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Armenia

Armenia sent 25.9% of its 2025 goods exports to the GCC and Iran, US$2.15bn, most of it to the UAE. The share was 40.9% in 2024, a year of much larger gold exports. Approved reading

This page answers: Which questions do our briefs address about Armenia?

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  • Region Russia and Eurasia · the Caucasus
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Your exposure

Armenia in our readings

Armenia is in 3 of our country readings; High in 1.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
  • Russia sanctions Medium
  • Sovereign debt Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to November 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Elevated
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Elevated
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Not yet set
  • Energy and resources Elevated
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Low
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Armenia on the outlook map

Dates for Armenia on the risk calendar

The other side: 2 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Armenia

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

Show all 3 risks that reach Armenia
  • Russia sanctions Medium

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Sovereign debt Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for Armenia

See Armenia's 5 risks on a chart

Armenia's five risks each hold a different score pair.

Russia's curbs on Armenianfarm and food goods are stillin force on 30 Jun 20271234567891012345678910LowLowElevatedElevatedHighHighSevereSevereImpactLikelihood

Area is the count.

Solid arc: share under way. Dashed arc: share low confidence.

Tint and lines are the card counts smoothed, each line double the last. They follow the cards; they are not a score.

Every card is in the list below, with its scores.

SourceStrature world-risk cards, approved, as of 11 Nov 2026. Scores are judgements, not probabilities. The two scores are never multiplied.
Exhibit R-5 · ARMENIA · strature.net
Show all 5 world risks for Armenia

All world risks that touch Armenia

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Armenia makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Monthly Armstat exports by country: the UAE, Iraq and Iran. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Armstat gold trade (HS 7108): imports and exports. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • 18 Jul 2028 C-002's six scenarios for Iran resolve; they frame trade with and supply from Iran. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Monthly Central Bank of Armenia data on money transfers by country. Russia sanctions
  • Monthly World Bank Armenia Monthly Economic Update: Russia's share of net transfers. Russia sanctions
  • Yearly Ember yearly electricity data: the nuclear share of generation. Russia sanctions

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Armenia?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Armenia, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Armenia on the map of brief questions

Country analysis

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Armenia.

Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Armenia

Armenia sent 25.9% of its 2025 goods exports to the GCC and Iran, US$2.15bn, most of it to the UAE. The share was 40.9% in 2024, a year of much larger gold exports.

Theme band High

25.9%

of goods exports to the GCC and Iran (2025)

US$2.05bn

goods exports to the UAE, US$m (2025)

US$1.35bn

gold exports, all destinations, US$m (2025)

US$538.5m

US$m of Gulf-bound exports in 3 months (our calculation)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • The UAE took US$2,054.5m of exports in 2025, down from US$5,254.9m in 2024. A Gulf shock could hit that trade and its payments.
  • Gold is a large part of exports: Armstat counts US$1,350.6m of gold exports to all destinations in 2025 and does not publish them by destination. Hetq, an Armenian news site, reports that exports to the UAE are mainly re-exported gold, and that they fell in 2025 as gold re-exports decreased (press report, Feb 2026). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Iraq, whose oil leaves through the Strait, bought US$331.6m of Armenian goods in 2025, up from US$246.2m in 2024.
  • Iran supplied US$680.0m of Armenia's imports in 2025 (Armstat). A war involving Iran could disrupt that supply.

Opportunities

  • The largest markets lie outside the Gulf: Russia took US$2,916.4m and China US$763.6m in 2025.
  • The share fell from 40.9% in 2024 to 25.9% in 2025 as exports to the UAE fell.

Uncertainties

  • Armstat does not split exports by origin or gold by destination, so the gold share of the UAE trade rests on press analysis. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Totals differ: the country rows sum to US$8,311.4m, press reports give about US$8.4bn. On the press figure the share is 25.6%, still just above the High line. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Nitrogen fertiliser imports were 47.2 kt in 2025 (Armstat); no open source reached splits them by origin.
  • Gulf direct investment is small: US$565.7m at end-2024, 1.93% of GDP, below the gulf-capital line.

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves: a renewed strike could disrupt trade with the UAE and Iran.
  • MonthlyArmstat exports by country: the UAE, Iraq and Iran.
  • MonthlyArmstat gold trade (HS 7108): imports and exports.
  • 18 Jul 2028C-002's six scenarios for Iran resolve; they frame trade with and supply from Iran.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Exports to the GulfTrade25.9% 2025Share of goods exports to GCC states and IranHighHigh ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10%
Gulf capitalCapital and finance1.93% of GDP end-2024 position / 2025 GDPHormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥10% of GDP or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Goods exports by market, 2025 (US$m)
Goods exports to Russia: US$2.92bn (2025)Russia2.92Goods exports to the United Arab Emirates: US$2.05bn (2025)United Arab Emirates2.05Goods exports to China: US$763.6m (2025)China0.76Goods exports to Iraq: US$331.6m (2025)Iraq0.33

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia (Armstat), external trade database by country.

Briefs and questions

  • T-003 How the Strait was repriced cargo by cargo, and why LNG recovered least.
  • S-001 F-0074 Renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran by 20 Nov 2026: our estimate, scored when it resolves.
  • C-002 F-0020, F-0008, F-0010 Iran's scenarios to 2028; three of them mean intermittent disruption. Our estimates, scored when they resolve.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Share of goods exports to GCC states and Iran: 25.9% (= exports to GCC + Iran / total exports × 100)
  • Goods exports to GCC states and Iran at stake if Gulf trade stops for 3 months (on 2025 values): US$538.5m (= 2025 exports to GCC + Iran × 3/12)
  • Hormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDP: 1.93% of GDP (= Gulf inward DI position end-2024 / GDP 2025 × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

Russia sanctions · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Russia sanctions: what is at stake for Armenia

Russia supplied an estimated 82.3% of Armenia's gas imports in 2025, Russian-design nuclear power gave 31.09% of its electricity, and transfers from Russia were about 2.8% of GDP by our calculation.est.

Theme band Medium

82.3%est.

of gas imports from Russia, 2025 (press estimate)

31.1%

of electricity from nuclear power of Russian design (2025)

2.8%

of GDP: transfers from Russia, lower estimate (Strature calculation)

US$3.88bnest.

US$bn gross transfers from Russia, 2025 (press)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Russia supplied an estimated 82.3% of Armenia's gas imports in 2025, 2.229 bcm of 2.707 bcm (estimate from press: Interfax via bm.ge, citing State Revenue Committee customs data). The rest came from Iran under a gas-for-electricity swap. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Armenia's nuclear power comes from a reactor of Russian (VVER) design and gave 31.09% of its electricity in 2025 (Ember). The fuel supplier was not verified for this reading.
  • Russia accounted for 63% of net non-commercial transfers to individuals in September 2025 (World Bank) and 52% in December 2025 (estimate from press: Armbanks.am, citing the World Bank). On the lower share, transfers from Russia were about 2.8% of GDP (Strature calculation). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Gross money transfers from Russia were about US$3.88bn in 2025, of US$5.98bn in all (estimate from press: Armbanks.am, citing Central Bank of Armenia data). Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Russia's share of net transfers fell from 63% in September 2025 to 52% in December 2025 (World Bank; the December share as reported by Armbanks.am). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Card rk-rus-ukraine-ceasefire, "Russia and Ukraine sign a general ceasefire on the current front line", is rated Low likelihood and High impact. If measures eased after a ceasefire, the channels above could ease too.

Uncertainties

  • The gas share rests on press reports of customs data; the State Revenue Committee's own table was not reached. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The transfer shares are for single months (September and December 2025) and may not hold for the year; the 2.8% of GDP applies the lower share to the 2024 total. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Armenia's goods trade with Russia is not banded here: no figure from Armenia's own statistics on this line is on file yet.
  • The fuel supplier for the reactor was not verified, so the nuclear band stays capped at Medium.

What to watch

  • MonthlyCentral Bank of Armenia data on money transfers by country.
  • MonthlyWorld Bank Armenia Monthly Economic Update: Russia's share of net transfers.
  • YearlyEmber yearly electricity data: the nuclear share of generation.
  • 31 Jul 2027Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1437 of 25 June 2026 provides that Decision 2014/512/CFSP, on the EU's restrictive measures, applies until 31 Jul 2027; a later date needs a new Council decision.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
EnergyEnergy82.3%est. 2025 low confidenceShare of natural gas (all) imports from RussiaMediumHigh ≥50% · Medium 25–50% · Low 10–25%
Nuclear fuelEnergy31.1% 2025Nuclear share of electricity generationMediumHigh ≥40% · Medium 20–40% · Low 10–20%
RemittancesRemittances2.8% of GDP 2024-2025Remittances from Russia as % of GDP (lower estimate)MediumHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Russia's weight in three channels (%)
Share of natural gas (all) imports from Russia: 82.3% (2025)Natural gas (all)82.3Russia's share of net non-commercial transfers to individuals: 63% (Sep 2025)Russia63.0Nuclear share of electricity generation: 31.1% (2025)Nuclear31.1

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Armenia State Revenue Committee customs data, via Interfax / bm.ge: Armenia reduces Russian gas imports; World Bank, Armenia Monthly Economic Update, November 2025; Ember, Yearly electricity data.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Remittances from Russia as % of GDP (lower estimate): 2.8% of GDP (= WDI personal remittances % of GDP × Russia share of net transfers (52%))

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Sovereign debt · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Sovereign debt: what is at stake for Armenia

Armenia's debt burden is light on the theme's lines: interest took 12.6% of revenue in 2024, and external public principal due in 2026-2028 is 25.4% of reserves.

Theme band Low

12.6%

of central government revenue went to interest (2024)

25.4%

of reserves: external public principal due 2026-2028

US$1.29bn

US$bn of external public principal due 2026-2028

2.9%

of export earnings went to public external debt service (2024)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • External public principal of US$1.29bn falls due in 2026-2028 against reserves of US$5.09bn in 2025, just over the 25% line.
  • Interest took 12.6% of central government revenue in 2024, in the Low band.
  • Government debt was a reported 47.2% of GDP in 2025; the Finance Ministry has projected up to 54% in 2027-2028 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
  • The draft 2027 budget has a reported deficit of 468.2bn drams. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • No bond principal falls due in 2026-2028 on the end-2024 schedule.
  • Public external debt service was 2.9% of export earnings in 2024, below the line.
  • An IMF Stand-By Arrangement of SDR 128.8m was approved in Dec 2025, and the authorities treat it as precautionary; its first review was completed on 10 Jun 2026 (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Creditors in China held 0.2% of public external debt in 2024.

Uncertainties

  • The 2026-2028 schedule leaves out borrowing after end-2024, so new loans or bonds would add to it.
  • The 2027 budget figures come from a press summary; no parliamentary vote on them was found in the sources read. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Ratings come from a secondary list: S&P BB- stable and Fitch BB- positive (low confidence). Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • Dec 2026 (expected)Parliament votes on the 2027 budget; the 2026 budget passed on 4 Dec 2025.
  • About every six monthsIMF reviews of the Stand-By Arrangement; access was SDR 36.8m after the first.
  • Dec 2028The 36-month Stand-By Arrangement ends.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Interest burdenRevenue12.6% of revenue 2024Interest payments, % of revenue (central government)LowHigh ≥30% · Medium 20–30% · Low 10–20%
Refinancing wallCapital and finance25.4% of reserves 2026-2028 vs reserves 2025External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reservesLowHigh ≥100% · Medium 50–100% · Low 25–50%
External debt serviceCapital and finance2.9% of exports 2024Public and publicly guaranteed external debt service, % of exports of goods, services and primary incomeBelow lineHigh ≥21% · Medium 15–21% · Low 10–15%
Imf exposureCapital and finance0.11% of GDP Nov 2026 credit vs GDP 2025IMF credit outstanding, % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP, or <1% of GDP but ≥US$1bn
China creditorDependence0.2% of PPG external debt 2024Share of public external debt owed to ChinaBelow lineHigh ≥33% · Medium 20–33% · Low 10–20%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

External public principal due 2026-2028, reserves and public external debt (US$bn)
Public and publicly guaranteed external debt outstanding, all creditors: US$6.31bn (2024)Public and publicly…6.31Projected principal repayments on public and publicly guaranteed external debt, 2026-2028 (all creditors): US$1.29bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Projected principal…1.29Total reserves including gold: US$5.09bn (2025)Total5.09

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart World, projected); World Bank, World Development Indicators (FI.RES.TOTL.CD); World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.DOD.DPPG.CD, counterpart World).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reserves: 25.4% of reserves (= projected PPG principal 2026-2028 / total reserves × 100)
  • IMF credit outstanding, % of GDP: 0.11% of GDP (= IMF credit (SDR) × US$ per SDR / GDP × 100)
  • Share of public external debt owed to China: 0.2% of PPG external debt (= debt owed to China / PPG external debt × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

ISO 3166-1 name: Armenia (ARM). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Sources and licences

No figure on this page yet.

Cite this page Strature, “Armenia”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/arm/, 11 Nov 2026.

  • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
  • General research, not advice.
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