadian vehicles takes effect · 40%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · Open · brief C-006
Case: Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days. The day on file when the supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when the late-arrival gap begins; late is never added to lost.
first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Inside the EU (27) figure: shown, never added to it or to a total
EU (27)
supply shortfall begins:day 19
first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Good by good (7)
Aluminiumsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Heliumsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Polyethylene and polypropylenesupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Refined fuelssupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Ricesupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Sulphursupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Wheatsupply shortfall begins: day 19first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file)
Each good keeps its own day; days and quantities are never added across goods.
First to run short in this case: India, day 4.
Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.3, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of the line is the closure (30 days); the line runs to day 120.
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
How much Germany makes, buys and sells, good by good
Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).Reading the supply balance
Supply balance first, suppliers second.
One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.
Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.
Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).
What to watch
End-2027 Submarine contracting with TKMS to be concluded. Canada's capital projects
31 Oct 2027 F-0151, F-0152 and F-0155 resolve. Canada's capital projects
10 Jan 2027 China's suspension of its October 2025 rare-earth, magnet-technology, battery and graphite-anode export controls ends unless extended. Critical minerals
Each licence cycle China's licences for seven medium and heavy rare earths and magnets, required since 4 Apr 2025. Critical minerals
Federal budget debate Parliament decides on raising the Raw Materials Fund to EUR 1.5bn. Critical minerals
24 May 2027 The European Commission reviews the EU's critical and strategic raw materials lists. Critical minerals
Questions firms in this position often review
Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, reach Germany through the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could come another way?
How many days of stock do we hold in Germany against the day a supply shortfall begins there in the case shown?
Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Germany, and which outcome would change them?
The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration in one stage, not a rating. Dashed underline = low confidence.
More measures (5, each its own unit; never added)
Share of national use that passes the strait · LNG (all gas): 0% of gas supplyStrature calculation
Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one · crude oil: 1 041–1 058 on an index from 0 to 10 000Strature calculation
Supplier concentration, counting suppliers behind one strait as one (ratio to the ordinary index) · crude oil: 1.02 times the ordinary indexStrature calculation
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait (against the extra voyage days) · crude oil: 5.97 times the added voyage daysStrature calculation
Days that stocks could replace the supply through the strait · crude oil: 1 379–1 848 daysStrature calculation
importer through the straitsFlows as of 2025, measured moves 2Q 2026; each figure shows its own period.See the map ›
Where Germany’s supply comes from, and the straits on the way
DirectionYear
In scenarios: Germany
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Scenario
Questions about Germany
Each answer is written from the cited figures by fixed rules; tap a number for its source.
How much of Germany’s supply crosses Hormuz?
On file, 4.7–6.3% of its crude oil imports; 4.2–7.2% of its refined fuels imports; 0% of its LNG imports cross the strait.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Who supplies Germany’s crude oil?
Norway 17% (2025), Libya 15% (2025), Kazakhstan 14% (2025) of its crude imports, with 1 more on the map. Each share is its own figure; they are not added.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How much of Germany’s energy is imported?
Germany imported 71% of the energy it used in 2024, and 91% of its oil.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
Does Germany hold a large share of a world value-chain stage?
Its largest share on file: silicon wafers (materials) 12% of world (2020); motor vehicles 4.3% of world (2025). The 50% and 65% lines mark concentration, not a rating.
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
How many days of oil stocks does Germany hold?
Germany held 96 days (Aug 2026), counted as emergency stocks, days equivalent (Eurostat).
Written from the cited figures by fixed rules
What this means
No approved block reading for Germany yet; this section shows approved readings only.
Chips and chip-making tools exposure
Chips: Outside the lines
Chip-making tools: Medium
Source: Eurostat Comext, EU trade since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8 (DS-045409).
The questions our published briefs address that touch Germany.
HighCritical minerals: what is at stake for GermanyMineralsCritical minerals
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Critical minerals: what is at stake for Germany
Germany buys 74.6% of its rare earths and magnets and 54.0% of its gallium and germanium from China. Medium and high-tech industry adds 10.8% of GDP.
Theme band High
74.6%
of rare-earth and magnet imports from China (2025)
73.9%
the same share in 2023, before the licences
54%
of gallium and germanium imports from China (2025)
US$545.1bn
US$bn of medium and high-tech value added (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
China supplied 74.6% of Germany's rare-earth and magnet imports in 2025, on a bill of US$758.2m. The share was 73.9% in 2023, before licensing of seven rare earths and magnets began on 4 Apr 2025.
Gallium and germanium: 54.0% came from China in 2025, on US$24.0m, against 57.1% in 2023. China has licensed these exports since 1 Aug 2023.
Germany's car industry association said in Jun 2025 that production delays and even production outages could no longer be ruled out if licensing did not improve (reported). Estimate from press or commentary
Industry is where a shortage would bite: manufacturing is 17.6% of GDP, and 61.3% of it is medium and high-tech.
China's wider October 2025 rare-earth, magnet-technology, battery and graphite-anode export controls are suspended only to 10 Jan 2027. If they return, more inputs would need Chinese licences.
Opportunities
The federal Raw Materials Fund, run by KfW, has committed EUR 150m of equity to a lithium production project and EUR 50m to a rare-earths extraction project. The government aims to raise the fund to EUR 1.5bn by 2030.
Other controlled inputs lean less on China: graphite fell to 18.3% from China in 2025, from 34.5% in 2024, and tungsten was 6.6% of a US$357.5m bill.
Germany exported US$246.6bn of high-technology goods in 2024; buyers seeking supply chains less tied to China could add to that.
Uncertainties
The 2025 shares are measured after China's controls began. The rare-earth and magnet bill fell from EUR 755.95m in 2023 to EUR 670.61m in 2025, so a share may reflect what licences allowed rather than the full need.
The EU aims by 2030 to depend on no single third country for more than 65% of any strategic raw material. The benchmark covers the Union as a whole, not Germany alone.
Raising the Raw Materials Fund to EUR 1.5bn is subject to the parliamentary budget debate.
No open data show which German plants use these inputs or how much stock they hold.
What to watch
10 Jan 2027China's suspension of its October 2025 rare-earth, magnet-technology, battery and graphite-anode export controls ends unless extended.
Each licence cycleChina's licences for seven medium and heavy rare earths and magnets, required since 4 Apr 2025.
Federal budget debateParliament decides on raising the Raw Materials Fund to EUR 1.5bn.
24 May 2027The European Commission reviews the EU's critical and strategic raw materials lists.
MonthlyEurostat Comext: Germany's imports of rare earths, magnets, gallium and germanium by partner.
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Magnets reeDependence
74.6%2025Share of imports of rare-earth compounds, metals and permanent magnets (HS 2846, 280530, 850511) from China, Hong Kong and Macao, by value
High
High ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
Gallium germaniumDependence
54%2025Share of imports of gallium and germanium (unwrought, powders, articles) from China, Hong Kong and Macao, by value
High
High ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
GraphiteDependence
18.3%2025Share of graphite imports (HS 2504+380110) from China, Hong Kong and Macao, by value
Low
High ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
Antimony tungstenDependence
6.6%2025Share of tungsten imports (HS 8101+261100) from China, Hong Kong and Macao, by value
Below line
High ≥40% · Medium 25–40% · Low 15–25%
Industry at stakeSupply chain
10.8% of GDP2025 x 2024Medium and high-tech manufacturing value added, % of GDP
Medium
Medium ≥12% of GDP · Low 8–12% of GDP
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
Share of imports from China, Hong Kong and Macao, 2025 (%)
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Eurostat Comext, EU trade since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8 (DS-045409); Eurostat Comext DS-045409, DE imports by partner, 2025.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.
HighCanada's capital projects: what is at stake for GermanyCapitalCanada's capital projects
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Canada's capital projects: what is at stake for Germany
Not from the brief: Germany is High on PowerCo's planned C$7bn battery plant; TKMS is unsigned preferred bidder for submarines reported at up to C$60bn; Uniper contracted 2 Mtpa from Ksi Lisims, not yet built.
Theme band High
C$7bn
PowerCo cell plant, St. Thomas, planned investment (C$bn)
C$60bnest.
Submarines, TKMS preferred bidder, up to (C$bn, unsigned)
2
Uniper LNG offtake from Ksi Lisims, binding, from 2032 (Mtpa)
2.53%
Share of inward FDI stock, ultimate investor (2025)
Read the full panel
Risks
PowerCo's start of production was reported moved from 2027 to 2029 (press report). Federal support of up to C$13.2bn in investments, subsidies and tax credits is tied to the plant (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
The submarine award is not signed. Canada said it would conclude contracting no later than end-2027, with Hanwha Ocean as the reserve supplier (press report quoting the Prime Minister). Estimate from press or commentary
Ksi Lisims has no final investment decision. The company expects one before the end of 2026, and Uniper's deliveries start only in 2032.
SEFE's 1 Mtpa from Ksi Lisims is a non-binding letter of interest, signed in May 2026 (NRCan).
Opportunities
Canada applies its Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy to the submarine programme; the first 4 boats are due in 2034. Estimate from press or commentary
Uniper's 2 Mtpa is the first binding long-term Canadian LNG contract to Europe, for customers in Germany, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands.
The plant is sized at 90 GWh a year, with about 3,000 workers at full operation (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
Uncertainties
The up to C$60bn submarine figure is a press estimate covering boats and decades of support; no contract value is published. Estimate from press or commentary
The FDI share depends on the basis: 2.53% of inward stock by ultimate investor, 1.64% by immediate investor (2025).
By a press count, 9 Mtpa of Ksi Lisims's 12 Mtpa is under supply agreements. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
End 2026Ksi Lisims final investment decision, expected by the company before the end of 2026.
End-2027Submarine contracting with TKMS to be concluded.
31 Oct 2027F-0151, F-0152 and F-0155 resolve.
2029PowerCo's reported new start of production (press report).
Exposure by channel
Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
Channel
Figure
Band
Published line
Project equityCapital and finance
C$7bn2023-2030Volkswagen PowerCo battery-cell plant, St. Thomas, Ontario (planned investment to 2030)
High
High ≥C$5bn · Medium C$2–5bn · Low C$1–2bn
ProcurementProcurement
C$60bn (up to)est.2026-07low confidenceCanadian Patrol Submarine Project: TKMS named preferred bidder (up to 12 Type 212CD)
Medium
High ≥C$10bn · Medium C$3–10bn · Low C$1–3bn
OfftakeTrade
2 Mtpa2026-07Uniper offtake from Ksi Lisims LNG (20 years, from 2032)
Medium
High ≥4 Mtpa, or ≥C$5bn, or ≥25% of records · Medium ≥2 Mtpa, or ≥C$2bn, or 10-25% of records · Low ≥1 Mtpa, or ≥C$1bn
FDI stockCapital and finance
2.53%2025German direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor)
Low
High ≥10% · Medium 3–10% · Low 2–3%
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
German direct investment stock in Canada, immediate investor (C$bn)
By immediate investor: the country where the investment is booked. The band uses the ultimate-investor basis, the country of the company that controls it.
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0008-01, International investment position, Canadian direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in Canada, by country, annual (book value, C$ millions).
German direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (ultimate investor): 2.53% (= 40,457 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))
German direct investment stock, share of Canada's inward FDI (immediate investor): 1.64% (= 26,247 / 1,600,470 (C$ millions))
German buyers' share of Ksi Lisims LNG capacity (Uniper binding 2 Mtpa + SEFE letter of interest 1 Mtpa): 25% (= (2 + 1) / 12)
Adapted from Statistics Canada data, used under the Statistics Canada Open Licence. This does not constitute an endorsement by Statistics Canada of this product.
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 23 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Canada's capital projects →
MediumFood and fertiliser: what is at stake for GermanyFoodFood and fertiliser
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Food and fertiliser: what is at stake for Germany
Russian compound fertiliser carried phosphate equal to about 41.9% of Germany's farm use in 2024 (our estimate from Eurostat). Compound imports from Russia fell 30.5% in 2025, the year EU duties began.
Theme band Medium
41.9%
of farm phosphate use, from Russia, Belarus and China (2024, estimate)
24.2%
of compound fertiliser imports from Russia, Belarus and China (2024)
-30.5%
change in compound fertiliser imports from Russia (2025)
4.7%
of world potash production (2024)
Read the full panel
MediumChipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for GermanyChipsChipmaking in Taiwan
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Chipmaking in Taiwan: what is at stake for Germany
Taiwan was the largest source of Germany's chip and processor imports in 2025, and Germany backs ESMC's Dresden fab, 70% owned by TSMC, with EUR 5bn of state aid.
Theme band Medium
24.8%
of processor imports from Taiwan, the largest source (2025, Eurostat)
19.9%
of chip imports from Taiwan, the largest source (2025, Eurostat)
EUR5bn
German state aid for ESMC Dresden
EUR10bn
ESMC Dresden total investment, expected to be more than this (2023)
Read the full panel
MediumUS tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for GermanyUS tariffsUS tariffs and Canada
Strature analysis, not from the brief
US tariffs and Canada: what is at stake for Germany
Germany is on eight channels, Medium on five. It holds 11.5% of US car imports, so a US duty on Canadian vehicles could favour it; Canada tops its non-EU iron ore imports.
Theme band Medium
11.5%
Share of US passenger-car imports, 2025 (US Census)
48.5%
Canada's share of German iron-ore imports from outside the EU, 2025 (Eurostat)
1.26%
Share of Canada's exports excl. gold, 2025
C$26.2bn
Direct investment in Canada, 2025
Read the full panel
Strait of Hormuz: what passes the strait for GermanyHormuzChokepoints: Strait of Hormuz
Strature analysis, not from the brief
Germany: what passes the strait
Little direct Gulf supply: its diesel and jet fuel arrive mainly through the Netherlands and Belgium, which hides the true origin.
What it says about GermanyCounterpart: buyer, supplier, partner, host or route
“ESMC in Dresden, 70% TSMC with Bosch, Infineon and NXP at 10% each, is planned for 40,000 12-inch wafers a month on 28/22nm and 16/12nm (TSMC, 8 Aug 2023).”
Each answer is quoted verbatim from the brief, and so is each sentence under “What it says”; anything labelled “Context, not from the brief” comes from the public source named beside it. Answers with a register ID are our estimates, scored when they resolve; the others are the brief’s reading of the evidence, not forecasts.
Regions in these questions East Asia · Europe · North America
ISO 3166-1 name: Germany (DEU). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.
Published briefs
Briefs with Germany as their subject.
No published brief has Germany as its subject yet; the questions above name it in another role.
Forecast register
Forecasts on the register attached to the questions above.
Each is our estimate, scored when it resolves. Published briefs only; the full register lists every one.
A registered question, separate from the scenario results on this page: no probability is carried into the scenarios.
No registered forecast is attached to these questions yet.
Registered forecasts attached to questions touching Germany: identifier, forecast, our estimate, issued, resolves by, status
The summary sheet and the executive read are free.
The full brief is supplied to organisations through the request form on the brief’s page: they accept its terms and confirm a work email, and it is free during the introductory period.
For organisations. About two minutes to request; the download link comes by email.
General research for general circulation; not investment, legal or tax advice and not tailored to any reader. Every probability is our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources in this profile
Tap any number for its source, period, licence and confidence. Kpler and Vortexa figures appear only as published by the IEA or the EIA, credited to both.
Show the list
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait closes. Figures as of 2025 for flows; each figure shows its own period. Terms
Map: Natural Earth, with Crimea drawn as part of Ukraine. Boundaries as drawn by the source; no position on any dispute is implied. Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty. We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf. Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us. Company shares, where shown, are as published by the named source; naming a company is not a view on it or its securities. Research, not advice.
Strature GPS · Figures as of 2025 for flows and as dated beside each other figure; scenario results built 13 Nov 2026.
Sources and licences
[1] Crude oil: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Eurostat, 2025
[2] LNG: share of imports through the Strait of Hormuz. Eurostat, 2024
Cite this page Strature, “Germany”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/deu/, 17 Nov 2026.
Notes and limits
Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. It does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
General research, not advice.
Ask about Germany
A question this page does not answer?
Suggest it for the series; if we take it up, the answer is published to everyone.
Is your company exposed in Germany? An exposure assessment of your own company, free. Request a free pilot →