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World risk · Supply chains and chokepoints · Red Sea & Bab el-Mandeb

The Red Sea stays closed to most shipping: Houthi attacks, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal

The test Between 25 Oct 2026 and 25 Oct 2027, traffic through Bab el-Mandeb stays below half its pre-campaign level in at least three quarters of the months BigOceanData reports for that period, with at least 6 reported months. The test is BigOceanData's average of observed transits a day over each reported month by cargo and tanker vessels of 10,000 dwt or 100 m and over: under 25.65 a day, half its stated pre-campaign level of 51.3 a day in October 2023 (Strature arithmetic on BigOceanData's figure) [45]. BigOceanData samples months rather than publishing every month; if it reports fewer than 6 months for the period, the test is unresolved, not failed, and the card says so. In plain terms: no broad return of shipping to the Red Sea route inside the year.

Under way · Confidence: medium · Reviewed 28 Oct 2026 · Scores from 1 to 10

This page answers: What could happen, how it is scored, and who is exposed?

Using this page
  1. Read the two scores: Likelihood and Impact are kept apart.
  2. Check what is happening, each fact with its source.
  3. Use the calendar for the dates to watch.

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Likelihood
8High rising this month

Likelihood ↑ Since 10 Sep 2026: the Houthis seized Mocha [10]; the government's 5 Oct counter-claim confirms the coast is contested [12].

Impact
8High steady this month
Breadth8
Depth7
Duration8
Hard to substitute8
Canada pointNot added0

Impact is the average of the four parts, rounded, plus one point when Canada is directly hit on two or more channels, up to 10.

Two separate scales from 1 to 10. Strature never multiplies or merges them.

What changed

Dated, newest first

  1. Likelihood 9 to 8.
  2. Impact 7 to 8; Impact trend up to flat.

Why it matters

Most ships still avoid Bab el-Mandeb: BigOceanData observed 21.7 transits a day in August 2026 against 51.3 in October 2023, the month before the Houthi campaign, under half its pre-campaign level; July 2026 was just over half [45]. Lloyd's List Intelligence counted September 2026 transits 47% below its own pre-crisis level, a baseline it does not define, which would put traffic just above half [41]. The Houthi blockade on Saudi shipping (20 July 2026) and their capture of Yemen's Red Sea coast in September put at risk the route that carried Saudi crude round the constrained Strait of Hormuz.

Why Likelihood 8 Stays at 8, not 9: no named actor is negotiating an exit (UN envoy contacts, no talks round or truce, 9 Oct 2026.

Why Impact 8 Many countries across four regions; about US$175bn a year of oil through the strait (4.2 mb/d in 1H2025 at US$114 Brent, Strature estimate); diversion since January 2024; a chokepoint with a partial bypass (the Cape for containers, none for Yanbu-to-Asia crude while Hormuz is constrained).

The other facts on file (45)
  • BigOceanData, the tracker this card's test uses, observed 51.3 Bab el-Mandeb transits a day in October 2023, the month before the Houthi campaign, 19.2 at the June 2024 trough, 23.1 in January 2026, 25.2 in February, 26.4 in July and 21.7 in August 2026, an 18% fall from July after the 20 July blockade; it counts cargo and tanker vessels of 10,000 dwt or 100 m and over seen on its AIS network, samples six months rather than every month, and calls the figures observations, not a total count. [45]
  • Against the line of 25.65 a day (half of October 2023, Strature arithmetic) [45], January, February and August 2026 were under it and July just above.
  • Lloyd's List Intelligence counted 1,215 Bab el-Mandeb transits in September 2026 (1,170 in August), up 16% on a year and 47% below its own pre-crisis level, a baseline the source does not define [41]; on its figures September was just above half, so the two trackers disagree.
  • Traffic figure pending a second source. [1]
  • Traffic figure pending a second source. [1]
  • The gap is ships that enter the Red Sea from Suez and turn back north: Bloomberg reported that the Houthi threat had led "many ships" to exit north rather than cross the strait, and that 526 tankers passed the canal in July 2026. [6]
  • Drewry counted 55 Suez sailings in week 42. [13]
  • Carriers are testing the canal: Hapag-Lloyd told the SCA on 21 October 2026 that two of its Asia-Europe services already use it and more are expected [40]; the SCA said on 20 October that Maersk-affiliated transits were 276 in January-September 2026 against 146 a year earlier, and that Maersk hopes to return all its services by March 2027. Strature reads the October rise as mostly ships calling at Red Sea ports, with a few Asia-Europe loops testing the strait (Strature reading, medium). [39]
  • Traffic figure pending a second source. [1]
  • The Cape adds about 16 days from the Gulf to northwest Europe: nearly 35 days against about 19 via Suez, on EIA's figures. [4] [22]
  • The IMO said Magic Seas and Eternity C were attacked on 6 and 7 July 2025, that all 22 Magic Seas crew were rescued and that at least three died on Eternity C. [30]
  • Both ships sank; Eternity C, with 25 aboard, sank on 9 July after attacks on 7 and 8 July, gCaptain reported, citing JMIC. [31]
  • The Philippines' Department of Migrant Workers reported three Filipino dead and one missing on 29 July 2025 [27]; in December 2025 it gave two dead and one missing. [28]
  • The Houthis said they held a group of the crew. [17]
  • Oman said 11 seafarers were returned on 3 December 2025. [17]
  • Attacks stopped after the Gaza ceasefire of October 2025 [21]; on 11 November 2025 AP reported that the Houthis had signalled an end to their attacks on Israel and on Red Sea shipping. [26]
  • The US and Israeli strikes on Iran began on 28 February 2026, and the Houthis repeatedly threatened to join the war (low confidence: Wikipedia only). [21]
  • They declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on 20 July 2026. [8]
  • The Saudi tanker Encelia was struck off Jizan on 22-23 July [9][20]; the Houthis claimed the strike and the Saudi Press Agency confirmed the ship was hit. [8]
  • Attacks reported by governments or UKMTO followed. The India-flagged Faize Noore Oliya sank off Yemen after being struck; India's foreign ministry condemned the attack, without naming the attacker, and said all 13 Indians aboard were rescued (reported 5 August). [34]
  • Yemen's government coastguard said a Houthi strike on the cargo ship Tihamah near the strait on 11 August killed at least six people. [33]
  • UKMTO reported a tanker struck about 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu on 24 August; Bahri said its ship Amzan was involved and the crew were safe. [35]
  • A list compiled on Wikipedia from news reports counts 8 attacks on merchant ships from 22 July to 11 August 2026 (low confidence). [20]
  • An attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on 10 October 2026 killed 12 people and injured more than 300, according to Saudi authorities; the UN envoy for Yemen attributed it to the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and called the attacks a "grave escalation". [38]
  • On 9 October he told the Security Council he had engaged "intensively" with the government and the Houthis, but he announced no talks round or truce. [37]
  • On 26 October 2026 Egypt's House of Representatives, in a closed session and by at least two-thirds, authorised President el-Sisi to give military support to defend Saudi Arabia if Riyadh asks; Sisi said the focus is the defence of the kingdom's territory, and no formal Saudi request was announced (AP; Reuters). [46] [47]
  • On 27 October clashes in Yemen, mostly near Bab el-Mandeb, killed 97 fighters, 63 Houthi and 34 pro-government, according to AFP military sources relayed by CBS News (low-confidence source). The parties' own claims about who holds ground were not verified. [48]
  • They seized Mocha on 10 September 2026 [10] and Perim (Mayun) island on 11 September, which a government official and a Houthi official confirmed to AP. [32]
  • Al Jazeera's correspondent reported that they held Hanish and Yemen's whole Red Sea coast. [32]
  • On 5 October the government announced it had regained control of the Bab el-Mandeb area and Dhubab, with Mokha announced after [12]; the UN envoy told the Security Council on 9 October that the government had reported retaking areas around the strait. [37]
  • The Houthis denied that Mokha was retaken, according to a Wikipedia account (low confidence). [19]
  • The strait is about 29 km wide at its narrowest; defence analyst Wolfgang Pusztai said the Houthis could control it with artillery alone. [10]
  • IOM counts more than 268,000 people displaced in Yemen as of 23 October 2026, almost all since the beginning of September. [29]
  • Southern Red Sea cover was about 0.3% of hull value before the blockade, 0.75% on 21 July and over 1% on 23 July 2026. [9]
  • Saudi-linked ships calling at Jizan and Al Shuqaiq or crossing the strait were quoted up to 3%, against about 0.1% at Jeddah and Yanbu. [9]
  • Al Jazeera put the strait at 0.5%. [8]
  • By 24 September, four industry sources told Reuters, Saudi-linked tankers calling at Yanbu were quoted about 3% and calls south of Yanbu up to 7% or more, while Red Sea transits with no Saudi link were quoted 0.2-0.3%. [36]
  • In December 2023 the market quoted 0.5-0.7%. No October 2026 quote was found. [23]
  • Drewry's World Container Index rose 2% to US$4,585 per 40ft on 22 October 2026, its highest in 15 weeks. [13]
  • Shanghai-Rotterdam was US$3,632 (+3%) and Shanghai-Genoa US$4,152 (+5%). [13]
  • The Shanghai SCFI could not be read for this review (not confirmed). EIA says tanker rates reached records in September 2026. [3]
  • Revenue was a record US$9.4bn in 2023 and fell to US$3.9bn in 2024, according to the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) chair. [5]
  • It rose 23% on fiscal 2024/25 to US$4.67bn in fiscal 2025/26. [5]
  • July 2026 brought US$505m, up 42% and the most in a month since December 2023, on CAPMAS data reported by Bloomberg. [6]
  • The SCA expects US$5.8-6bn for calendar 2026. [6]

Where it sits

Bab el-MandebStrait of HormuzSuez Canal11. The Red Sea stays closed to most shipping: Houthi attacks, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal: High impact · under way1 · High impact · under wayBab el-MandebStrait of HormuzSuez CanalYanbuJizanJeddahUAEEGYPTERITREAETHIOPIAIRANOMANSAUDI ARABIASUDANYEMENRED SEAGULF OF ADEN0500 kmat 20°NMap data: Natural Earth (public domain).
Bab el-Mandeb11. The Red Sea stays closed to most shipping: Houthi attacks, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal: High impact · under wayBab el-MandebJeddahERITREAETHIOPIASAUDI ARABIASUDANYEMENRED SEATHE GULF0300 kmat 20°NMap data: Natural Earth (public domain).

How it spreads

If

Between 25 Oct 2026 and 25 Oct 2027, traffic through Bab el-Mandeb stays below half its pre-campaign level in at least three quarters of the months BigOceanData reports for that period, with at least 6 reported months. The test is BigOceanData's average of observed transits a day over each reported month by cargo and tanker vessels of 10,000 dwt or 100 m and over: under 25.65 a day, half its stated pre-campaign level of 51.3 a day in October 2023 (Strature arithmetic on BigOceanData's figure) [45]. BigOceanData samples months rather than publishing every month; if it reports fewer than 6 months for the period, the test is unresolved, not failed, and the card says so. In plain terms: no broad return of shipping to the Red Sea route inside the year.

Under way now

Channels 6 on the card

  1. CanadaCanada's direct exposure is small but real.
    More

    In Strature's Red Sea case, about 2.6 million barrels of Canada's crude on file arrive late, of the 58 million for all buyers [22]. The larger channel is price: Canadian refiners and shippers pay Brent and freight levels set while both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are constrained [3][13]. Asia-to-Atlantic-Canada container cargo that came through Suez now goes round the Cape or across the Pacific and by rail; no Canadian volume figure is on file (gap).

  2. OilBab el-Mandeb carried 9.3 million barrels a day of oil in 2023, 4.1 in 2024 and 4.2 in the first half of 2025 [2].
    More

    With Hormuz flows constrained, Saudi Arabia shipped more than 5.0 million barrels a day through Yanbu on the Red Sea until attacks halted the East-West pipeline in September 2026; flows had only partly resumed as of 22 September [3]. Al Jazeera reported Saudi crude through Bab el-Mandeb from March to mid-July 2026 at eight times the same period of 2025 (data source not named) [11]. Brent averaged US$114 in September 2026 and peaked at US$131 on 15 September [3]. A strait closed to Saudi tankers cuts the one Gulf bypass that reaches Asia by sea from the Red Sea.

  3. Egypt's financesEgypt lost an estimated US$7bn of canal revenue in 2024 [7].
    More

    Canal revenue was about 1.3% of GDP in fiscal 2025/26 on Strature's calculation: US$4.67bn of revenue [5] over 2025 GDP of US$365.3bn [42] [24]. If traffic fell back to the 2024 pace, Strature estimates about US$0.73bn lost in one quarter (low confidence): August 2026 revenue of US$567.1m [43] against a 2024 monthly average of US$3.9bn / 12 [5], over three months [24]. The IMF puts the current-account deficit at 4.5% of GDP for fiscal 2025/26 (medium confidence: read from a summary of the report; the report itself was not opened) [44].

  4. Trade and prices for Europe and AsiaAsia-Europe container trade goes round Africa for a third year: container ships pass the Cape at several times their 2023 rate on PortWatch's count (traffic figure pending a second source) [1].
    More

    Every diverted cargo arrives late. In Strature's Red Sea case (half of traffic avoids the strait for 90 days), 58 million barrels of crude on file arrive late over 120 days, 51 million of them the EU's [22].

  5. Yemen's peopleFuel imports fell about 85% in August 2026 from a year earlier, with no diesel or petrol arrivals at northern ports [14].
    More

    About 5.4 million people in government areas face crisis-level hunger or worse in October-December 2026 [14].

  6. The Horn of AfricaEthiopia runs about 95% of its trade through Djibouti, on a 2023 World Bank figure cited by Asia Times [7].
    More

    IOM counts 3,836 Yemenis arrived in Djibouti as of 17 October 2026 [29].

Goods 4

Sectors 3

  • Ports and logistics
  • Banks and insurers
  • Energy and pipelines

Three scenarios and their signposts

  1. S1

    The Saudi blockade holds, the detour holds

    Houthis keep hitting Saudi-linked ships and mostly spare others; transits stay well under half of their pre-campaign level; container lines stay on the Cape; Suez lives on tankers going north.

  2. S2

    Full closure

    Attacks widen to all shipping or artillery on Perim closes the narrows; transits fall below 15 a day; Yanbu-to-Asia crude stops; Strature's combined Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb case becomes the live one.

  3. S3

    Coast retaken, slow return

    Government forces hold Mokha and Dhubab, a Saudi-Houthi truce is agreed and the Iran war cools; carriers test single services, but in Strature's view traffic stays under half of its pre-campaign level for most of the year, as in January, February and August 2026 on BigOceanData's count.

The signposts of each scenario
PathSignpost
S1BigOceanData's count staying under 25.65 transits a day, half its October 2023 level [45]; Lloyd's List Intelligence counts staying low [41]
S1war-risk quotes for transits with no Saudi link staying near 0.2-0.3% [36]
S1no attack on a ship without a Saudi link
S2attack on a ship with no Saudi, Israeli or US link
S2wider Houthi declaration
S2Brent back toward its US$131 peak of 15 Sep 2026 [3]
S3dated Saudi-Houthi truce
S3Maersk's hoped-for return of all services to Suez by March 2027 goes ahead; more Hapag-Lloyd loops follow its two
S3Asia-Europe WCI falls

No probability is given for the three paths.

Forecasts

Strature forecast linked to this risk

61%F-0074 · A renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran, 22 Aug-20 Nov 2026 (operative)
Strature forecast F-0074: 61% (21 Aug 2026) · resolves by 20 Nov 2026
050100%

Where the card uses it Strature forecast F-0074 (renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran): 61% (21 Aug 2026) resolves

Other forecasts the card links Open one for what it forecasts and where the card uses it

  • F-00109.2%Forecasts: S2 Frozen Siege

    F-0010 and F-0020 (C-002), nearest related forecasts on the hub, resolve. Strature forecast F-0010: 9.2% (23 Jul 2026);

    Strature forecast F-0010: 9.2% (23 Jul 2026) · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · brief C-002

  • F-002013.74%Forecasts: S1 Guard-Managed Attrition (MODAL) corrected; supersedes F-0007

    F-0010 and F-0020 (C-002), nearest related forecasts on the hub, resolve. Strature forecast F-0020: 13.74% (7 Aug 2026)

    Strature forecast F-0020: 13.74% (7 Aug 2026) · resolves by 18 Jul 2028 · brief C-002

A forecast is a probability on a dated question. The Likelihood score above is a separate judgement and is never turned into a percentage.

The forecast register lists every forecast and how it is scored.

Dates to watch

Calendar

The dates to watch

A dot is a day, a bar a month or a year; a hollow mark is tentative. The line marks today.

  1. Nov 2026 SCA or CAPMAS monthly canal revenue for October [6] Tentative · Outside event
  2. 20 Nov 2026 Strature forecast F-0074 (renewed US or Israeli strike on Iran): 61% (21 Aug 2026) resolves [25] Declared · Strature date

    Remind me

  3. 31 Dec 2026 End of FAO's Oct-Dec 2026 hunger projection for government areas of Yemen [14] Declared · Outside event

    Remind me

  4. Jan 2027 SCA full-year 2026 revenue against its US$5.8-6bn expectation [6] Tentative · Outside event
  5. Mar 2027 Maersk's hoped-for return of all its services to the Suez Canal (as reported by the SCA) [39] Tentative · Outside event
  6. 30 Jun 2027 Egypt's fiscal 2026/27 ends; SCA reports the year's canal revenue [5] Tentative · Outside event

    Remind me

  7. 18 Jul 2028 F-0010 and F-0020 (C-002), nearest related forecasts on the hub, resolve. Strature forecast F-0010: 9.2% (23 Jul 2026); Strature forecast F-0020: 13.74% (7 Aug 2026) [25] Declared · Strature date

    Remind me

Sign in, with alerts on, for an email 7 days and 1 day before.

SourceStrature world-risk card; the dates cite the sources below.
Exhibit R-3 · WORLD · strature.net

The other side

Egypt gains while Saudi oil loaded on the Red Sea goes north through Suez (July 2026 canal revenue the highest since December 2023) [6]. Cape-route ports and bunkering and Atlantic-basin crude sellers can gain business [3]. For Canada, high Brent and long Gulf voyages raise the value of crude and products that reach Europe across the Atlantic without a chokepoint.

Connected in Strature

Sources

45 sources, numbered as the text cites them

  1. Daily Chokepoints Data: Bab el-Mandeb, Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, 2023-01-01 to 2026-10-18. IMF PortWatch · 18 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  2. World Oil Transit Chokepoints. U.S. Energy Information Administration · 3 Mar 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  3. Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026: Global oil markets. U.S. Energy Information Administration · 6 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  4. Red Sea attacks increase shipping times and freight rates (Today in Energy). U.S. Energy Information Administration · 1 Feb 2024 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  5. Suez Canal Revenue Rises 23 Percent in the 2025/2026 Fiscal Year as Regional Tensions Ease. Egyptian Streets (citing the Suez Canal Authority) · 30 Jun 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  6. Suez Canal revenue rises as Hormuz crisis reroutes ships (monthly figure from CAPMAS data). Transport Topics (Bloomberg) · 8 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  7. African Red Sea states' risks grow as Houthi rebels expand reach. Asia Times · 1 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  8. How shipping insurance rates are rising as Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb shut down. Al Jazeera · 23 Jul 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  9. Red Sea shipping insurance costs double overnight after Houthi attack. Baird Maritime (Reuters) · 24 Jul 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  10. Yemen's Houthis seize strategic Red Sea city of Mocha. Al Jazeera · 10 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  11. Saudi-Houthi fighting in Yemen escalates: what happened and what's next. Al Jazeera · 8 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  12. Bab el-Mandeb returns to Yemeni control, marking just another stage in the war (opinion, Arhab Mohamed Al Sarhi). Il Sole 24 Ore · 5 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  13. World Container Index, 22 Oct 2026. Drewry · 22 Oct 2026 · Industry · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  14. GIEWS Country Brief: Yemen. FAO · 13 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  15. Oman helps free Filipino, Indian, Russian crew of Eternity C from Houthis. Khaleej Times · 3 Dec 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  16. Strait of Bab al-Mandab crisis. Wikipedia · 18 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  17. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels (revision 1375596289). Wikipedia · 25 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  18. Houthis in the 2026 Iran war; Red Sea crisis. Wikipedia · 25 Oct 2026 · Commentary · confidence low · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  19. Scenario page: Bab el-Mandeb avoided by half of traffic for 90 days (SCN-R-01, RD-S-R01). Strature · 11 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  20. Scenario page: Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb closed together for 90 days (SCN-C-01, RD-S-C01). Strature · 11 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  21. Egypt country reading, theme gulf-war-hormuz (Strature calculations). Strature · 23 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  22. Register rows F-0074, F-0073, F-0010, F-0020; questions T-003 (q0, q3, q9, q10, q18) and S-001 (q2, q10, q11). Strature · 14 Oct 2026 · Think tank · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  23. Yemen's Houthi rebels signal that they've stopped attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping (headline and date read). The Associated Press (via CTV News) · 11 Nov 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  24. DMW confirms 9 Pinoy seafarers in Houthi hands. Daily Tribune (Philippines), reporting the Department of Migrant Workers · 29 Jul 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  25. Remains of Filipino seafarer killed in Houthi attack on Eternity C repatriated to Manila. Marine Insight · 8 Dec 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  26. Thousands Flee Yemen by Sea as Displacement Tops 268,000. International Organization for Migration (IOM) · 23 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  27. IMO Secretary-General urges constructive dialogue after Red Sea attacks. International Maritime Organization · 8 Jul 2025 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  28. Maritime Industry Condemns Deadly Red Sea Attacks (citing JMIC). gCaptain · 9 Jul 2025 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  29. Iran-backed Houthis seize strategic Mayun Island: Can they hold it?. Al Jazeera (citing AP) · 12 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  30. Yemen coastguard says six killed in Houthi strike on ship in Red Sea. Gulf News · 11 Aug 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  31. Indian-flagged ship sinks after projectile strike in Red Sea; MEA condemns attack. The Week (India) · 5 Aug 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  32. Houthis claim attack on Saudi vessel near Yanbu, crew safe. Baird Maritime (Reuters) · 24 Aug 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  33. Feature: Inside Saudi Arabia's growing struggle to export oil via the Red Sea. Baird Maritime (Reuters) · 24 Sep 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  34. Briefing by the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, to the Security Council. Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen · 9 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  35. Statement by UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, on latest attacks against Saudi Arabia. Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen · 11 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  36. SCA Chairman discusses with Maersk the return of its services. Suez Canal Authority · 20 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  37. SCA Chairman meets Hapag-Lloyd's regional head. Suez Canal Authority · 21 Oct 2026 · Official · confidence high · retrieved 25 Oct 2026
  38. Red Sea Brief - 15 October 2026. Lloyd's List Intelligence · 15 Oct 2026 · Industry · confidence medium · retrieved 27 Oct 2026
  39. GDP (current US$), Egypt, 2025 (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD). World Bank, World Development Indicators · 8 Oct 2026 · International body · confidence high · retrieved 27 Oct 2026
  40. Suez Canal Sees 27% Vessel Increase, $567.1M Revenue in August 2026. Daily Beirut (citing the Suez Canal Authority) · 20 Sep 2026 · News · confidence low · retrieved 27 Oct 2026
  41. Arab Republic of Egypt, IMF Country Report No. 26/224 (read from a summary; PDF not opened). International Monetary Fund · 2026 · International body · confidence medium · retrieved 6 Oct 2026
  42. At Bab el-Mandeb, Ships Are Saying Less and Signalling More (research report; six month-long AIS extracts, October 2023 to August 2026; baseline October 2023, 51.3 transits a day). BigOceanData · 5 Sep 2026 · Industry · confidence medium · retrieved 27 Oct 2026
  43. Egypt's Parliament Authorizes Military Support for Saudi Arabia to Defend Against Houthi Attacks. US News & World Report (Associated Press) · 26 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 28 Oct 2026
  44. Egypt Approves Military Support for Saudi Arabia After Houthi Attacks Escalate. US News & World Report (Reuters) · 26 Oct 2026 · News · confidence medium · retrieved 28 Oct 2026
  45. Iran war live updates (Fresh clashes in Yemen kill 97 combatants, military sources tell AFP), 27 Oct 2026. CBS News · 27 Oct 2026 · News · confidence low · retrieved 28 Oct 2026

Reviewed 28 Oct 2026 · version 3 · last change: reviewed · All risks