Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Pakistan
Pakistan is among the most exposed importers, yet no released brief treats it as exposed. Gulf LNG, fuel, remittances and Saudi deposits all matter at once; the GCC supplies 81% of its fuel imports.
98%
of LNG imports from Qatar (2025)
81%
of fuel imports from the GCC (IMF, Apr 2026)
5.52%
of GDP: remittances from the GCC, US$22.52bn (FY2025/26)
37.3%
of SBP reserves: Saudi deposits of US$8bn (US$5bn on a three-year tenor, US$3bn rolled over in July)
Read the full panel
Risks
- Gas: QatarEnergy force majeure runs to 4 Nov 2026; spot bids at US$26.97/MMBtu were rejected in September, and 3,600 MW of night-peak power was lost in August. Estimate from press or commentary
- Fuel: a record diesel premium of US$34 a barrel in April, and petrol cover of 18 days in September. Estimate from press or commentary
- Prices: CPI inflation reached 10.3% in Sep 2026, with transport up 27.4%. Estimate from press or commentary
Opportunities
- Remittances keep rising: US$3.66bn in Aug 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
- Food exports to the Gulf: 51.1% of animal-product exports go to the GCC.
Uncertainties
- A Saudi deferred-oil facility of US$6.7bn was requested in July; no signature was found by 6 Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
- The Saudi-backed Gwadar refinery (US$10bn) was first pledged in 2019; no construction start was found in the sources read by Oct 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
- Pakistan opened 6 overland transit routes to Iran in Apr 2026 (Transit of Goods Order 2026); how much trade uses them, and under what sanctions exposure, is not assessed here. Estimate from press or commentary
What to watch
- 4 Nov 2026QatarEnergy force majeure to Pakistan due to end (as reported).
- 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves.
- Late Nov–Dec 2026IMF fourth EFF review: next tranche of about US$1.0bn.
- WeeklySBP-held reserves: US$21.44bn on 25 Sep 2026.
- MonthlyState Bank remittances by country; Qatari cargo arrivals.
Exposure by lens
| Lens | Figure | Band | Published line |
|---|---|---|---|
| LNGDependence | 98% 2025Share of LNG imports from Qatar | High | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25% |
| Crude oilDependence | 80%est. 2025-2026Share of crude imports passing through Hormuz | High | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25% |
| Refined productsDependence | 78%est. 2024Middle East share of domestic oil consumption | High | High ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20% |
| SulphurFood and farming | 76.5% 2024Share of sulphur imports (HS 2503) from Gulf producers (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain) | High | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% |
| RemittancesRemittances | 5.52% of GDP FY2025/26GCC remittances as % of GDP | High | High ≥5% · Medium 2–5% · Low <2 but ≥US$1bn |
| Gulf capitalCapital and finance | 37.3% of SBP reserves 2026-09Gulf (Saudi) deposits at SBP as % of SBP-held reserves | High | High ≥10 or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% · Low <2 but ≥US$1bn |
| Fertiliser (urea)Food and farming | 26.1% 2024Share of urea imports from Gulf producers (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq) | Medium | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25% |
| Exports to the GulfTrade | 8.9% exports 2023Share of goods exports to GCC6+Iran | Low | High ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10% |
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
GulfTotals
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Remittances: cushion with a catch (Business Recorder Research, citing SBP). * Our calculation from the cited figures.
Briefs and questions
- T-003 · Does reopening the Strait restore Qatar's LNG exports? Reopening the water does not restore Qatar's LNG: 'the plant binds'.
- S-001 F-0074 Renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran by 20 Nov 2026, 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
- Q-023 Saudi crude exports if the Strait stays shut; the GCC supplies most of Pakistan's fuel.
- C-002 · Where does exposure to Iran sit? Gulf deposits support Pakistan's reserves; C-002 names Pakistan only as mediator.
Sources cited
- IEA Gas Market Report Q2-2026 (2025; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- IMF Country Report No. 26/101, Pakistan: Third Review under the EFF and Second Review under the RSF (staff report 23 Apr 2026) (Apr 2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- UN Comtrade (public API) PAK imports HS 2503 by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- WITS/UN Comtrade: PAK urea (HS 310210) imports by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- WITS tradestats product group 01-05 (2023; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
Estimates from press or commentary
- Middle East Crisis Could Triple Pakistan's Oil Import Bill (OilPrice.com) (2025-2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Ranked: Which Countries Depend Most on Middle East Oil? (Visual Capitalist, data IEA World Energy Statistics 2024) (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan Plans to Secure Three LNG Cargoes from Qatar in October (Daily Independent) (2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- LNG crisis worsens as Pakistan fails to secure spot cargo for third time (The Nation) (2026-09; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Govt Says Sorry for Daily Load-Shedding (ProPakistani, citing Power Division) (2026-08; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan Is Now Paying a Record Premium for Fuel Imports (OilPrice.com), citing Express Tribune / PSO letter (2026-04; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan faces fuel shortage risk as OMCs await Rs66.7bn in dues (Daily Independent, citing OCAC) (2026-09; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan's inflation stays above 10% in September 2026 (Profit, citing PBS) (2026-09; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan's Remittances Rise 17% to $3.66 Billion in August 2026 (ProPakistani, citing SBP; read via search summary) (2026-08; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan secures $3 Billion Saudi Loan Rollover, eyes $6.7 Billion Oil Deal (Daily Pakistan) (2026-07; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan renews proposal for Saudi investment to set up $10 billion refinery at Gwadar (Profit, citing Express Tribune) and search summaries (2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Pakistan opens up road trade routes into Iran amid Hormuz blockade (Al Jazeera) (2026-04; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- IMF shares first MEFP draft with Pakistan ahead of staff-level talks (Daily Times) (2026-10; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- SBP-held foreign exchange reserves rise $39m to $21.44bn (Business Recorder, citing SBP) (2026-09-25; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Remittances: cushion with a catch (Business Recorder Research, citing SBP) (FY2025/26; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
Our calculations
- GCC remittances as % of GDP: 5.52% of GDP (= 22.52 / 407.786)
- Gulf (Saudi) deposits at SBP as % of SBP-held reserves: 37.3% of SBP reserves (= (5 + 3) / 21.439)
- Share of goods exports to GCC6+Iran: 8.9% exports (= WITS tradestats API XPRT-TRD-VL (reporter data): world 28.75bn, GCC6 2.55bn, Iran 0.01bn; (2.55+0.01)/28.75)
- Scenario: combined one-quarter FX hit (LNG premium + oil price + 10% fall in GCC remittances) as % of SBP reserves: 9.1% of SBP reserves (= (0.67 + 0.71 + 2.25 / 4) / 21.439 = 1.94 / 21.439)
- Scenario: extra FX cost of replacing Qatari LNG with spot cargoes for 3 months (Nov 2026-Jan 2027) after a renewed strike: US$0.67bn (= cargoes × 3.076m MMBtu × (spot - 12.24); central 6 a month × 3 × (24.43 - 12.24); low 12 × (21.88 - 12.24); high 21 × (26.97 - 12.24))
- Scenario: extra oil import bill for one quarter if a renewed strike adds US$10-20/bbl: US$0.71bn per quarter (= 1.9 × 1.5 / 4 (low 1.8 × 1 / 4; high 2.0 × 2 / 4))
- Scenario: annual reserve hit from a 10% fall in GCC remittances: US$2.25bn per year (= 0.10 × 22.52)
- Remittances from the six GCC states: US$22.52bn (= 9.78 + 8.81 + 3.93)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 6 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who is exposed to the Gulf war / Hormuz