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Strait of Hormuz

Follow Strait of HormuzAlerts when its risks move. Free.

In a 30-day closure some oil never arrives at all: of the economies shown, China loses the most, 310-317 million barrels. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

This page answers: Who depends on this strait, who runs short first if it closes, and what is there to watch?

Using this page
  1. Read the short version: the register box, the figures and who runs short first.
  2. Open a scenario case for the worked arithmetic behind each day.
  3. Choose Full analyst view for the tools, the sources and the method.
Link to this page
Forecast register

Related forecasts in our register

Nearest related forecast; not a closure probability.

In the register’s exact words, each with our estimate, scored when it resolves.

  • F-0010 · Frozen Siege · 9.2%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · Open · brief C-002

  • F-0020 · Guard-Managed Attrition · 13.74%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · Open · brief C-002

The full forecast register

The strait in figures

Oil, normal (2025 average)
19.9 mb/dSource [1]
Oil, as measured (2Q 2026)
4.9 mb/dSource [2]
Liquefied natural gas, 2025
112 bcmSource [3] 20%Source [3] of world LNG trade
Unused pipeline capacity round the strait (crude only)
3.5–5.5 mb/dSource [3]
Oil with no route round it
14.4–16.4 mb/dSource [3]

The normal figure is the 2025 average (IEA, Kpler data); the measured one is EIA’s, based on Vortexa tanker data, which misses ships with tracking switched off. The methods differ. Liquefied natural gas has no route round the strait.

Who depends on it

Crude oil: share of imports through the strait

  1. Sri Lanka 50–100%Source [4]
  2. Vietnam 80%Source [5]
  3. South Korea 68%Source [6]
  4. Japan 67.7%Source [7]
  5. Taiwan 62%Source [8]
  6. Bangladesh 50%Source [9]
  7. China 46.8%Source [7]
  8. India 43.6%Source [10]
  9. Malaysia 40%Source [11]
  10. EU (27) 5.7–12.5%Source [12]
Show the rest
  1. Canada 11.2%Source [13]
  2. France 7.4–10.1%Source [14] inside the EU (27) figure, never added to it
  3. United States 3.1–7.9%Source [15]
  4. Germany 4.7–6.3%Source [16] inside the EU (27) figure, never added to it
  5. United Kingdom 0%Source [17]

LNG: share of imports through the strait

  1. Pakistan 90%Source [18]
  2. India 55.1%Source [19]
  3. Taiwan 34%Source [8]
  4. China 33%Source [20]
  5. United States 25.6%Source [21]
  6. South Korea 20%Source [22]
  7. EU (27) 8.08%Source [23]
  8. Japan 6.3%Source [24]
  9. United Kingdom 6%Source [25]
  10. France 1.7%Source [26] inside the EU (27) figure, never added to it
Show the rest
  1. Germany 0%Source [27] inside the EU (27) figure, never added to it

Route shares are modelled estimates on cited figures; a range shows where sources differ. Germany and France are shown on their own; the EU (27) is a bloc, shown on the switch and never added to its members. Every good, in the Atlas.

If it closes

Who runs short first

Case: Strait of Hormuz closed, restricted or unsafe. For each country, the day on file when its supply shortfall begins, or, where nothing runs short, when its late-arrival gap begins. Gulf sellers stay in the list, marked as sellers with their export shares through the strait.

All 11 countries on file in this case reach a supply shortfall; the first to run short are listed first.

  1. EU (27) supply shortfall begins: day 19

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Aluminium, Ammonia, Crude oil, Helium

  2. India supply shortfall begins: day 4

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Crude oil, LNG, LPG

  3. Bahrain supply shortfall begins: day 10

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · LNG

    Seller
  4. Canada supply shortfall begins: day 10

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Crude oil, Urea and nitrogen fertilisers, Wheat

  5. Kuwait supply shortfall begins: day 10

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · LNG, Wheat

    Seller · 100% of its crude oil exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025) pass the strait
  6. Qatar supply shortfall begins: day 10

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Sulphur

    Seller · 93% of its LNG exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025) pass the strait
  7. United States supply shortfall begins: day 10

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Crude oil, LNG, Refined fuels

  8. France supply shortfall begins: day 19

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Aluminium, Helium, Methanol, Polyethylene and polypropylene

    Inside the EU (27) figure: shown, never added to it or to a total
  9. Germany supply shortfall begins: day 19

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Aluminium, Helium, Polyethylene and polypropylene, Refined fuels

    Inside the EU (27) figure: shown, never added to it or to a total
Show all 11
  1. Japan supply shortfall begins: day 20

    first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file · Crude oil, Helium, LNG, LPG

  2. China supply shortfall begins: day 21

    first day with cargo lost (no stock record on file) · Crude oil, LNG

  3. South Korea supply shortfall begins: day 21

    first day lost cargo is not covered by the stocks on file · Crude oil

No row on file in this case Saudi Arabia: Seller · 82% of its crude oil exports (US Energy Information Administration, Q2 2024) pass the strait; United Arab Emirates: Seller · 63% of its crude oil exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025); 96% of its LNG exports (IEA (Kpler data), 2025) pass the strait. Not a finding that they are unaffected.

Days as on file in the precomputed case “Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days” (Strature network pack, engine 1.2.2, the network map’s default settings). Day 0 is the first day of the closure; the shaded part of each line is the closure (30 days); each line runs to day 120.

Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

The Stock Clock in the Network map: clocks, lanes and a table

Who is exposed

40 of 63 countries read are High; 15 Medium, 8 Low.

Each country’s band is its highest channel band on our published materiality lines. Strature analysis, not from the brief.

Show a region
  1. PakistanHighCrude oilGulf capitalLNGRefined productsRemittancesSulphur
  2. IndiaHighLNGRefined products (LPG)Sulphur
  3. ThailandHighCrude oilFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  4. KenyaHighFertiliser (urea)Refined productsSulphur
  5. South KoreaHighCrude oilHeliumRefined products
  6. TaiwanHighCrude oilHeliumLNG
  7. South AfricaHighFertiliser (urea)Refined productsSulphur
  8. EgyptHighGulf capitalRefined products
Show all 63 countries read
  1. JapanHighCrude oilRefined products
  2. JordanHighCrude oilRefined products
  3. RwandaHighFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  4. Sri LankaHighCrude oilFertiliser (urea)
  5. TanzaniaHighFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  6. SingaporeHighCrude oilLNG
  7. BahrainHighGulf capitalGulf producer
  8. KuwaitHighLNGGulf producer
  9. UgandaHighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)
  10. ZimbabweHighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)
  11. ChinaHighHelium
  12. BangladeshHighLNG
  13. EthiopiaHighRefined products
  14. MoroccoHighSulphur
  15. MozambiqueHighFertiliser (urea)
  16. PolandHighLNG
  17. YemenHighRefined products
  18. IndonesiaHighSulphur
  19. PhilippinesHighCrude oil
  20. DenmarkHighRefined products (JET)
  21. ItalyHighLNG
  22. LebanonHighExports to the Gulf
  23. AustraliaHighFertiliser (urea)
  24. EritreaHighRefined products
  25. IraqHighGulf producer
  26. MalawiHighFertiliser (urea)
  27. MalaysiaHighCrude oil
  28. NepalHighRemittances
  29. New ZealandHighFertiliser (urea)
  30. QatarHighGulf producer
  31. Saudi ArabiaHighGulf producer
  32. VietnamHighCrude oil
  33. BrazilMediumFertiliser (urea)Sulphur
  34. OmanMediumExports to the GulfGulf producer
  35. TurkeyMediumAluminium
  36. BelgiumMediumLNG
  37. FranceMediumRefined products
  38. GreeceMediumCrude oil
  39. IranMediumGulf producer
  40. LithuaniaMediumCrude oil
  41. NamibiaMediumRefined products
  42. NorwayMediumAluminium
  43. RomaniaMediumRefined products
  44. SloveniaMediumRefined products
  45. SudanMediumRefined products
  46. United Arab EmiratesMediumGulf producer
  47. United StatesMediumFertiliser (urea)
  48. BruneiLowCrude oil
  49. Czech RepublicLowCrude oil
  50. FinlandLowRefined products (diesel)
  51. KazakhstanLowGulf capital
  52. MadagascarLowRefined products
  53. NetherlandsLowRefined products
  54. PortugalLowRefined products
  55. SerbiaLowCrude oil

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026 F-0074 resolves: our register question on renewed US or Israeli military action against Iran, the signpost the Gulf readings name first.
  • Weekly LNG carrier transits of the strait.
  • Monthly Crude imports by origin in the largest buyers: China's customs data, Japan's trade ministry figures and South Korea's national oil company figures.
  • Ongoing Any transit arrangement brokered by Oman, and how the war-risk insurance market answers it.
  • 18 Jul 2028 F-0010 and F-0020, the nearest related forecasts above, resolve.

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of our supplies, or our suppliers' inputs, pass the Strait of Hormuz, and how much of each could go round it?
  • How many days of stock do we hold against the day a supply shortfall begins in our main sourcing countries?
  • Which goods we buy have no route round the strait, such as LNG and refined products, and where else could they come from?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

The briefing

How the Gulf’s oil and gas normally move, what changed, and who is most exposed, in 7 short chapters. The lanes are modelled routes, not ship tracks.

1 · Normal flows · 2025 In 2025, about 19.87 mb/dSource [3] of oil passed the Strait of Hormuz.

That is crude oil (14.95 mb/dSource [3]) and refined products (4.93 mb/dSource [3]). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is counted on its own: 112 bcmSource [3] in the year, 20%Source [3] of world LNG trade.

The lanes are modelled routes, not ship tracks.

2 · Who depends · 2025 Most of it goes east.

89%Source [20] of the crude that crossed the strait in 1H 2025 went to Asia. Sri Lanka and Vietnam have the largest shares of crude imports through the strait: 50–100%Source [4] and 80%Source [5].

Route shares are modelled estimates; a range shows where sources differ.

3 · The disruption · 2Q 2026, as measured In 2Q 2026, oil through the strait fell to 4.9 mb/dSource [2], in EIA’s estimate.

That is 77.3%Source [2] below the last quarter of 2025. Liquefied natural gas fell further: 92.4%Source [2] below.

Quarterly averages from EIA, based on Vortexa tanker data; ships with tracking switched off are missed, so the fall may be overstated. Not a description of today. The 2025 figure is from IEA (Kpler data); the methods differ.

4 · The bypasses · capacity, not flow Pipelines can carry only part of it round.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have unused pipeline capacity of 3.5–5.5 mb/dSource [3] (IEA). On IEA’s estimate, that leaves 14.4–16.4 mb/dSource [3] of oil with no route round. The pipelines carry crude only; liquefied natural gas has no route round the strait.

A narrower estimate: 2.6 mb/dSource [28] of unused capacity (EIA, 2024).

5 · Most exposed · crude oil Who is most exposed, for crude oil.

Ranked by the share of each country’s crude imports that passes the strait. A bar with two ends is a range where sources differ.

Producers on the Gulf, share of crude exports through the strait: Iran 100%Source [3], Kuwait 100%Source [3], Iraq 89.6%Source [29], Saudi Arabia 82%Source [30], United Arab Emirates 63%Source [3].

Russia: outside the strait. Not shown as a Hormuz exporter: its oil and gas leave by other routes. A closure of the strait would change its buyers and revenue, not its routes. beneficiary note

6 · LNG · counted separately Liquefied natural gas has no way round.

Qatar sends 93%Source [3] of its LNG through the strait, and its bypass capacity is noneSource [31]. The UAE sends 96%Source [3].

In 2Q 2026, LNG through the strait was 0.8 Bcf/dSource [2]. We count LNG apart from oil: it has no bypass, and its units differ.

7 · Critical concentrations Where much depends on one area.

Critical concentrations. Approximate areas where much of a country’s water, energy or export revenue depends on a few large sites close together. Drawn from public sources and dated, for research and planning only. Areas are deliberately general and never smaller than 100 km across. We show what depends on an area, never site details, and we do not rank sites. Not advice. To raise a concern: legal@strature.net.

The areas, by country in alphabetical order (not ranked)

The areas, by country in alphabetical order (not ranked)

  • Cox's Bazar coast (Chattogram division)

    All imported LNG: 100%Source [32] of Bangladesh’s total (2026).

    Sources: Apparel Resources, 'Bangladesh poised for major LNG import surge, says IEA outlook' (2025, IEA WEO 2025); Offshore Technology.

  • Gulf of Suez to Alexandria corridor

    The canal and the crude pipeline across Egypt: 2.5 mb/dSource [33] of Egypt’s total (2026).

    Sources: EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (updated 3 Mar 2026). single source

  • Gujarat coast (west)

    LNG imports (regasification capacity): 62%Source [34] of India’s total (2023).

    Sources: EIA, Country Analysis Brief: India (last updated 6 Feb 2025). single source

  • Basra, southern coast

    Seaborne crude exports: 100%Source [35] of Iraq’s total (2024).

    Sources: EIA, Country Analysis Brief: Iraq (last updated 14 Jul 2025). single source

  • Aqaba coast

    All seaborne energy and grain imports (the only seaport): 100%Source [36] of Jordan’s total (2026).

    Sources: Petra, 'Kingdom maintains robust strategic oil and gas stocks, supply chains uninterrupted' (1 Apr 2026). single source

  • Kuwait Gulf coast (national) national: listed, not drawn

    Drinking water (desalination): 90%Source [37] of Kuwait’s total (c.2020-2022).

    Sources: CSIS, Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies? (republished by Circle of Blue). single source

  • Kuwait southern coast

    Refining capacity: 100%Source [38] of Kuwait’s total (2023).

    Sources: EIA, Country Analysis Brief: Kuwait (last updated 20 Jul 2023). single source

  • Karachi coast (Sindh)

    All imported LNG: 100%Source [39] of Pakistan’s total (2026).

    Sources: The Friday Times, 'Pakistan's LNG Lifeline And The Fragility Of Hormuz' (4 Jun 2026); Engro Corporation; Offshore Energy.

  • Qatar coast (national) national: listed, not drawn

    Drinking water (desalination): 99%Source [40] of Qatar’s total (c.2022-2025).

    Sources: CSIS, Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies? (republished by Circle of Blue). single source

  • Qatar north-east coast

    LNG production capacity: 100%Source [41] of Qatar’s total (2025-2026).

    Sources: MUFG Americas, Chart of the Day 3/19: The World's Most Consequential Gas Field (Mar 2026). single source

  • Saudi Arabia (national) national: listed, not drawn

    Drinking water (desalination): 70%Source [37] of Saudi Arabia’s total (c.2020-2022).

    Sources: CSIS, Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies? (republished by Circle of Blue). single source

  • Gulf coast (Eastern Province)

    Seaborne crude exports: 82%Source [30] of Saudi Arabia’s total (Q2 2024).

    Sources: EIA, Country Analysis Brief: Saudi Arabia (last updated 4 Oct 2024). single source

  • UAE (national) national: listed, not drawn

    Drinking water (desalination): 42%Source [37] of the United Arab Emirates’ total (c.2020-2022).

    Sources: CSIS, Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies? (republished by Circle of Blue). single source

  • Al Dhafra, western Abu Dhabi

    Refining capacity: 65%Source [42] of the United Arab Emirates’ total (Jan 2026).

    Sources: EIA, Country Analysis Brief: United Arab Emirates (last updated Jul 2026). single source

The Atlas tool

Every good, every country covered here, the flows on the map, the closure calculator and traffic through the strait. It loads only when you open it.

Every country read

  1. Pakistan HighCrude oilExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Gulf capital
  2. India HighAluminiumCrude oilExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)
  3. Thailand HighAluminiumCrude oilFertiliser (urea)LNG
  4. Kenya HighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Gulf capitalRefined products
  5. South Korea HighAluminiumCrude oilHeliumLNG
  6. Taiwan HighCrude oilHeliumLNGRefined products
  7. South Africa HighCrude oilExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  8. Egypt HighCrude oilExports to the GulfGulf capitalRefined products
  9. Japan HighAluminiumCrude oilHeliumLNG
  10. Jordan HighCrude oilExports to the GulfGulf capitalRefined products
  11. Rwanda HighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  12. Sri Lanka HighCrude oilExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Remittances
  13. Tanzania HighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  14. Singapore HighCrude oilLNGRefined products
  15. Bahrain HighGulf capitalGulf producer
  16. Kuwait HighLNGGulf producer
  17. Uganda HighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Remittances
  18. Zimbabwe HighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)
  19. China HighCrude oilFertiliser (urea)HeliumLNG
  20. Bangladesh HighCrude oilFertiliser (urea)LNGRemittances
  21. Ethiopia HighExports to the GulfGulf capitalRefined products
  22. Morocco HighFertiliser (ammonia)Gulf capitalRefined productsSulphur
  23. Mozambique HighExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  24. Poland HighCrude oilLNG
  25. Yemen HighRefined productsRemittances
  26. Indonesia HighCrude oilRefined productsSulphur
  27. Philippines HighCrude oilFertiliser (urea)Refined productsRemittances
  28. Denmark HighCrude oilExports to the GulfHeliumLNG
  29. Italy HighAluminiumCrude oilLNG
  30. Lebanon HighExports to the GulfRefined products
  31. Australia HighFertiliser (urea)
  32. Eritrea HighRefined products
  33. Iraq HighGulf producer
  34. Malawi HighFertiliser (urea)
  35. Malaysia HighCrude oil
  36. Nepal HighFertiliser (urea)Remittances
  37. New Zealand HighFertiliser (urea)
  38. Qatar HighGulf producer
  39. Saudi Arabia HighGulf producer
  40. Vietnam HighCrude oil
  41. Brazil MediumFertiliser (urea)Sulphur
  42. Oman MediumExports to the GulfGulf producer
  43. Türkiye MediumAluminiumCrude oilExports to the GulfGulf capital
  44. Belgium MediumLNG
  45. France MediumCrude oilRefined products
  46. Greece MediumCrude oil
  47. Iran MediumGulf producer
  48. Lithuania MediumCrude oil
  49. Namibia MediumExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  50. Norway MediumAluminiumExports to the GulfRefined products
  51. Romania MediumRefined products
  52. Slovenia MediumRefined products
  53. Sudan MediumGulf capitalRefined products
  54. United Arab Emirates MediumGulf producer
  55. United States MediumCrude oilFertiliser (urea)
  56. Brunei Darussalam LowCrude oil
  57. Czech Republic LowCrude oil
  58. Finland LowAluminiumExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  59. Kazakhstan LowGulf capital
  60. Madagascar LowExports to the GulfFertiliser (urea)Refined products
  61. Netherlands LowCrude oilLNGRefined products
  62. Portugal LowCrude oilExports to the GulfLNGRefined products
  63. Serbia LowCrude oil

Scenario cases

  • Strait of Hormuz closed, restricted or unsafe

    In short In a 30-day closure some oil never arrives at all: of the economies shown, China loses the most, 310-317 million barrels. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

  • Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb closed together

    In short Closing Bab el-Mandeb as well adds delay, not loss: Saudi crude sent round Africa arrives 27-36 days late. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice. Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.

Every scenario case

Open in the Network map

The Strait of Hormuz in the Network map

Suppliers, the strait and buyers on one map, good by good, with the Stock Clock.

Traffic and prices

Traffic through the strait, yearly averages
YearOilLNG
201821 mb/dSource [43]–
202019.2 mb/dSource [44]10.7 Bcf/dSource [44]
202119.7 mb/dSource [45]10.8 Bcf/dSource [45]
202221.9 mb/dSource [46]11 Bcf/dSource [46]
202321.8 mb/dSource [47]10.6 Bcf/dSource [47]
202420.7 mb/dSource [48]10.5 Bcf/dSource [48]
202519.87 mb/dSource [3]–
1H 202520.9 mb/dSource [49]11.4 Bcf/dSource [49]
4Q 202521.6 mb/dSource [50]10.5 Bcf/dSource [50]
2Q 20264.9 mb/dSource [2]0.8 Bcf/dSource [2]

Observed price moves in past disruptions

  • Brent spot (EIA, daily): 71.32–138.21 USD/bblSource [51] (2026-04-07)
  • Brent month-end: 72–118 USD/bblSource [52] (2026-04-28)
  • Platts cash Dubai differential to Dubai futures: 1.21–23.81 USD/bbl premiumSource [53] (2026-03-06)
  • Asian LNG benchmark (World Bank), change over March 2026: 94–94 % change over the monthSource [52] (2026-03)
  • NY Harbor ULSD spot: 2.686–5.365 USD/galSource [54] (2026-09-16)
  • US Gulf Coast jet spot: 2.428–4.705 USD/galSource [55] (2026-09-15)
  • European jet crack: 100–100 USD/bblSource [56] (2026-03-31)
  • Saudi Aramco propane OSP (Asia): 545–750 USD/tSource [57] (2026-04)
  • Tampa ammonia contract: 480–825 USD/t CFRSource [58] (2026-09-10)
  • QatarEnergy monthly sulphur price: 740–805 USD/t FOBSource [59] (2026-06-02)
  • helium spot (US distributors): 40–100 % riseSource [60] (2026)
  • Brent spot (EIA) monthly avg: 83.76–114.16 USD/bblSource [51] (2026-10-06)
  • Arabian Light: 66–121 USD/bblSource [61] (2026-09-08)

Published studies for comparable disruptions. Not a Strature price. Not a forecast.

Briefs on this strait

  • S-001 Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: a scenario brief
  • T-003 Was the strait closed, or repriced cargo by cargo?
  • Q-023 Saudi crude if the strait stays closed
  • C-002 Iran’s possible futures

Method

Every figure on this page carries its source, its year and a link; figures from 2023 or older carry an amber mark. Route shares are modelled estimates on cited figures. The days in “Who runs short first” are read from the precomputed cases the network map and the scenario pages use; nothing is added across goods, late cargo is never added to lost cargo, and the EU (27) is never added to its members. The forecast box shows our register’s words and estimates unchanged, each scored when it resolves.

Sources and licences

  1. [1] IEA (Kpler data), 2025
  2. [2] EIA (Vortexa data), 2026
  3. [3] IEA (Kpler data), 2025
  4. [4] Daily FT (Sri Lanka), 2025
  5. [5] MarketScreener, 2025
  6. [6] EIA (Vortexa data)
  7. [7] EIA, 2025
  8. [8] PTS News (Taiwan), 2025
  9. [9] Prothom Alo English, 2025
  10. [10] Geo News, 2025
  11. [11] Krungthai Research Institute (KRI), 2025
  12. [12] Eurostat, 2025
  13. [13] Canada Energy Regulator, 2025
  14. [14] Eurostat, 2025
  15. [15] EIA, 2025
  16. [16] Eurostat, 2025
  17. [17] DESNZ (UK government), 2025
  18. [18] CSIS, 2025
  19. [19] J.M. Baxi Marine Services, 2025
  20. [20] EIA, 2025
  21. [21] EIA, 2025
  22. [22] Zawya, 2025
  23. [23] European Commission, 2025
  24. [24] METI (Japan), 2025
  25. [25] DESNZ (UK government), 2025
  26. [26] Eurostat, 2024
  27. [27] Eurostat, 2024
  28. [28] EIA, 2024
  29. [29] Shafaq News, 2025
  30. [30] EIA, 2024
  31. [31] IEA (Kpler data)
  32. [32] Apparel Resources, 2026
  33. [33] EIA, 2026
  34. [34] EIA, 2023 2023 or older
  35. [35] EIA, 2024
  36. [36] Petra (Jordan News Agency), 2026
  37. [37] CSIS, 2020 2023 or older
  38. [38] EIA, 2023 2023 or older
  39. [39] The Friday Times, 2026
  40. [40] CSIS, 2022 2023 or older
  41. [41] MUFG Americas, 2025
  42. [42] EIA, 2026
  43. [43] US Energy Information Administration, 2018 2023 or older
  44. [44] US Energy Information Administration, 2020 2023 or older
  45. [45] US Energy Information Administration, 2021 2023 or older
  46. [46] US Energy Information Administration, 2022 2023 or older
  47. [47] US Energy Information Administration, 2023 2023 or older
  48. [48] EIA (Vortexa data), 2024
  49. [49] EIA (Vortexa data), 2025
  50. [50] EIA (Vortexa data), 2025
  51. [51] US Energy Information Administration, 2026
  52. [52] World Bank, 2026
  53. [53] S&P Global Commodity Insights, 2026
  54. [54] US Energy Information Administration, 2026
  55. [55] US Energy Information Administration, 2026
  56. [56] Commerzbank (via FXStreet), 2026
  57. [57] Hydrocarbon Processing, 2026
  58. [58] Fertilizer Daily, 2026
  59. [59] Fertilizer Daily, 2026
  60. [60] Westair Gases, 2026
  61. [61] Haver Analytics, 2026

Cite this page Strature, “Strait of Hormuz”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/chokepoints/hormuz/, 31 Oct 2026.

  • Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; not a forecast; not advice.
  • Illustrative arithmetic on stated assumptions; it does not say whether, when or for how long a strait will close.
  • Nearest related forecast; not a closure probability.
  • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
  • Normal flow through the Strait of Hormuz: 19.9 mb/d, 2025 average, IEA (Kpler data).
  • Routes are modelled, not ship tracks; not for navigation.
  • No data provider endorses Strature or this page, and none is affiliated with us.
  • General research, not advice.