Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief
Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Indonesia
Indonesia's exposure runs through sulphur: Gulf producers supplied 71.4% of its 2024 sulphur imports, an input for nickel processing and fertiliser.
2.6
sulphur from Gulf producers (2024)
38%
of propane imports from Gulf producers (2024)
US$22.5bn
fuel subsidy budget, 2026
23est.
of fuel reserves
Read the full panel
Risks
- Sulphur from the Gulf is hard to replace quickly: 2.60 Mt of the 3.62 Mt imported in 2024.
- Fuel reserves are short, about 23 days. Estimate from press or commentary
- Higher oil prices land on the budget: the 2026 fuel subsidy is US$22.5bn, and a widely used fuel was raised 32% in Jun 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
- Refined products come mainly from Singapore, whose refineries lost Gulf crude; our calculation puts Gulf crude inside 53.5% of product imports.
Opportunities
- Indonesian urea can fill gaps left by Gulf urea: it supplied US$220.5m of Australia's urea in 2024.
- Crude is diversified: Hormuz producers supplied 20.5% of 2024 crude imports.
Uncertainties
- Sulphur demand from nickel leaching has grown since 2024, so the Gulf volume at stake is likely higher.
- No Gulf share of Indonesia's remittances was found, so the labour lens is not banded.
- Butane imports were not checked; the LPG share covers propane only.
What to watch
- 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves; a renewed strike would cut Gulf sulphur and LPG together.
- MonthlyCustoms sulphur imports by origin, against 2.60 Mt from the Gulf in 2024.
- QuarterlyFuel subsidy spending against the US$22.5bn budget.
- MonthlyNickel processing output and any acid shortages reported by producers.
Exposure by lens
| Lens | Figure | Band | Published line |
|---|---|---|---|
| SulphurSupply chain | 71.4% 2024Share of sulphur imports (HS 2503, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers (excluding Oman) | High | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% |
| Crude oilDependence | 20.5% 2024Share of crude oil imports (HS 270900, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers | Low | High ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25% |
| Refined productsDependence | 8.1% 2024Share of refined product imports (HS 271000, by value) from Hormuz Gulf producers | Below line | High ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20% |
Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.
GulfElsewhere
Drawn to scale from zero. Source: UN Comtrade (public API): IDN sulphur (HS 2503) imports by partner 2024; WITS/UN Comtrade: IDN propane (HS 271112) imports by partner 2024; WITS/UN Comtrade: IDN crude (HS 270900) imports by partner 2024; WITS/UN Comtrade: IDN petroleum products (HS 271000) imports by partner 2024.
Briefs and questions
- T-003 · How much did each cargo through the Strait of Hormuz fall in 2026? Crude through the Strait fell to under a quarter of its late-2025 flow in Q2 2026.
- T-003 · Which economies are most exposed to the Gulf fertiliser shock? Gulf economies supply about a quarter of world nitrogen fertiliser exports.
- T-003 · Had Hormuz crude flows recovered by late September 2026? Refined products recovered least after the reopening.
- S-001 F-0074 Renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran by 20 Nov 2026, 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves.
Sources cited
- WITS/UN Comtrade: IDN propane (HS 271112) imports by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- ORF: ASEAN's energy vulnerability and the impact of the Hormuz crisis (17 Jul 2026) (2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- UN Comtrade (public API): IDN sulphur (HS 2503) imports by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- WITS/UN Comtrade: IDN crude (HS 270900) imports by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- WITS/UN Comtrade: IDN petroleum products (HS 271000) imports by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- WITS/UN Comtrade: AUS urea (HS 310210) imports by partner 2024 (2024; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
Estimates from press or commentary
- VIR: ASEAN countries exposed by Middle East oil dependence (23 Mar 2026, Maybank Investment Bank data) (Mar 2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
- Reuters: Indonesia raises price of widely used fuel by 32% (10 Jun 2026), via Wikipedia, 2026 Iran war fuel crisis (10 Jun 2026; retrieved 6 Oct 2026)
Our calculations
- Sulphur imports from Gulf producers, volume: 2.6 Mt (= 1.008 + 0.900 + 0.418 + 0.225 + 0.042 + 0.005 Mt)
- Gulf crude embedded in refined product imports (import share x supplier's Gulf crude share): 53.5% of product imports (= sum over suppliers of (share of product imports by value × supplier's Gulf share of crude imports): Singapore 52.9% × 52.3%; Malaysia 21.0% × 48.7%; China 4.8% × 39.7%; India 3.4% × 45%; Korea 3.3% × 69.9%; Gulf direct incl. Oman 9.9% × 100%)
- Scenario: Gulf sulphur to replace if Gulf loadings stop for a quarter: 0.65 Mt per quarter (= 2.60 Mt / 4 = 0.65 Mt)
- Scenario: extra crude and product import bill for one quarter if prices rise 15%: US$1.2bn per quarter (= (10.35 + 21.56) / 4 × 15% = 7.98 × 0.15 = 1.20 (10-20%: 0.80-1.60); = 5.3% of the US$22.5bn subsidy budget)
- Scenario: Gulf propane to replace if Gulf loadings stop for a quarter: 0.3 Mt per quarter (= (0.371 + 0.314 + 0.320 + 0.201) Mt / 4 = 1.205 / 4)
Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 6 Oct 2026. General research, not advice. Who is exposed to the Gulf war / Hormuz