Sign in Get in touch
World risk · Trade, tariffs and sanctions · Taiwan Strait & China

China's export surge meets a wall of trade defence

The test Between 25 Oct 2026 and 25 Oct 2027, the United States or the European Union brings into force a new trade-defence measure on Chinese goods (a tariff, quota or minimum-price measure under trade-remedy, safeguard or Section 301-type law, including suspended US tariffs that come back when a truce lapses) that covers all or substantially all Chinese goods, or Chinese goods worth at least US$50bn a year on the importer's own figures for the year before.

Not under way · Confidence: medium · Reviewed 25 Oct 2026 · Scores from 1 to 10

This page answers: What could happen, how it is scored, and who is exposed?

Using this page
  1. Read the two scores: Likelihood and Impact are kept apart.
  2. Check what is happening, each fact with its source.
  3. Use the calendar for the dates to watch.

Follow this riskSign in to follow; one weekly email if you ask for it.

Likelihood
5Elevated steady this month
Impact
6Elevated steady this month
Breadth7
Depth4
Duration7
Hard to substitute6
Canada pointNot added0

Impact is the average of the four parts, rounded, plus one point when Canada is directly hit on two or more channels, up to 10.

Two separate scales from 1 to 10. Strature never multiplies or merges them.

What changed

Dated, newest first

  1. Likelihood 6 to 5; Impact 7 to 6.

Why it matters

China's exports grew 36.3% in September and its nine-month surplus reached US$938.1bn, on pace to beat the 2025 record of about US$1.2tn, while retail sales of consumer goods grew 1.1% and property investment fell 20.6%. Partners are answering with quotas, surtaxes and duties; the next big test is the US excess-capacity case, due by 11 March 2027, two months after the truce ends on 10 January 2027.

Why Likelihood 5 Pushes: a record surplus is all but certain; the US excess-capacity decision is due by 11 Mar 2027; fourteen partners signed on 7 Oct to act on excess capacity. Brakes: the truce extended to 10 Jan 2027; USTR proposed on 23 Oct to keep its maritime action suspended; negotiated caps such as the EU hybrid cap.

Why Impact 6 Threshold case: a new US or EU measure on US$50bn a year of Chinese goods; Canada is hit only at one remove. Not systemic on its own.

The other facts on file (37)
  • China's customs agency reported on 14 Oct 2026 that exports rose 36.3% in September from a year earlier and imports rose 31%. The monthly surplus was US$133.5bn and the January-September surplus US$938.1bn. [6]
  • Semiconductor exports rose 108.1% by value and auto exports 54.3% in January-September. [6]
  • In yuan terms, exports grew 16.4% in January-September, to RMB23,197.9bn. [3]
  • To beat the 2025 record of US$1.18tn on the revised customs basis [16], China needs about US$242bn in October-December, about US$81bn a month; September alone brought US$133.5bn (our calculation from [6][16]).
  • At the nine-month pace, the year would end near US$1.25tn (our calculation from [6]; low confidence, because monthly totals swing).
  • GDP grew 4.6% in January-September (5.0% in Q1, 4.3% in Q2, 4.5% in Q3). [3]
  • Retail sales of consumer goods grew only 1.1%, fixed-asset investment fell 7.2%, and real-estate development investment fell 20.6%. [3]
  • New home sales fell 13.9% by value and 13.2% by floor space. [3]
  • Households cut their loans by RMB1.03tn in January-September (short-term loans down RMB1.14tn, medium- and long-term loans up RMB106.2bn), while total yuan loans rose RMB11.52tn. [15]
  • Consumer prices rose 0.9% a year in September and 0.9% on average in January-September; core prices rose 1.0%; pork fell 10.0%. [1]
  • Factory-gate prices rose 5.0% a year in September, led by coal (up 35.3%), oil and gas extraction (up 24.5%) and non-ferrous metals (up 21.4%). [2]
  • Consumer-goods factory prices fell 0.1% and car-making prices fell 2.0%. [2]
  • Nominal GDP grew about 5.5% against real growth of 4.6% in January-September, which implies a deflator near +0.9% (our calculation from [3][4]; low confidence, because the 2025 base may have been revised).
  • In February the IMF had projected a deflator of -0.7% for 2026, after -1.0% in 2025. [9]
  • In September new home prices were 2.7% lower than a year earlier in Beijing, 1.1% lower in Guangzhou and 1.0% lower in Shenzhen, and 2.8% higher in Shanghai (indices 97.3, 98.9, 99.0 and 102.8). [5]
  • The Ministry of Finance put hidden local debt at RMB14.3tn at end-2023 and about RMB10.5tn at end-2024. The RMB10tn swap programme runs to 2028, and more than RMB1.3tn of refinancing bonds had been issued by early May 2026. [14]
  • The IMF puts augmented government debt, which includes local financing vehicles, at 126.6% of GDP in 2025, rising to 135.3% in 2026. [9]
  • The IMF's 2025 Article IV review (Executive Board, 13 Feb 2026) found China's external position "stronger than implied by fundamentals and desired policies". On its preliminary 2025 figures, China's cyclically adjusted current-account surplus of 3.2% of GDP is 2.3 points above the norm of 0.9%. [9]
  • An IMF staff estimate puts China's industrial-policy support at about 4% of GDP as of 2023, against EU state aid of about 1.5% in 2022; the IMF warns that the two are hard to compare. [9]
  • The IMF reports that Chinese authorities have identified "involution" in iron and steel, glass, solar panels, electric vehicles, batteries and chemicals. [9]
  • In October 2026 the IMF put growth at 4.5% for 2026 (the low end of Beijing's 4.5-5% target) and 4% for 2027. [10]
  • sets no number for raising household consumption. One economist puts the share at "just under 40%" of GDP. [13]
  • The Party's recommendations for the plan call for "maintaining a reasonable share for manufacturing", which was about 24.9% of GDP in 2024. Read together, Beijing plans to keep its factory base, not shrink it. [12]
  • The US Federal Reserve's H.10 rate was 6.6861 yuan per dollar on 16 Oct 2026. [11]
  • China's central bank says it has "no need or intent" to gain an edge by devaluing. [6]
  • On 23 Sep 2026 (reported on 24 Sep), Treasury Secretary Bessent said the truce, due to end on 10 Nov 2026, now runs to 10 Jan 2027. [17]
  • The first official US paper in line with it came on 23 Oct 2026: USTR proposed to extend the suspension of its Section 301 action on China's maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors by two months, from 9 Nov 2026 to 9 Jan 2027, "to allow for further negotiation with China"; comments close on 30 Oct 2026. [40]
  • On 27 Sep USTR said the US-China Board of Trade, set up during the President's May 2026 visit to Beijing, recommended US$30bn of trade in non-sensitive goods on each side for better tariff treatment in future. [42]
  • MOFCOM said both sides would keep working toward a further extension before year-end. [18]
  • Separately, on 11 Mar 2026 USTR opened Section 301 investigations into "structural excess capacity" in 16 economies, China included. [38]
  • Hearings began on 5 May 2026 [19], and the law requires a decision within 12 months of the start, so by 11 Mar 2027. [20]
  • No determination or proposed action in that case appears among USTR's Federal Register notices up to 26 Oct 2026. [44]
  • On 7 Oct 2026 fourteen economies, among them the EU, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Mexico, India, Japan, South Korea, Türkiye and the UK, signed a joint statement with the US to "examine and take effective action" on structural excess capacity in key sectors, through new sector platforms. China is not named. [43]
  • In a separate Section 301 case, USTR set a tariff on Chinese semiconductors at 0% from 23 Dec 2025, rising on 23 Jun 2027 to a rate it will announce at least 30 days before. Whether that trade reaches US$50bn a year was not checked, so it is not counted as the defined event. [41]
  • On 23 Jul 2026 the administration finalised Section 301 tariffs from the separate forced-labour case, on all products from 60 economies (with listed exemptions), for goods entered from 24 Jul 2026. [39]
  • China pays 12.5% on top of the normal (MFN) rate. [35]
  • They replaced the 10% global surcharge under Section 122. One law firm reads the excess-capacity case as likely to bring more tariffs. This measure came before the window, so it does not count for this risk. It shows the tool works, and it sets the base for any further rise. [35]

Where it sits

Taiwan Strait11. China's export surge meets a wall of trade defence: Elevated impact · possible1 · Elevated impact · possibleTaiwan StraitHong KongTokyoCHINAJAPANSOUTH KOREANORTH KOREAVIETNAMEAST CHINA SEASOUTH CHINA SEAPHILIPPINE SEA0500 kmat 30°NMap data: Natural Earth (public domain).
Taiwan Strait11. China's export surge meets a wall of trade defence: Elevated impact · possibleTaiwan StraitShanghaiCHINASOUTH KOREAEAST CHINA SEA0300 kmat 30°NMap data: Natural Earth (public domain).

How it spreads

If

Between 25 Oct 2026 and 25 Oct 2027, the United States or the European Union brings into force a new trade-defence measure on Chinese goods (a tariff, quota or minimum-price measure under trade-remedy, safeguard or Section 301-type law, including suspended US tariffs that come back when a truce lapses) that covers all or substantially all Chinese goods, or Chinese goods worth at least US$50bn a year on the importer's own figures for the year before.

Not under way

Channels 5 on the card

  1. CanadaCanada imported C$90.19bn from China and exported C$42.71bn in the 12 months to August 2026; exports grew 32.3% [30].
    More

    Canada agreed to let in 49,000 Chinese EVs a year at 6.1% [26]. Its 50% surtax on steel above quota runs to 27 Jun 2027, and since December 2025 the tariff-free quota for countries without a trade agreement, China among them, is 20% of 2024 volumes [28]; since 26 Dec 2025 a 25% surtax has applied to many steel derivative goods [29]. China's relief on Canadian canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs ends on 31 Dec 2026 [26][27]. A broad US measure would raise US pressure on Canada to match it (Strature key question KQ-16 “By 30 September 2027, will a published US-Canada arrangement commit Canada to match US tariffs on third countries in named sectors?”) and would steer more diverted Chinese steel and goods at Canada's quota system.

  2. The EUThe EU's goods deficit with China was €359.8bn in 2025: imports rose 6.4% and exports fell 6.5% [23].
    More

    In Q2 2026 alone, EU imports from China were €154bn and the deficit €103bn, the largest since Q3 2022 [37]. From 1 Jul 2026, a permanent steel regime cut duty-free quotas by about 47% and doubled the out-of-quota duty to 50% [21]. On 9 Oct 2026 Brussels and Beijing agreed to cap Chinese hybrid and plug-in hybrid imports at 350,000 a year from 1 Dec 2026, against recent imports of about 50,000 a month [22]. A broad US measure would push more Chinese goods toward Europe and make the next EU step more likely.

  3. Trade diversion across the G20Mexico raised tariffs on 1,463 tariff lines, at 5% to 50%, on countries without a trade agreement from 1 Jan 2026 [25].
    More

    MOFCOM said on 25 Mar 2026 that these are "trade and investment barriers" [24]; about US$30.25bn of Chinese exports are affected [25]. Brazil set five-year anti-dumping duties on Chinese and Indian pre-painted steel and 25% tariffs on nine steel categories for 12 months in January 2026 [31]. India opened anti-dumping cases on five Chinese products on 5 Oct 2026 [34]. Türkiye replaced its China-only car surcharges with tariffs on most non-EU, non-FTA origins (25% to 30%) on 22 Sep 2025 [33]. Every new wall raises the pressure on the markets still open.

  4. Critical minerals as the answerChina's rare-earth exports fell 9.6% in January-September, to 43,711 tonnes [7].
    More

    Strature's brief finds China's October-2025 export controls suspended, not removed, to 10 Nov 2026 [16]. A broad US or EU measure would raise the chance that licensing is used again.

  5. Prices outside ChinaCheaper Chinese goods hold down goods prices for importers.
    More

    Trade defence moves part of that saving into tariff revenue or quota rents, and raises costs for firms that buy Chinese inputs.

Goods 8

  • Steel
  • Electric vehicles
  • Hybrid vehicles
  • Semiconductors
  • Solar modules
  • Batteries
  • Rare earth magnets
  • Canola

Sectors 6

  • Autos
  • Mining and metals
  • Energy and pipelines
  • Batteries
  • Chemicals
  • Agriculture and food

Straits 1

Three scenarios and their signposts

  1. S1

    Managed walls

    The truce rolls over again in January 2027 and partners copy the EU hybrid and Canadian EV model of negotiated caps and quotas. The surplus stays above US$1tn, but no single US or EU measure reaches the defined scale.

  2. S2

    The US acts broadly

    USTR finds against China in the excess-capacity case by 11 Mar 2027 and the President orders tariffs, or the truce lapses and suspended tariffs come back. China answers with export-control licensing.

  3. S3

    Rebalancing at home

    Anti-involution steps and the consumption plan start to bite, the yuan rises past 6.65 per dollar and export growth slows; partners hold off on new measures.

The signposts of each scenario
PathSignpost
S1Truce extension before 10 Jan 2027
S1EU hybrid cap in force on 1 Dec 2026
S1March 2027 EU-China trade round
S2No extension by 10 Jan 2027
S2USTR proposed action published in the Federal Register
S2Rare-earth magnet licences slowing
S3Retail sales growth above 3%
S3Consumer-goods factory prices turning positive
S3Full-year 2026 surplus at or below the 2025 record

No probability is given for the three paths.

Forecasts

Strature forecast linked to this risk

80%F-0195 · 2026 surplus: past the record, without a new US or EU measure
Strature forecast F-0195: 80% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026
050100%

Other forecasts the card links Open one for what it forecasts and where the card uses it

  • F-01969%Forecasts: 2026 surplus: past the record, with a new US or EU measure

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0196: 9% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-01979%Forecasts: 2026 surplus: short of the record, without a new measure

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0197: 9% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-01982%Forecasts: 2026 surplus: all other outcomes

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0198: 2% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-019163%Forecasts: Trade clocks: rolled on a short clock

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0191: 63% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 10 Jan 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-019222%Forecasts: Trade clocks: settled for longer

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0192: 22% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 10 Jan 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-01938%Forecasts: Trade clocks: both clocks lapse

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0193: 8% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 10 Jan 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-01947%Forecasts: Trade clocks: all other outcomes

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0194: 7% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 10 Jan 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-020550%Forecasts: Yuan at end-2026: stronger than 6.65

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0205: 50% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-020633%Forecasts: Yuan at end-2026: held at 6.65-6.75

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0206: 33% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-02076%Forecasts: Yuan at end-2026: weaker than 6.85

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0207: 6% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-020811%Forecasts: Yuan at end-2026: all other outcomes

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0208: 11% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 31 Dec 2026 · brief C-005

  • F-020910%Forecasts: Risk: The US raises tariffs on Chinese goods generally above the truce level

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0209: 10% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 10 Jan 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-02104%Forecasts: Risk: China halts rare-earth permanent-magnet export licences to US or EU buyers generally

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0210: 4% (2 Oct 2026) · resolves by 10 Jan 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-021772%Forecasts: Household credit Jan-May 2027: still repaying

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0217: 72% (10 Oct 2026) · resolves by 25 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-021825%Forecasts: Household credit Jan-May 2027: borrowing again

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0218: 25% (10 Oct 2026) · resolves by 25 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-02193%Forecasts: Household credit Jan-May 2027: all other outcomes

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0219: 3% (10 Oct 2026) · resolves by 25 Jun 2027 · brief C-005

  • F-016930%Forecasts: China's tariff relief on Canadian peas, canola meal and seafood lapses at the end of 2026

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0169: 30% (1 Oct 2026) · resolves by 1 Jan 2027 · brief C-006

  • F-01767%Forecasts: Fortress North America: Canada accepts aligning its outside tariffs with US policy as the price of restored access

    The card links it as a related forecast.

    Strature forecast F-0176: 7% (1 Oct 2026) · resolves by 30 Sep 2027 · brief C-006

A forecast is a probability on a dated question. The Likelihood score above is a separate judgement and is never turned into a percentage.

The forecast register lists every forecast and how it is scored.

Dates to watch

Calendar

The dates to watch

A dot is a day, a bar a month or a year; a hollow mark is tentative. The line marks today.

  1. 9 Nov 2026 US suspension of the BIS Affiliates Rule ends unless renewed [16] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  2. 9 Nov 2026 Current suspension of USTR's maritime Section 301 action on China ends unless extended [40] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  3. 10 Nov 2026 China's suspension of its October-2025 export controls ends unless renewed [16] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  4. 1 Dec 2026 EU cap of 350,000 Chinese hybrids and plug-in hybrids a year starts, if EU procedures finish [22] Tentative · Outside event

    Remind me

  5. 31 Dec 2026 China's tariff relief on Canadian canola meal, peas, lobsters and crabs ends [26] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  6. 1 Jan 2027 Brazil's tariff on imported car kits (CKD) rises to 35% [32] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  7. Jan 2027 China's customs publishes the full-year 2026 surplus [16] Tentative · Outside event
  8. 9 Jan 2027 Proposed end of the extended maritime Section 301 suspension [40] Tentative · Outside event

    Remind me

  9. 10 Jan 2027 US-China truce ends unless extended [17] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  10. Mar 2027 Next comprehensive EU-China trade and investment round [22] Tentative · Outside event
  11. 11 Mar 2027 USTR 12-month deadline in the Section 301 excess-capacity case (opened 11 Mar 2026) [19] [20] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  12. Jun 2027 Many Chinese localities aim to exit all local financing platforms [14] Tentative · Outside event
  13. 23 Jun 2027 US Section 301 tariff on Chinese semiconductors rises from 0% (rate announced at least 30 days before) [41] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  14. 27 Jun 2027 Canada's 50% steel surtax measures run to this date [28] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

Sign in, with alerts on, for an email 7 days and 1 day before.

SourceStrature world-risk card; the dates cite the sources below.
Exhibit R-3 · CHINA · strature.net

The other side

The glut that triggers trade defence also brings cheap inputs: buyers of solar modules, batteries, EVs and machinery pay less. A partner that negotiates caps instead of blanket tariffs can trade access for what it needs, as Canada did in January 2026 when its 49,000-car EV quota came with China's canola seed duty cut from 84% to about 15% [26]; Canada's exports to China grew 32.3% in the 12 months to August 2026 [30].

Connected in Strature

Sources

42 sources, numbered as the text cites them

  1. Consumer Price Index in September 2026. National Bureau of Statistics of China · 15 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  2. Industrial Producer Price Indexes in September 2026. National Bureau of Statistics of China · 15 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  3. National Economy was Generally Stable with New Achievement Made in High-Quality Development in the First Three Quarters. National Bureau of Statistics of China · 19 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  4. National economy, first three quarters of 2025. National Bureau of Statistics of China · 20 Oct 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  5. Sales Prices of Commercial Residential Buildings in 70 Medium and Large-sized Cities in September 2026. National Bureau of Statistics of China · 19 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  6. China's exports surge 36.3% in September as pressure ramps up to rebalance trade. Associated Press (via News4Jax) · 14 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  7. China September rare earth exports rise 6.7% from a year earlier. Reuters (via 93.3 The Drive) · 14 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  8. People's Republic of China: 2025 Article IV Consultation, Staff Report (CR 26/44). International Monetary Fund · 2026-02 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  9. IMF lowers Beijing's 2026 growth forecast. The Star · 14 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  10. H.10 Foreign Exchange Rates (weekly). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · 19 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  11. 保持制造业合理比重 (Maintaining a reasonable share for manufacturing). Xinhua · 17 Nov 2025 · Official · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  12. China's Plan: From Iffy to Disappointing. Stephen S. Roach · 14 Mar 2026 · Commentary · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  13. Debt swap programme on track, State Council review. China Daily · 13 May 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  14. Financial Statistics Report (Q1-Q3 2026). The People's Bank of China · 14 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  15. China: The Surplus on the Clock (C-005, ed. 1.3). Strature · 14 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  16. US, China to extend trade war truce by 2 months. Supply Chain Dive · 24 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  17. China and U.S. to set up Trade Council and extend trade truce to January 2027. investingLive · 28 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  18. Administration Announces New Section 301 Investigations into Structural Excess Capacity and Production and Forced Labor. Wiley Rein LLP · 2026-03 · Commentary · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  19. 19 U.S. Code § 2414, Determinations by Trade Representative. Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School · n.d. (current US Code text) · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  20. New EU safeguards on steel imports from third countries (Regulation (EU) 2026/1384). European Commission, Access2Markets · 30 Jun 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  21. China agrees to limit hybrid exports to the EU. electrive · 11 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  22. EU trade gap with China grows as imports surge in 2025 (citing Eurostat). Cyprus Mail · 14 Apr 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  23. MOFCOM spokesperson on the conclusions of the trade barrier investigation into Mexico. Ministry of Commerce of the PRC · 25 Mar 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  24. Trade newsletter: China's trade barrier finding on Mexico. AllBright Law Offices · 30 Apr 2026 · Commentary · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  25. Backgrounder: Preliminary Joint Arrangement on Addressing Bilateral Economic and Trade Issues between Canada and the PRC. Global Affairs Canada · 16 Jan 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  26. Canola trade with China (update). Canola Council of Canada · 28 Feb 2026 · Industry · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  27. Customs Notice 25-24: Order Imposing a Surtax on the Importation of Certain Steel Goods (updated 2026-06-27). Canada Border Services Agency · 27 Jun 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  28. Canada further shuts its market to steel imports: CBSA guidance released. Osler · 2025-12 · Commentary · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  29. Table 12-10-0011-01, International merchandise trade by principal trading partners, monthly (via Strature dossier CHN-us-tariffs-canada-chn-19/20/21). Statistics Canada · 6 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  30. Brazil Imposes Antidumping Duties on Steel, Adjusts Tariffs on Industrial Inputs. Datamar News · 29 Jan 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  31. Governo mantém alta de tarifas para elétricos, mas zera cota para modelos desmontados. Tribuna do Sertão (Agência O Globo) · 24 Jun 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  32. Türkiye removes additional tariffs on US, China and introduces new blanket tariffs for motor cars. EY Global Tax News · 29 Sep 2025 · Commentary · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  33. India steps up trade probe into five Chinese products over dumping claims. Deccan Chronicle · 5 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  34. Trump Administration Implements Replacement Tariffs Covering Most U.S. Imports. Dorsey & Whitney LLP · 24 Jul 2026 · Commentary · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  35. China-EU - international trade in goods statistics (Statistics Explained; data extracted August 2026). Eurostat · 2026-08 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  36. Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors (FR Doc. 2026-05214). Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Federal Register · 17 Mar 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  37. Notice of Actions in Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies, forced labour (FR Doc. 2026-15181). Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Federal Register · 28 Jul 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  38. Request for Comments on Further Suspension of Section 301 Action: China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance (FR Doc. 2026-21755; public inspection 2026-10-23). Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Federal Register · 26 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  39. Notice of Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance (FR Doc. 2025-23912). Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Federal Register · 29 Dec 2025 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  40. Ambassador Greer Issues Statement on Announcement of Recommendations from the U.S.-China Board of Trade. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative · 27 Sep 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  41. Fourteen Economies Join United States in Signing Joint Ministerial Statement to Address Global Excess Capacity. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative · 7 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  42. USTR documents on Section 301 and China, newest first (to 26 Oct 2026). Federal Register · 25 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026

Reviewed 25 Oct 2026 · version 1 · last change: reviewed · All risks