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Georgia

Georgia imports 58.3% of the grain it eats, and Russia supplied 78.6% of its wheat imports in 2025 and 95.5% in January-September 2026 (Geostat). Most of its wheat comes from one origin. Approved reading

This page answers: Which questions do our briefs address about Georgia?

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  • Region Russia and Eurasia · the Caucasus
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Your exposure

Georgia in our readings

Georgia is in 5 of our country readings; High in 2.

  • Food and fertiliser High
  • Russia sanctions High
  • Gulf war / Hormuz Medium
  • Sovereign debt Low
  • Europe's right turn Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to November 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Elevated
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Elevated
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Low
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Georgia on the outlook map

Dates for Georgia on the risk calendar

The other side: 3 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Georgia

  • Gulf war / Hormuz Medium

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

Show all 5 risks that reach Georgia
  • Food and fertiliser High

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Russia sanctions High

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Sovereign debt Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Europe's right turn Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for Georgia

All world risks that touch Georgia

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Georgia makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Monthly Geostat wheat imports by country: Russia's share after 95.5% in January-September 2026. Food and fertiliser
  • 4 Dec 2026 FAO Food Price Index for November. Food and fertiliser
  • Monthly Geostat external trade by commodity and country: crude, light oils, coal and wheat. Russia sanctions
  • Monthly National Bank of Georgia money transfers by country. Russia sanctions
  • Monthly Eurostat crude oil imports by partner (nrg_ti_oilm). Russia sanctions
  • 31 Jul 2027 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1437 of 25 June 2026 provides that Decision 2014/512/CFSP, on the EU's restrictive measures, applies until 31 Jul 2027; a later date needs a new Council decision. Russia sanctions

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Georgia?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Georgia, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Georgia on the map of brief questions

Country analysis

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Georgia.

Food and fertiliser · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Food and fertiliser: what is at stake for Georgia

Georgia imports 58.3% of the grain it eats, and Russia supplied 78.6% of its wheat imports in 2025 and 95.5% in January-September 2026 (Geostat). Most of its wheat comes from one origin.

Theme band High

58.3%

of grain use met by imports (2024/25)

78.6%

of wheat imports from Russia (2025, Geostat)

95.5%

from Russia, Jan-Sep 2026 (preliminary)

0.54%

of GDP, staple import bill (2024 prices)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Russia supplied 404,720.2 t of 514,691.8 t of wheat imports in 2025 (Geostat). A Russian export ban or quota could cut most of the supply at once.
  • Wheat imports meet 78.9% of wheat use (2024/25), so the local crop could not replace a lost origin within the season.
  • Concentration rose again in 2026: Russia's share was 95.5% in January-September, after 78.6% in 2025, when Kazakhstan supplied 21.3%.
  • In the 2022 shock the US wheat benchmark averaged US$430.0/t, 36% above 2021; Georgia's wheat bill moves with world prices.

Opportunities

  • A second overland origin has been used: Kazakhstan supplied 109,747.0 t in 2025, 21.3% of wheat imports.
  • The staple import bill is small, 0.54% of GDP on 2024 prices (about US$0.18bn), so a price spike weighs little on the external account.
  • Georgia makes more nitrogen fertiliser than its farms use: 158,070 t produced against 41,800 t used in 2024 (FAOSTAT).

Uncertainties

  • Geostat's 2026 months are preliminary and are revised.
  • Periods differ: Geostat counts 514.7 kt of wheat imports in calendar 2025, USDA 493 kt for 2024/25.
  • Geostat does not state whether wheat is attributed by country of origin or of consignment.

What to watch

  • 6 Nov 2026FAO Food Price Index for October: cereals.
  • 10 Nov 2026USDA WASDE: Russia's and Kazakhstan's wheat export estimates for the new season.
  • MonthlyGeostat wheat imports by country: Russia's share after 95.5% in January-September 2026.
  • 4 Dec 2026FAO Food Price Index for November.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Cereal import dependenceDependence58.3% 2024/25Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley)HighHigh ≥70% · Medium 40–70% · Low 25–40%
Staple import billRevenue0.54% of GDP 2024/25 volumes, 2024 pricesStaple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥4% of GDP · Medium 2–4% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Russia's share of Georgia's wheat imports, by quantity (%)
Russia's share of wheat imports (quantity): 99.5% (2024)202499.5Russia's share of wheat imports (quantity): 95.5% (Jan-Sep 2026)Jan-Sep 202695.5Russia's share of wheat imports (quantity): 78.6% (2025)202578.6

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Geostat (National Statistics Office of Georgia), External Merchandise Trade Portal: imports, HS 1001 wheat and meslin, by partner country.

Sources cited

Our calculations

  • Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley): 58.3% (= 100 × sum of imports / sum of domestic consumption, four grains, capped at 100)
  • Staple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDP: 0.54% of GDP (= sum(PSD imports × Pink Sheet 2024 annual price) / GDP 2024)
  • Wheat imports as a share of domestic consumption: 78.9% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Russia sanctions · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Russia sanctions: what is at stake for Georgia

Russia supplied 98.3% of Georgia's crude oil imports in 2025, 225 thousand t, and 92.7% of its hard coal imports in 2024 (Eurostat). Transfers from Russia were about 13% of the total (press estimate).est.

Theme band High

98.3%

of crude oil imports from Russia (2025)

92.7%

of hard coal imports from Russia (2024)

222,529

t of light petroleum oils from Russia (2025, Geostat)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Russia supplied 98.3% of Georgia's crude oil imports in 2025, 225 thousand t of 229 thousand t (Eurostat).
  • Russia supplied 92.7% of hard coal imports in 2024, 106 thousand t of 115 thousand t (Eurostat).
  • Eurostat records Russia as the partner for 41.0% of Georgia's oil products imports in 2025, 846.561 thousand t of 2,065.57 thousand t; Geostat records 222,529 t of light petroleum oils imported from Russia in 2025.
  • Geostat's rows give Russia 78.6% of wheat and meslin imports by weight in 2025.

Opportunities

  • Partners other than Russia supplied most of Georgia's oil products imports in 2025 (Eurostat).
  • Card rk-rus-ukraine-ceasefire, "Russia and Ukraine sign a general ceasefire on the current front line", is rated Low likelihood and High impact. If measures eased after a ceasefire, the channels above could ease too.

Uncertainties

  • Eurostat reports the partner as declared: a transit country may be shown instead of the origin.
  • Coal data are for 2024; no 2025 figure by partner is on file.
  • Transfers from Russia were US$0.468bn in 2025, about 13% of US$3.646bn (estimate from press: FactCheck Georgia, from National Bank of Georgia data). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Georgia's goods trade with Russia is not banded here: no figure from Georgia's own statistics on this line is on file yet.

What to watch

  • MonthlyGeostat external trade by commodity and country: crude, light oils, coal and wheat.
  • MonthlyNational Bank of Georgia money transfers by country.
  • MonthlyEurostat crude oil imports by partner (nrg_ti_oilm).
  • 31 Jul 2027Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1437 of 25 June 2026 provides that Decision 2014/512/CFSP, on the EU's restrictive measures, applies until 31 Jul 2027; a later date needs a new Council decision.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
EnergyEnergy98.3% 2025Share of crude oil imports from RussiaHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
EnergyEnergy92.7% 2024Share of hard coal imports from RussiaHighHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
EnergyEnergy41% 2025Share of oil products imports from RussiaMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
RemittancesRemittances1.2% of GDP 2025 low confidenceMoney transfers from Russia as % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Russia's share of Georgia's imports (%)
Share of crude oil imports from Russia: 98.3% (2025)Crude oil98.3Share of hard coal imports from Russia: 92.7% (2024)Hard coal92.7Share of oil products imports from Russia: 41% (2025)Oil products41.0

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Eurostat, imports of crude oil by partner country, monthly data (nrg_ti_oilm), Jan-Dec 2025 summed; Eurostat, energy imports by partner country, annual (nrg_ti_sff), 2024; Eurostat, imports of crude oil and petroleum products by partner country, monthly data (nrg_ti_oilm), oil products (O4600), Georgia, Jan-Dec 2025 summed.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Money transfers from Russia as % of GDP: 1.2% of GDP (= transfers from Russia / GDP × 100)

Eurostat data: © European Union, CC BY 4.0; shares and sums computed by Strature.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Georgia

Georgia's Gulf exposure is capital: Gulf investors held US$1.17bn of direct investment at end-2024, 3.07% of GDP, US$1.04bn from the UAE. Eagle Hills plans over US$6bn more (reported).est.

Theme band Medium

US$1.17bn

Gulf direct investment position, US$bn, end-2024 (IMF)

3.07%

Gulf direct investment position, % of GDP

US$1.04bn

UAE direct investment position, US$bn, end-2024 (IMF)

17.6%

Eagle Hills planned investment, % of 2024 GDP (a plan, reported)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Gulf money is concentrated in one state. The UAE held US$1.04bn of the US$1.17bn Gulf position at end-2024. A Gulf fiscal squeeze from lost exports could slow new commitments.
  • The Eagle Hills plan, over US$6bn in Tbilisi and near Batumi, would equal 17.55% of 2024 GDP (our calculation on a reported figure). The Ministry of Economy said Georgia is a co-owner with a 33% stake (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
  • The economy minister said construction would begin by mid-2026, after plan approval and a construction permit (press report). No report of a start was found in the press searched to 3 Nov 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Exports to the seven Hormuz Gulf states were US$185.2m in 2025, 2.54% of goods exports. After the UAE, Iraq and Iran were the largest buyers; a war in the Gulf puts those sales and their payments at risk.

Opportunities

  • Gas imports, 3,388.4 million m3 in 2024, had no Gulf partner, so the LNG loss does not reach Georgia's gas supply directly.
  • The ministry expects the Eagle Hills projects to create more than 30,000 jobs and over 350,000 tourist visits a year (reported claim, not a measured result). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Only 4.74% of oil product imports came from Gulf producers in 2025, and 2.66% of diesel, so a Gulf product squeeze reaches Georgia mainly through price.

Uncertainties

  • The plan has three press values: over US$6bn, over US$6.5bn and a US$6.6bn joint venture. Gulf money has not yet shown in inflows: no Gulf state was among the ten largest investors in 2025, the tenth at US$66.9m. The terms of the agreements have not been published (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
  • The UAE was the fourth-largest source of inflows in H1 2026, at US$51.6m (press, preliminary). Whether this marks the start of the plan is not stated. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The IMF figures count money by the immediate investor: money routed through the UAE counts as UAE, and no ultimate-investor split is published for Georgia.

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves. A renewed strike could test Gulf export revenue and Gulf investment budgets.
  • QuarterlyGeostat direct investment by country: whether UAE inflows rise if the Eagle Hills projects start.
  • 2026/27Plan approval, construction permits and a start of works in Tbilisi and Gonio.
  • Dec 2026IMF direct investment positions for end-2025, the next official Gulf stock.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Gulf capitalCapital and finance3.07% of GDP end-2024 position / 2025 GDPHormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDPMediumHigh ≥10% of GDP or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Inward direct investment position by Gulf investor, end-2024 (US$bn)
Inward direct investment position held by investors in the UAE (outstanding stock): US$1.04bn (end-2024)End-2024, the UAE1.038Inward direct investment position held by investors in Saudi Arabia (outstanding stock): US$0.054bn (end-2024)End-2024, Saudi Arabia0.054Inward direct investment position held by investors in Qatar (outstanding stock): US$0.041bn (end-2024)End-2024, Qatar0.041Inward direct investment position held by investors in Iran (outstanding stock): US$0.035bn (end-2024)End-2024, Iran0.035

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: IMF, Direct Investment Positions by Counterpart Economy (DIP, formerly CDIS), Georgia inward positions, net, all instruments (INWD_D_NETLA_FALL_ALL).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Hormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDP: 3.07% of GDP (= Hormuz Gulf inward DI position end-2024 / nominal GDP 2025 × 100)
  • Planned UAE (Eagle Hills) investment as % of GDP: 17.6% of GDP (= planned investment / GDP × 100)
  • Share of goods exports going to the Hormuz Gulf states: 2.54% (= exports to the seven Hormuz Gulf states / total exports × 100)

Eurostat data: © European Union, CC BY 4.0; shares and sums computed by Strature.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

Europe's right turn · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Europe's right turn: what is at stake for Georgia

Georgia is an EU candidate whose accession the European Council found de facto halted on 27 Jun 2024; over EUR 120m of aid to the authorities is suspended. Each step needs every member state.

Theme band Low

120m

EU aid to the authorities suspended since 2024

2.42%

of the population living in EU states (floor, 2024)

45%est.

of money transfers sent from EU states (Oct 2025, press reading of central bank data, estimate)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • EU sanctions and accession steps need unanimity. On 16 Dec 2024 Hungary and Slovakia blocked proposed EU sanctions on Georgian officials, Euronews reported. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Visa-free travel is suspended for Georgian diplomatic, service and official passports from 6 Mar 2026 to 6 Mar 2027; press reports say it could be widened to all citizens. Estimate from press or commentary
  • EU aid to the Georgian authorities, over EUR 120m, has been suspended since 2024; support to civil society and media continues.
  • At least 92,258 Georgian citizens live in EU states, 2.42% of the population; residence and visa rules reach them directly.

Opportunities

  • Georgia remains a candidate (status granted 14 Dec 2023), so the process can resume if the member states agree.
  • EU imports from Georgia rose to EUR 875.1m in 2025 from EUR 591.9m in 2024; iron and steel rose to EUR 94.6m.

Uncertainties

  • EU states sent about 45% of money transfers to Georgia in 2025 (press reading of central bank data). The Eurostat series the remittance line uses is a gap for Georgia, so that channel is not banded. Estimate from press or commentary
  • In Apr 2026 the EU's foreign policy chief was reported as saying that 26 member states backed proposed sanctions over Georgia's treatment of the opposition and media, and 1 did not (press report, low confidence); sanctions need all member states. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Goods sold to the EU were 9.8% of exports in 2024, below the market line.

What to watch

  • 4 Nov 2026Commission enlargement package, with a report on Georgia (date as reported).
  • Feb 2027CBAM certificate sales open; Georgian steel and fertiliser sold to the EU are in CBAM chapters.
  • 6 Mar 2027The visa suspension for official passports ends unless extended.
  • 18 Apr 2027French presidential election, first round; the second round is on 2 May 2027.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
AccessionRevenuecandidate (status granted Dec 2023); EU pre-accession amounts not found in this scan 2026EU accession status and EU pre-accession moneyLowHigh ≥1.0% of GDP · Medium 0.25–1.0% of GDP · Low candidate status, money below 0.25% of GDP or not found
Eu marketTrade9.8% 2024Share of goods exports sold to the EU27 (EU mirror imports / own exports)Below lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 33–50% · Low 20–33%
Nationals in euOther:migration2.42% of population 2024Citizens resident in EU states, % of home populationBelow lineHigh ≥10% · Medium 5–10% · Low 2–5%
Climate car rulesTrade0.25% of GDP 2024EU imports of CBAM-chapter goods from the country, % of its GDPBelow lineHigh (a) ≥4.0% of GDP or (b) ≥10% of GDP · Medium (a) ≥2.0% of GDP or (b) ≥5% of GDP · Low (a) ≥1.0% of GDP or (b) ≥2% of GDP

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

EU27 imports from Georgia, 2025 (EUR m): total and iron and steel
EU27 goods imports from the country (EU-recorded, by origin): EUR875.1m (2025)EU27 goods imports…875.1EU27 imports of iron and steel (HS 72) from the country: EUR94.6m (2025)Iron and steel94.6

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Eurostat Comext DS-045409, EU trade since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8 (reporter EU27, imports by origin).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Citizens resident in EU states, % of home population: 2.42% of population (= citizens resident in reporting EU states / population × 100)
  • Share of goods exports sold to the EU27 (EU mirror imports / own exports): 9.8% (= EU27 imports from the country (EUR) × ECB 2024 rate / merchandise exports (US$) × 100)
  • EU imports of CBAM-chapter goods from the country, % of its GDP: 0.25% of GDP (= CBAM-chapter imports (EUR) × ECB 2024 rate / GDP (US$) × 100)

Eurostat data: © European Union, CC BY 4.0; shares and sums computed by Strature.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Sovereign debt · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Sovereign debt: what is at stake for Georgia

Georgia sits Low: IMF credit is 1.01% of GDP and public external principal due 2026-2028 is 42.3% of 2025 reserves. A 2031 Eurobond refinanced the 2026 bond (reported).est.

Theme band Low

1.01%

IMF credit outstanding, % of GDP (Nov 2026)

42.3%

external public principal due 2026-2028, % of 2025 reserves

US$500mest.

US$m Eurobond at 5.125%, due 2031 (reported)

31.6%est.

government debt, % of GDP, 2027 draft budget (reported)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Public external principal of US$2.6bn falls due in 2026-2028, against reserves of US$6.16bn in 2025.
  • The new Eurobond pays 5.125%, against 2.75% on the 2021 bond it refinances (reported). Estimate from press or commentary
  • The lari bond of GEL 400m placed in May 2026 pays 9% a year to 2032 (reported). Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Demand for the 2031 Eurobond reached US$2.8bn, more than five times the issue (reported). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Interest took 5.5% of revenue and public external debt service 4.5% of exports in 2024, below both lines.
  • The 2027 draft budget puts government debt at 31.6% of GDP and the deficit at 2.5% (reported). Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • The World Bank schedule is built on end-2024 debt; the 2026 refinancing changed the bond profile. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Ratings come from a secondary compilation (S&P BB, Fitch BB), not yet checked against the agencies. Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • Dec 2026Parliament expected to approve the 2027 budget (reported).
  • 2028Bond principal of US$0.5bn falls due on the end-2024 schedule.
  • 28 Jan 2031Maturity of the US$500m Eurobond (reported).

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Imf exposureCapital and finance1.01% of GDP Nov 2026 credit vs GDP 2025IMF credit outstanding, % of GDPLowHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP, or <1% of GDP but ≥US$1bn
Refinancing wallCapital and finance42.3% of reserves 2026-2028 vs reserves 2025External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reservesLowHigh ≥100% · Medium 50–100% · Low 25–50%
External debt serviceCapital and finance4.5% of exports 2024Public and publicly guaranteed external debt service, % of exports of goods, services and primary incomeBelow lineHigh ≥21% · Medium 15–21% · Low 10–15%
Interest burdenRevenue5.5% of revenue 2024Interest payments, % of revenue (central government)Below lineHigh ≥30% · Medium 20–30% · Low 10–20%
Default arrearsCapital and finance0.02% of GDP 2025 vs GDP 2025Sovereign debt in default, % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 1–5% of GDP · Low <1% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Public external principal due 2026-2028 and reserves (US$bn)
Projected principal repayments on public and publicly guaranteed external debt, 2026-2028 (all creditors): US$2.6bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Principal due, all creditors, 2026-282.60Projected principal repayments to bondholders on public external debt, 2026-2028: US$1bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Principal due to bondholders, 2026-281.00Total reserves including gold: US$6.16bn (2025)Total6.16

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart World, projected); World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart Bondholders, projected); World Bank, World Development Indicators (FI.RES.TOTL.CD).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • IMF credit outstanding, % of GDP: 1.01% of GDP (= IMF credit (SDR) × US$ per SDR / GDP × 100)
  • External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reserves: 42.3% of reserves (= projected PPG principal 2026-2028 / total reserves × 100)
  • Sovereign debt in default, % of GDP: 0.02% of GDP (= debt in default (US$ m) / GDP × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

ISO 3166-1 name: Georgia (GEO). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Sources and licences

No figure on this page yet.

Cite this page Strature, “Georgia”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/geo/, 11 Nov 2026.

  • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
  • General research, not advice.
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