Sign in Get in touch
Your exposure · Country · Russia and Eurasia

Azerbaijan

Gulf investors held US$4.08bn of direct investment in Azerbaijan at end-2024, 5.37% of GDP; the UAE held US$2.43bn. Azerbaijan's own oil and gas reach Europe outside the Strait. Approved reading

This page answers: Which questions do our briefs address about Azerbaijan?

Using this page
  1. Read the questions our briefs address, and any country reading.
  2. Filter the questions by domain, series or topic.
  3. Open a brief for its free summary sheet and executive read.
  • Region Russia and Eurasia · the Caucasus
  • Readings updated
Link to this page

Follow AzerbaijanSign in to follow; one weekly email if you ask for it.

Your exposure

Azerbaijan in our readings

Azerbaijan is in 4 of our country readings; High in 2.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High
  • Europe's right turn High
  • Sovereign debt Low
  • Food and fertiliser Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to November 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Not yet set
  • Energy and resources Low
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Low
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Azerbaijan on the outlook map

Dates for Azerbaijan on the risk calendar

The other side: 3 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Azerbaijan

  • Gulf war / Hormuz High

    • F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 · 61%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 20 Nov 2026 · Open · brief S-001

    Note, : US Central Command reported strikes on Iranian territory on 30 Aug and 1 Sep 2026; this question resolves on 20 Nov under its rules.

    Strait of Hormuz

Show all 4 risks that reach Azerbaijan
  • Europe's right turn High

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Sovereign debt Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Food and fertiliser Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for Azerbaijan

All world risks that touch Azerbaijan

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Azerbaijan makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Monthly State Customs Committee crude exports by destination, and ministry gas export figures. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Dec 2026 IMF direct investment positions for end-2025, the next official Gulf stock. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • 17 Dec 2026 European Council with the 2028-2034 EU budget on its agenda. Europe's right turn
  • 1 Jan 2027 Under Regulation (EU) 2026/261, Article 4(3), the ban on imports of Russian LNG under long-term contracts applies. Europe's right turn
  • Feb 2027 CBAM certificate sales open; Azerbaijan's sales to the EU in CBAM chapters are small. Europe's right turn
  • 18 Apr 2027 French presidential election, first round; the second round is on 2 May 2027. Europe's right turn

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Azerbaijan?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Azerbaijan, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Azerbaijan on the map of brief questions

Country analysis

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Azerbaijan.

Europe's right turn · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Europe's right turn: what is at stake for Azerbaijan

The EU bought 64.8% of Azerbaijan's goods exports in 2024, and 98.3% of that was mineral fuels. EU energy and trade rules, set by Council and Parliament votes, carry that stake.

Theme band High

64.8%

of goods exports sold to the EU27 (2024)

EUR15.62bn

EUR bn of mineral fuels bought by the EU (2024)

12.8est.

bcm of gas sent to Europe (2025, reported)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • EU imports from Azerbaijan fell from EUR 15.9bn in 2024 to EUR 13.9bn in 2025, as fuel imports fell to EUR 13.7bn. Sales to the EU move with fuel volumes and prices.
  • Fuels are almost the whole trade: 98.3% of EU imports from Azerbaijan in 2024. Little else would cushion a change in EU energy rules.
  • The EU-Azerbaijan gas aim, at least 20 bcm a year by 2027, is set in a 2022 memorandum, not a contract; press readings of the text say both sides 'aspire' to it, subject to commercial viability and market demand. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Under Regulation (EU) 2026/261, Article 4, EU imports of Russian gas under long-term contracts are banned from 1 Jan 2027 for LNG and from 30 Sep 2027 for pipeline gas (1 Nov 2027 in a member state the Commission finds at risk of missing its 2027 storage filling target). Other pipeline suppliers could see more EU demand.
  • Europe already takes about half of Azerbaijan's gas: 12.8 bcm of 25.2 bcm exported in 2025 (press figures). The pipeline route is in place. Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • At the European Parliament's constitutive session of 23 Jul 2024, Patriots for Europe held 84 seats, ECR 78 and ESN 25; the current composition may differ. How these groups vote on each EU rule is not measured here.
  • The share is a mirror ratio: EU imports by origin, EUR 15.9bn, against Azerbaijan's own exports, US$26.55bn, in 2024. Prices and timing differ between the two.
  • Remittances from EU states are not split out for Azerbaijan in the table read; remittances from all sources were US$1.35bn in 2024.

What to watch

  • 17 Dec 2026European Council with the 2028-2034 EU budget on its agenda.
  • 1 Jan 2027Under Regulation (EU) 2026/261, Article 4(3), the ban on imports of Russian LNG under long-term contracts applies.
  • Feb 2027CBAM certificate sales open; Azerbaijan's sales to the EU in CBAM chapters are small.
  • 18 Apr 2027French presidential election, first round; the second round is on 2 May 2027.
  • 30 Sep 2027Under Regulation (EU) 2026/261, Article 4(2), the ban on imports of Russian pipeline gas under long-term contracts applies; 1 Nov 2027 in a member state the Commission finds, by 15 Sep 2027, at risk of missing its 2027 storage filling target.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Eu marketTrade64.8% 2024Share of goods exports sold to the EU27 (EU mirror imports / own exports)HighHigh ≥50% · Medium 33–50% · Low 20–33%
Climate car rulesTrade0.06% of GDP 2024EU imports of CBAM-chapter goods from the country, % of its GDPBelow lineHigh (a) ≥4.0% of GDP or (b) ≥10% of GDP · Medium (a) ≥2.0% of GDP or (b) ≥5% of GDP · Low (a) ≥1.0% of GDP or (b) ≥2% of GDP
Nationals in euOther:migration0.46% of population 2024Citizens resident in EU states, % of home populationBelow lineHigh ≥10% · Medium 5–10% · Low 2–5%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

EU27 imports from Azerbaijan, total and mineral fuels (EUR bn)
EU27 goods imports from the country (EU-recorded, by origin): EUR15.89bn (2024)2024, goods EU-recorded…15.9EU27 imports from the country of mineral fuels and oils (HS 27): EUR15.62bn (2024)2024, of mineral fuels…15.6EU27 goods imports from the country (EU-recorded, by origin): EUR13.91bn (2025)2025, goods EU-recorded…13.9EU27 imports from the country of mineral fuels and oils (HS 27): EUR13.67bn (2025)2025, of mineral fuels…13.7

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Eurostat Comext DS-045409, EU trade since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8 (reporter EU27, imports, 2024); Eurostat Comext DS-045409, EU trade since 1988 by HS2-4-6 and CN8 (reporter EU27, imports by origin).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Share of goods exports sold to the EU27 (EU mirror imports / own exports): 64.8% (= EU27 imports from the country (EUR) × ECB 2024 rate / merchandise exports (US$) × 100)
  • EU imports of CBAM-chapter goods from the country, % of its GDP: 0.06% of GDP (= CBAM-chapter imports (EUR) × ECB 2024 rate / GDP (US$) × 100)
  • Citizens resident in EU states, % of home population: 0.46% of population (= citizens resident in reporting EU states / population × 100)
  • Mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) share of EU27 imports from the country: 98.3% (= HS 27 imports / total imports × 100)

Eurostat data: © European Union, CC BY 4.0; shares and sums computed by Strature.

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Azerbaijan

Gulf investors held US$4.08bn of direct investment in Azerbaijan at end-2024, 5.37% of GDP; the UAE held US$2.43bn. Azerbaijan's own oil and gas reach Europe outside the Strait.

Theme band High

US$4.08bn

Gulf direct investment position, US$bn, end-2024 (IMF)

5.37%

Gulf direct investment position, % of GDP

US$2.43bn

UAE direct investment position, US$bn, end-2024 (IMF)

12.8est.

Gas exports to Europe, bcm, 2025 (ministry, reported)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • The UAE position more than doubled, from US$1.02bn at end-2021 to US$2.43bn at end-2024. A Gulf fiscal squeeze from lost exports could slow new commitments.
  • Investors in Iran held US$1.21bn at end-2024, down from US$2.84bn at end-2021 (IMF). A war involving Iran could put payments on that holding at risk.
  • Masdar and SOCAR Green's 315 MW Neftchala solar plant reached financial close in Sep 2026 (press report). Financial close of the 240 MW wind farm was expected by mid-2026; no report of it was found in the press searched to 3 Nov 2026. Estimate from press or commentary
  • XRG, ADNOC's investment company, holds 30% of the Absheron gas field and 12.5% of Southern Gas Corridor CJSC (press report). Gulf partners hold stakes in the gas export chain. Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Europe took 12.8 bcm of 25.2 bcm of gas exports in 2025, Italy 9.5 bcm (ministry, reported). Pipeline gas does not pass the Strait while Qatari LNG is short. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Crude exports were 23.38 Mt in 2025, 13.1 Mt to Italy (customs data, reported). Buyers replacing Gulf barrels can turn to crude loaded at Ceyhan. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carried 27.18 Mt in 2025, including oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, on a route that ends on the Mediterranean. Estimate from press or commentary

Uncertainties

  • Press puts cumulative UAE investment at US$3.4bn over 1995-2024, while the official UAE position at end-2024 was US$2.43bn. The IMF counts money by the immediate investor. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The Gulf position equals 30.1% of 2025 central bank reserves (32.1% of 2024 reserves; 21.2% without Iran). The reserves test was written for deposits and rollovers, not direct investment.
  • Masdar's total outlay is put at around US$1bn by the press; lenders' amounts for Neftchala were not stated. Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves. A renewed strike could test Gulf export revenue and Gulf investment budgets.
  • End-2026Planned start of the 445 MW Bilasuvar solar plant, which the energy ministry put at the end of 2026 (press report, Mar 2026).
  • MonthlyState Customs Committee crude exports by destination, and ministry gas export figures.
  • Dec 2026IMF direct investment positions for end-2025, the next official Gulf stock.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Gulf capitalCapital and finance5.37% of GDP end-2024 position / 2025 GDPHormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDPHighHigh ≥10% of GDP or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Inward direct investment position by Gulf investor, end-2024 (US$bn)
Inward direct investment position held by investors in the UAE (outstanding stock): US$2.43bn (end-2024)End-2024, the UAE2.43Inward direct investment position held by investors in Iran (outstanding stock): US$1.21bn (end-2024)End-2024, Iran1.21Inward direct investment position held by investors in Saudi Arabia (outstanding stock): US$0.179bn (end-2024)End-2024, Saudi Arabia0.18Inward direct investment position held by investors in Bahrain (outstanding stock): US$0.158bn (end-2024)End-2024, Bahrain0.16Inward direct investment position held by investors in Qatar (outstanding stock): US$0.077bn (end-2024)End-2024, Qatar0.08

GulfElsewhere

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: IMF, Direct Investment Positions by Counterpart Economy (DIP, formerly CDIS), Azerbaijan inward positions, net, all instruments (INWD_D_NETLA_FALL_ALL).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Hormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of GDP: 5.37% of GDP (= Hormuz Gulf inward DI position end-2024 / nominal GDP 2025 × 100)
  • Hormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of total reserves: 30.1% of reserves (= Hormuz Gulf inward DI position end-2024 / total reserves 2025 × 100)
  • Hormuz Gulf inward direct investment position as a share of total reserves, same year (end-2024): 32.1% of reserves (= Hormuz Gulf inward DI position end-2024 / total reserves 2024 × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

Food and fertiliser · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Food and fertiliser: what is at stake for Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan imports about half its wheat (48.4% of use in 2024/25); press reports of official data say Kazakhstan now supplies most of it. Cereal imports were 36.6% of use: Low.est.

Theme band Low

36.6%

cereal imports as a share of use (2024/25)

1,550

kt of wheat imported (2024/25)

558,669est.

t of wheat from Kazakhstan, Jan-Jul 2025 (reported)

13.6%

Russia's share of wheat imports, Jan-Jul 2025 (reported)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Wheat imports were 1,550 kt in 2024/25, 48.4% of the wheat used.
  • Supply rests on one origin: Kazakhstan sent 558,669 t of the 646,336 t imported in January to July 2025 (State Statistical Committee, as reported). A poor Kazakh crop or a Kazakh export curb could cut most of that supply. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Rice is 78.6% imported, though the volume is small.

Opportunities

  • Russia's share of wheat imports fell to 13.6% in January to July 2025 (reported), so a curb on Black Sea wheat could hit less than before. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Azerbaijan makes more nitrogen fertiliser than it uses: 259,864 t of N in 2024 against 39,012 t used. Higher urea prices raise the value of that surplus.
  • The staple import bill is small, 0.64% of GDP, about US$0.48 bn.

Uncertainties

  • The origin split comes from press reports of official data, not the official table. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Wheat imports were 1,292,026 t in 2024 (State Customs Committee, as reported); no full-year split by origin for a later period was found. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Barley is mostly home-grown: 88 kt imported of 1,175 kt used. A dry year would raise imports.

What to watch

  • 6 Nov 2026FAO Food Price Index for October: cereal and vegetable oil prices.
  • 10 Nov 2026USDA WASDE: world wheat, maize and rice balance sheets.
  • 10 Dec 2026USDA WASDE: next update of the world grain balance sheets.
  • MonthlyState Statistical Committee trade data: wheat from Kazakhstan and Russia.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Cereal import dependenceDependence36.6% 2024/25Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley)LowHigh ≥70% · Medium 40–70% · Low 25–40%
Staple import billRevenue0.64% of GDP 2024/25 volumes, 2024 pricesStaple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥4% of GDP · Medium 2–4% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP
Fertiliser (russia belarus china)Supply chain39,012 t N 2024N fertiliser agricultural useBelow lineHigh ≥50% · Medium 35–50% · Low 20–35%
Fertiliser (producer)Procurement0.21% 2024Share of world N fertiliser productionBelow lineHigh ≥10% · Medium 5–10% · Low 3–5%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Wheat imports by origin, Jan-Jul 2025 (t, reported)
Wheat imports from Kazakhstan (Jan-Jul 2025): 558,669 t (Jan-Jul 2025)Kazakhstan558,669Wheat imports from Russia (Jan-Jul 2025): 87,657 t (Jan-Jul 2025)Russia87,657

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: Report.az (15 Sep 2025), Azerbaijan significantly cuts wheat imports from Russia (State Statistical Committee data); Report.az (15 Sep 2025), Azerbaijan significantly cuts wheat imports from Russia.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley): 36.6% (= 100 × sum of imports / sum of domestic consumption, four grains, capped at 100)
  • Russia's share of wheat imports (Jan-Jul 2025): 13.6% (= 100 × imports from Russia / total wheat imports)
  • Staple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDP: 0.64% of GDP (= sum(PSD imports × Pink Sheet 2024 annual price) / GDP 2024)
  • Share of world N fertiliser production: 0.21% (= 100 × production / FAOSTAT World production)
  • Wheat imports as a share of domestic consumption: 48.4% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)
  • Milled rice imports as a share of domestic consumption: 78.6% (= 100 × imports / domestic consumption)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Sovereign debt · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Sovereign debt: what is at stake for Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan's debt burden is light: interest took 0.9% of revenue in 2024. The one line reached is the refinancing wall, US$4.9bn of external public principal due 2026-2028, 36.1% of reserves.

Theme band Low

36.1%

of reserves: external public principal due 2026-2028

US$4.9bn

US$bn of external public principal due 2026-2028

US$2.3bn

US$bn owed to bondholders in 2026 on the end-2024 schedule

0.9%

of central government revenue went to interest (2024)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Bond principal of US$2.3bn was due in 2026 on the end-2024 schedule, with none in 2027-2028; the schedule does not show whether it was paid or refinanced.
  • Public external debt service was US$3.31bn in 2024, 9.0% of export earnings, just under the line.
  • The draft 2027 budget has a deficit of 3.15bn manat, to be met partly by domestic and external borrowing (press report). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Debt service is planned at 2.2bn manat in 2027, about US$1.29bn (Finance Ministry, as reported). Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Reserves of US$13.56bn in 2025 are more than twice the US$4.9bn of principal due in 2026-2028.
  • Debt service planned for 2027 is 10.5% below the 2026 forecast, as reported. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The Bank of Canada and Bank of England database counts no sovereign debt in default in 2020-2025.

Uncertainties

  • The draft budget assumes oil at US$65 a barrel (press summary), so revenue moves with oil prices. Estimate from press or commentary
  • The World Bank schedule leaves out debt contracted after end-2024.
  • Ratings come from a secondary list: S&P BB+ positive and Fitch BBB- stable (low confidence). Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • Dec 2026 (expected)Parliament votes on the draft 2027 budget.
  • 2027Interest on public debt is planned at 999.3m manat (press report).
  • AnnualBank of Canada and Bank of England default database update; it last showed no debt in default.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Refinancing wallCapital and finance36.1% of reserves 2026-2028 vs reserves 2025External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reservesLowHigh ≥100% · Medium 50–100% · Low 25–50%
External debt serviceCapital and finance9% of exports 2024Public and publicly guaranteed external debt service, % of exports of goods, services and primary incomeBelow lineHigh ≥21% · Medium 15–21% · Low 10–15%
Interest burdenRevenue0.9% of revenue 2024Interest payments, % of revenue (central government)Below lineHigh ≥30% · Medium 20–30% · Low 10–20%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

External public principal due 2026-2028, the 2026 bond part, and reserves (US$bn)
Projected principal repayments on public and publicly guaranteed external debt, 2026-2028 (all creditors): US$4.9bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Principal due, all creditors, 2026-284.9Projected principal repayments to bondholders on public external debt, 2026-2028: US$2.3bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Principal due to bondholders, 2026-282.3Total reserves including gold: US$13.6bn (2025)Total13.6

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart World, projected); World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart Bondholders, projected); World Bank, World Development Indicators (FI.RES.TOTL.CD).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reserves: 36.1% of reserves (= projected PPG principal 2026-2028 / total reserves × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

ISO 3166-1 name: Azerbaijan (AZE). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Sources and licences

No figure on this page yet.

Cite this page Strature, “Azerbaijan”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/aze/, 11 Nov 2026.

  • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
  • General research, not advice.
Ask about Azerbaijan

A question this page does not answer?

Suggest it for the series; if we take it up, the answer is published to everyone.

Is your company exposed in Azerbaijan? An exposure assessment of your own company, free. Request a free pilot

Suggest a question The method