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Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's Gulf exposure is Saudi capital: ACWA Power has committed more than US$7.5bn, 5.1% of 2025 GDP (press figure). Saudi investment utilised in 2025 was US$2.8bn, up 105%. Approved reading

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  • Region Russia and Eurasia · Central Asia
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Your exposure

Uzbekistan in our readings

Uzbekistan is in 4 of our country readings.

  • Gulf war / Hormuz Medium
  • Russia sanctions Medium
  • Sovereign debt Low
  • Food and fertiliser Low

Each band as published in its reading, against that reading’s stated lines; the readings are never combined into one band.

Outlook to November 2027

  • Geopolitics and conflict Not yet set
  • Trade, tariffs and sanctions Not yet set
  • Supply chains and chokepoints Not yet set
  • Energy and resources Not yet set
  • Technology and cyber Not yet set
  • Regulation and compliance Not yet set
  • Finance and markets Low
The seven outlooks in full: why, and the index

Seven categories, 12 months ahead. The outlook is our judgement, approved by the Principal. The index measures open data on 0–10; higher means more risk. How they are set

Compare Uzbekistan on the outlook map

Dates for Uzbekistan on the risk calendar

The other side: 2 lines from our readings and register

General information, not advice.

Risks that reach Uzbekistan

  • Gulf war / Hormuz Medium

    • F-0020 · Guard-Managed Attrition · 13.74%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · Open · brief C-002

    • F-0008 · Contested Drift / Paralysis · 11.7%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · Open · brief C-002

    • F-0010 · Frozen Siege · 9.2%, our estimate, scored when it resolves · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · Open · brief C-002

    Strait of Hormuz

Show all 4 risks that reach Uzbekistan
  • Russia sanctions Medium

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Sovereign debt Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

  • Food and fertiliser Low

    No forecast in our register is attached to this reading.

Each forecast is our estimate, scored when it resolves, in the register’s own words.

World risks for Uzbekistan

All world risks that touch Uzbekistan

Goods and chokepoints

Exhibit S-1 · Supply balance

How much Uzbekistan makes, buys and sells, good by good

Consumption = production + imports − exports (± stock change).
Reading the supply balance

Supply balance first, suppliers second.

One card per good, each in its own unit. Goods are never added together.

Each card shows the latest complete period: the newest with consumption and at least one of production, imports and exports on file.

Figures of 1,000 kb/d or more show in million barrels a day (mb/d).

Periods are marketing years, as published.

What to watch

  • Quarterly Ministry of Investment releases on investment utilised by country: whether Saudi inflows hold. Gulf war / Hormuz
  • Quarterly Central Bank of Uzbekistan cross-border transfers by country. Russia sanctions
  • Monthly Statistics Agency of Uzbekistan gas imports and production. Russia sanctions
  • 31 Jul 2027 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1437 of 25 June 2026 provides that Decision 2014/512/CFSP, on the EU's restrictive measures, applies until 31 Jul 2027; a later date needs a new Council decision. Russia sanctions
  • 2027 US$1.66bn of external bond principal falls due on the end-2024 schedule. Sovereign debt
  • 2028 US$1.86bn of external bond principal falls due on the end-2024 schedule. Sovereign debt

Questions firms in this position often review

  • Which of the risks above reach our own suppliers, customers or assets in Uzbekistan?
  • Which of the forecasts above bear on our plans in Uzbekistan, and which outcome would change them?
  • Which dated items under What to watch fall inside our next planning cycle?

General research, not advice. Request a free pilot

Full analyst view

Open Uzbekistan on the map of brief questions

Country analysis

Questions our briefs address

The questions our published briefs address that touch Uzbekistan.

Gulf war / Hormuz · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Gulf war / Hormuz: what is at stake for Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's Gulf exposure is Saudi capital: ACWA Power has committed more than US$7.5bn, 5.1% of 2025 GDP (press figure). Saudi investment utilised in 2025 was US$2.8bn, up 105%.est.

Theme band Medium

5.1%

ACWA Power commitment, % of GDP (2025, press figure)

7.5 US$ bnest.

ACWA Power commitment, US$bn, operating and under construction

US$2.8bn

Saudi investment utilised, US$bn (2025, ministry)

1est.

GW of ACWA wind in operation since Apr 2025

Read the full panel

Risks

  • ACWA Power's commitment of more than US$7.5bn equals 5.1% of 2025 GDP (press figure). If lost exports squeeze Gulf budgets, new Gulf-backed phases could slow. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Saudi investment utilised roughly doubled to US$2.8bn in 2025 (+105%), the investment ministry said, so the Gulf part of foreign investment is growing.
  • The pipeline is far larger than the money spent: the minister put the Saudi portfolio at US$30bn in Oct 2025, with US$0.9bn disbursed that year to date (press). Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • ACWA Power's first two wind farms in Uzbekistan, 1 GW, have been in commercial operation since Apr 2025 (press report); plants already running do not depend on shipping through the Strait. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Trade with Saudi Arabia grew 24% to US$178m in 2025, and 433 enterprises with Saudi capital operate in Uzbekistan.

Uncertainties

  • The gulf-capital line names state deposits, loans and outstanding investment. ACWA Power is a listed company; the Saudi Public Investment Fund held 50% before its 2021 listing, and its stake now was not checked. Estimate from press or commentary
  • No outstanding stock is published: Uzbekistan reports no Gulf direct investment position to the IMF. Press figures range from US$7.5bn to US$15bn with the pipeline. Estimate from press or commentary
  • On the yearly flow, US$2.8bn is 1.9% of GDP: above the US$1bn line but below 2%, which would be Low.

What to watch

  • 20 Nov 2026F-0074 resolves. A renewed strike could test Gulf export revenue and Gulf investment budgets.
  • QuarterlyMinistry of Investment releases on investment utilised by country: whether Saudi inflows hold.
  • QuarterlyACWA Power results: progress on Uzbek projects under construction.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Gulf capitalCapital and finance5.1% of GDP 2025 low confidenceSaudi (ACWA Power) committed investment as % of GDPMediumHigh ≥10% of GDP or ≥25% of FX reserves · Medium 2–10% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn
Exports to the GulfTrade2.1% 2025Share of exports of goods and services to the United Arab EmiratesBelow lineHigh ≥25% · Medium 10–25% · Low 5–10%

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

ACWA Power commitment as a share of 2025 GDP (%)
Saudi (ACWA Power) committed investment as % of GDP: 5.1% of GDP (2025) (our calculation)Saudi (ACWA Power)…*5.1

Gulf

Drawn to scale from zero. * Our calculation from the cited figures.

Briefs and questions

  • C-002 F-0020, F-0008, F-0010 Iran's scenarios to 2028; three of them mean intermittent disruption, which matters for Gulf capital. Our estimates, scored when they resolve.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Saudi (ACWA Power) committed investment as % of GDP: 5.1% of GDP (= ACWA Power commitment / GDP 2025 × 100)
  • Saudi investment utilised in 2025 as % of GDP: 1.9% of GDP (= Saudi utilised investment 2025 / GDP 2025 × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice. Who else is exposed: Gulf war / Hormuz →

Russia sanctions · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Russia sanctions: what is at stake for Uzbekistan

Transfers from Russia were about 9.5% of Uzbekistan's GDP in 2024 (Strature calculation on press reports of central bank data); Russia's share of remittances was 72.4% in Q1 2026 (press report).est.

Theme band Medium

9.5%

of GDP: transfers from Russia, 2024 (estimate)

US$11.5bnest.

US$bn transfers from Russia, 2024 (press)

72.4%est.

Russia's share of remittances, Q1 2026 (press)

6.48est.

bcm of gas imported from Russia, 2025 (press)

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Cross-border transfers from Russia were US$11.5bn in 2024, about 9.5% of GDP (estimate from press: Daryo and UzDaily, citing the Central Bank of Uzbekistan; Strature calculation). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Russia's share of remittances was 72.4% in Q1 2026, of US$3.8bn in all (estimate from press: The Times of Central Asia, citing the Central Bank of Uzbekistan). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Uzbekistan imported 6.48 bcm of gas from Russia in 2025 (estimate from press: Kun.uz, citing the National Statistics Committee). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Gas production fell to 9.6 bcm in Q1 2026 from 11.3 bcm a year earlier, and gas imports from all origins cost US$360.5m (press: Kursiv Uzbekistan). Estimate from press or commentary

Opportunities

  • Russia's share of remittances fell from 77.6% a year earlier to 72.4% in Q1 2026 (estimate from press: The Times of Central Asia, citing the central bank). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Card rk-rus-ukraine-ceasefire, "Russia and Ukraine sign a general ceasefire on the current front line", is rated Low likelihood and High impact. If measures eased after a ceasefire, the channels above could ease too.

Uncertainties

  • The central bank's own releases were not reached; the transfer figures rest on press reports. Estimate from press or commentary
  • No share of Russian gas in imports or in use was found in the sources read for this reading. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Uzbekistan's goods trade with Russia is not banded here: no figure from Uzbekistan's own statistics on this line is on file yet.

What to watch

  • QuarterlyCentral Bank of Uzbekistan cross-border transfers by country.
  • MonthlyStatistics Agency of Uzbekistan gas imports and production.
  • 31 Jul 2027Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1437 of 25 June 2026 provides that Decision 2014/512/CFSP, on the EU's restrictive measures, applies until 31 Jul 2027; a later date needs a new Council decision.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
RemittancesRemittances9.5% of GDP 2024 low confidenceMoney transfers from Russia as % of GDPMediumHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low <2% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Russia's share of remittances to Uzbekistan (%)
Russia's share of remittances to Uzbekistan: 72.4% (Q1 2026)Russia72.4

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: The Times of Central Asia, citing the Central Bank of Uzbekistan: Russia still dominates Uzbek remittances despite falling share (3 Jul 2026).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Money transfers from Russia as % of GDP: 9.5% of GDP (= transfers from Russia / GDP 2024 × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Food and fertiliser · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Food and fertiliser: what is at stake for Uzbekistan

Imports met 44.7% of Uzbekistan's wheat, maize, rice and barley use in 2024/25, mostly wheat, much of it from Kazakhstan (press report). The staple import bill was 1.33% of GDP.est.

Theme band Low

44.7%

of grain use met by imports (2024/25)

1.33%

of GDP, staple import bill (2024 prices)

4,300

kt of wheat imported (2024/25)

94.6%

of 2025 flour imports from Kazakhstan

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Wheat imports were 4,300 kt against use of 8,900 kt in 2024/25. A cut in Kazakh supply could hit the main source. Estimate from press or commentary
  • Kazakhstan sent 2.7 Mt of wheat between Sep 2024 and Apr 2025, nearly 30% more than a season earlier (press report citing rail data). Estimate from press or commentary
  • Kazakhstan supplied 399.8 kt of the 422.6 kt of flour imported in 2025, 94.6% (national statistics).
  • Sunflower oil is almost all imported: 325 kt against use of 330 kt in 2024/25.

Opportunities

  • Uzbekistan also ships wheat abroad: PSD counts 1,900 kt of wheat exports in 2024/25.
  • Flour imports fell 10.3% in 2025 to 422.6 kt (US$124.6m).
  • The country makes its own nitrogen fertiliser: 1,125,678 t of N in 2024, more than farm use of 908,559 t.

Uncertainties

  • No open table of all wheat imports by origin was reached; Russia supplied 22.1 kt of the 422.6 kt of flour imported in 2025, so the theme's origin raise is not applied.
  • Phosphate fertiliser imports from Russia, Belarus and China rest on an internal-only source, and farm use is below the line's volume floor.

What to watch

  • 6 Nov 2026FAO Food Price Index for October: the cereals and vegetable oils sub-indices.
  • 10 Nov 2026USDA WASDE and PSD update: Uzbekistan's wheat balances for the new season.
  • 4 Dec 2026FAO Food Price Index for November.
  • MonthlyNational Statistics Committee trade releases: wheat and flour imports by country.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
Cereal import dependenceDependence44.7% 2024/25Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley)LowHigh ≥70% · Medium 40–70% · Low 25–40%
Staple import billRevenue1.33% of GDP 2024/25 volumes, 2024 pricesStaple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDPLowHigh ≥4% of GDP · Medium 2–4% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

Grain imports and use, 2024/25 (kt)
Wheat domestic consumption: 8,900 1000 t (2024/25)Wheat domestic cons…8,900Wheat imports: 4,300 1000 t (2024/25)Wheat imports4,300Corn (maize) domestic consumption: 915 1000 t (2024/25)Corn (maize) domest…915Milled rice domestic consumption: 320 1000 t (2024/25)Milled rice domesti…320Barley domestic consumption: 310 1000 t (2024/25)Barley domestic con…310Barley imports: 152 1000 t (2024/25)Barley imports152Milled rice imports: 120 1000 t (2024/25)Milled rice imports120Corn (maize) imports: 93 1000 t (2024/25)Corn (maize) imports93

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Wheat, Imports; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Wheat, Domestic Consumption; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Barley, Imports; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Barley, Domestic Consumption; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Milled rice, Imports; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Milled rice, Domestic Consumption; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Corn (maize), Imports; USDA FAS, Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD Online): Corn (maize), Domestic Consumption.

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Cereal imports as a share of domestic cereal consumption (wheat, maize, rice, barley): 44.7% (= 100 × sum of imports / sum of domestic consumption, four grains, capped at 100)
  • Staple import bill (wheat, maize, rice, barley, palm, soybean, sunflower and rapeseed oil) as % of GDP: 1.33% of GDP (= sum(PSD imports × Pink Sheet 2024 annual price) / GDP 2024)
  • Share of wheat flour imports from Kazakhstan (tonnes): 94.6% (= 399.8 / 422.6 × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

Sovereign debt · Strature analysis, not from the brief

Sovereign debt: what is at stake for Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's debt burden is low. Debt service took 13.9% of export earnings in 2024, and creditors in China hold 10.0% of public external debt, US$3.92bn.

Theme band Low

13.9%

of export earnings paid to public external creditors (2024)

10%

of public external debt owed to creditors in China (2024)

US$3.92bn

US$bn owed to creditors in China (2024)

17.6%

of 2025 reserves: external public principal due 2026-2028

Read the full panel

Risks

  • Debt service took 13.9% of export earnings in 2024, US$4.42bn.
  • Creditors in China held US$3.92bn of public external debt in 2024, 10.0% of the total.
  • Bond principal of US$1.66bn falls due in 2027 and US$1.86bn in 2028, on the end-2024 schedule.

Opportunities

  • Reserves of US$66.04bn in 2025 far exceed principal due 2026-2028: the ratio is 17.6%.
  • Interest took 3.3% of central government revenue in 2023.
  • IMF credit is 0.07% of GDP, and debt in default was US$14.3m in 2025.

Uncertainties

  • The China share sits at the inclusion line; a small change in either figure moves it.
  • The latest interest figure is for 2023; a newer one would show whether higher rates have raised the bill.
  • The rating (S&P BB, stable, as listed) comes from a secondary compilation. Estimate from press or commentary

What to watch

  • 2027US$1.66bn of external bond principal falls due on the end-2024 schedule.
  • 2028US$1.86bn of external bond principal falls due on the end-2024 schedule.
  • AnnualWorld Bank International Debt Statistics: debt service and the China share.

Exposure by channel

Exposure band per channel, with the figure and the published line
ChannelFigureBandPublished line
External debt serviceCapital and finance13.9% of exports 2024Public and publicly guaranteed external debt service, % of exports of goods, services and primary incomeLowHigh ≥21% · Medium 15–21% · Low 10–15%
China creditorDependence10% of PPG external debt 2024Share of public external debt owed to ChinaLowHigh ≥33% · Medium 20–33% · Low 10–20%
Refinancing wallCapital and finance17.6% of reserves 2026-2028 vs reserves 2025External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reservesBelow lineHigh ≥100% · Medium 50–100% · Low 25–50%
Interest burdenRevenue3.3% of revenue 2023Interest payments, % of revenue (central government)Below lineHigh ≥30% · Medium 20–30% · Low 10–20%
Imf exposureCapital and finance0.07% of GDP Nov 2026 credit vs GDP 2025IMF credit outstanding, % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 2–5% of GDP · Low 1–2% of GDP, or <1% of GDP but ≥US$1bn
Default arrearsCapital and finance0.01% of GDP 2025 vs GDP 2025Sovereign debt in default, % of GDPBelow lineHigh ≥5% of GDP · Medium 1–5% of GDP · Low <1% of GDP but ≥US$1bn

Bands follow the published materiality lines for this theme. A low-confidence figure alone caps a band at Medium.

External public principal due 2026-2028 against reserves, US$bn
Projected principal repayments on public and publicly guaranteed external debt, 2026-2028 (all creditors): US$11.6bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Principal due, all creditors, 2026-2811.6Projected principal repayments to bondholders on public external debt, 2026-2028: US$3.87bn (2026-2028 (projected on end-2024 stock))Principal due to bondholders, 2026-283.9Total reserves including gold: US$66bn (2025)Total66.0

Drawn to scale from zero. Source: World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart World, projected); World Bank, World Development Indicators (FI.RES.TOTL.CD); World Bank, International Debt Statistics (DT.AMT.DPPG.CD, counterpart Bondholders, projected).

Sources cited

Estimates from press or commentary

Our calculations

  • Share of public external debt owed to China: 10% of PPG external debt (= debt owed to China / PPG external debt × 100)
  • External public principal due 2026-2028, % of reserves: 17.6% of reserves (= projected PPG principal 2026-2028 / total reserves × 100)
  • IMF credit outstanding, % of GDP: 0.07% of GDP (= IMF credit (SDR) × US$ per SDR / GDP × 100)
  • Sovereign debt in default, % of GDP: 0.01% of GDP (= debt in default (US$ m) / GDP × 100)

Strature analysis, not from the brief: researched by Strature from public sources and kept in our country dossier, updated 3 Nov 2026. General research, not advice.

ISO 3166-1 name: Uzbekistan (UZB). Country and territory names follow common usage and imply no position on sovereignty.

Sources and licences

No figure on this page yet.

Cite this page Strature, “Uzbekistan”, Strature GPS, https://strature.net/gps/uzb/, 11 Nov 2026.

  • We say “the Gulf” for the sea also called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf.
  • General research, not advice.
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