Telecoms and subsea cables: vendors out, cables guarded
38 steps on record since Aug 2018: 31 aimed at another country, 7 rules at home. 27 restrictive steps in force or suspended count on the map.
Updated 3 Nov 2026 · Strong; 3 low confidence, 2 not read in the source
Every step, newest first
Licensing regime for operators of subsea-cable terminal equipment
Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks (Second Report and Order)Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, in force 25 Sep 2026 in part
Source: Federal Register 2026-15123 English text
FCC stops imports and sales of already-authorised equipment added to its Covered List in 2024 or earlier
Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or EarlierAimed at: China, Russia · Export or import rule · In force, in force 16 Jul 2026
Source: Federal Register 2026-13518 English text
Canada's cyber security law: new government powers over telecoms network security and a cyber regime for critical systems
Rule at home
An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts (Bill C-8, S.C. 2026, c. 9)Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, Royal Assent 15 Jun 2026 (S.C. 2026, c. 9); Telecommunications Act amendments in force on assent; the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act phased in later
Source: LEGISinfo, Bill C-8 (45-1) English text
FCC licence holders must attest whether a foreign adversary owns or controls them
Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary ControlAimed at: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Hong Kong, Macau · Other · In force, in force 9 Jun 2026
Source: Federal Register 2026-06992 English text
US revokes visas of three Chilean officials over a planned subsea cable to China
Cable submarino Chile-China: revocamiento de visas a altos funcionarios por EE.UU.Aimed at: Chile · Other · In force, visas revoked Feb 2026
Source: CNN Chile report (no official text found) Spanish text secondary source only: a news or law-firm note Low confidence
Cable Security Toolbox and €347 million for strategic cable projects
Rule at home
Submarine Cable Security Toolbox and Cable Projects of European InterestAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, toolbox; not binding
Source: Commission note on the toolbox English text
Poland's cybersecurity law amended: high-risk vendors can be designated and their equipment phased out
Ustawa z dnia 23 stycznia 2026 r. o zmianie ustawy o krajowym systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa oraz niektórych innych ustaw (Dz.U. 2026 poz. 252)Aimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, in force 3 Apr 2026; high-risk vendor rules referred to the Constitutional Tribunal
Source: Dziennik Ustaw 2026, poz. 252 Polish text
Revised Cybersecurity Act proposed: mandatory removal of high-risk third-country suppliers from EU mobile networks
COM(2026) 11: Proposal for a Regulation (Cybersecurity Act revision)Aimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · Proposed, in the legislative procedure
Source: Commission press release IP/26/105 English text
FCC closes the modular-transmitter gap and adopts a route to limit equipment it had already authorised
Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization ProgramAimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, in force 26 Dec 2025
Source: Federal Register 2025-21001 English text
Subsea cable licences presumed barred to foreign-adversary applicants and for landings in adversary countries
Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks (Report and Order)Aimed at: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, Hong Kong, Macau · Licensing · In force, in force 26 Nov 2025 in part
Source: Federal Register 2025-19658 English text
Test labs and certifiers for US equipment must certify they are not controlled by prohibited entities
Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization ProgramAimed at: all destinations, China · Export or import rule · In force, in force 8 Sep 2025 in part
Source: Federal Register 2025-14970 English text
EU Action Plan on Cable Security: prevent, detect, respond, deter
Rule at home
Joint Communication: EU Action Plan on Cable SecurityAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, policy plan; not binding
Source: Commission press release IP/25/580 English text
Connected-vehicle rule bars vehicle software and hardware linked to China and Russia
Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected VehiclesAimed at: China, Russia · Export or import rule · In force, in force 17 Mar 2025
Source: Federal Register 2025-00592 English text
Germany signs contracts with operators to remove critical components of two Chinese vendors from 5G networks
Not read in the source
Greater security and technological sovereignty for the German 5G mobile network: The Federal Government concludes contracts with telecommunications companiesThe official site refused our reader, so this row rests on the drafted summary until a person opens the text.
Aimed at: China · Agreement · Agreed, 5G core by end 2026; network management by end 2029
Source: BMI press release, 11 Jul 2024 English text
Commission recommendation on secure and resilient submarine cables
Rule at home
Recommendation on the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructuresAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, recommendation; not binding
Source: Commission library English text
Commission says two Chinese vendors pose materially higher 5G risks and stops using them in its own networks
Rule at home
Communication from the Commission: Implementation of the 5G cybersecurity Toolbox, C(2023) 4049Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, communication; not binding
Source: Commission library page English text
FCC stops authorising equipment on its Covered List
Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization ProgramAimed at: China · Export or import rule · In force, in force 6 Feb 2023
Source: Federal Register 2022-28263 English text
Canada to bar two Chinese vendors' equipment from 5G networks and remove existing gear
Policy Statement – Securing Canada's Telecommunications SystemAimed at: China · Export or import rule · In force, policy statement; Telecommunications Act powers in force on Royal Assent of Bill C-8, 16 Jun 2026
Source: ISED policy statement, 19 May 2022 English text
Japan's economic security law: telecoms and other key operators must have new critical equipment screened before use
経済施策を一体的に講ずることによる安全保障の確保の推進に関する法律（令和4年法律第43号）Aimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, infrastructure screening from May 2024 (not re-checked); 2026 revision not checked
Source: MIC economic security page Japanese text Medium confidence
FCC revokes a second Chinese state carrier's US subsidiary's licence to provide telecoms services
Official title not yet availableThe official title names a firm, so it is not shown; the source link stands in.Aimed at: China · Licensing · Revoked, services to stop within 60 days of release (2 Feb 2022); court outcome not checked
Source: FCC 22-9 English text
China's cybersecurity review: operators of key networks must have network products they buy reviewed for security risk
Rule at home
网络安全审查办法（国家互联网信息办公室等十三部门令第8号）Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, in force 15 Feb 2022 (first version 1 Jun 2020)
Source: CAC Order No. 8 Chinese text
UK telecoms security law: new security duties for operators and powers to restrict high-risk vendors
Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021Aimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, main duties from 1 Oct 2022
Source: 2021 c. 31 English text
US law tells the FCC to stop approving new equipment from firms on its Covered List
Secure Equipment Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-55)Aimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, signed 11 Nov 2021
Source: Public Law 117-55 English text
FCC revokes a Chinese state carrier's US subsidiary's licence to provide telecoms services
Official title not yet availableThe official title names a firm, so it is not shown; the source link stands in.Aimed at: China · Licensing · Revoked, services to stop 60 days after release (2 Nov 2021); upheld by the D.C. Circuit
Source: FCC 21-114 English text
FCC publishes its Covered List of telecoms equipment and services judged a security risk
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Publication of the List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act (DA 21-309)Aimed at: China · Entity or end-user list · In force, list kept up to date
Source: FCC DA 21-309 English text
Commerce rule to review and bar telecoms and IT transactions involving foreign adversaries
Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (interim final rule)Aimed at: China, Hong Kong, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela · Export or import rule · In force, effective 22 Mar 2021; final rule 6 Dec 2024
Source: FR Doc. 2021-01234 English text
38 more affiliates of a Chinese telecoms firm listed and the direct product rule tightened again
Official title not yet availableThe official title names a firm, so it is not shown; the source link stands in.Aimed at: China · Entity or end-user list · In force, effective 17 Aug 2020; temporary general licence ended
Source: 85 FR 51596 English text
Foreign direct product rule widened to chips designed or made with US tools for one listed Chinese telecoms firm
Export Administration Regulations: Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity ListAimed at: China · Export or import rule · In force, effective 15 May 2020
Source: FR Doc. 2020-10856 English text
Committee set up to review foreign participation in US telecoms licences for security risks (EO 13913)
Executive Order 13913: Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services SectorAimed at: all destinations · Other · In force, signed 4 Apr 2020
Source: 85 FR 19643 English text
US law bars federal subsidies for risky network equipment, sets up the Covered List and funds removal and replacement
Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-124)Aimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, signed 12 Mar 2020
Source: Public Law 116-124 English text
EU 5G toolbox: member states to assess suppliers' risk and restrict high-risk suppliers in key parts of 5G networks
Rule at home
Cybersecurity of 5G networks: EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measuresAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, toolbox; not binding
Source: Commission press release IP/20/123 English text
US subsidy funds barred from buying or supporting equipment from firms judged a security threat; two Chinese vendors named first
Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs (Report and Order, FCC 19-121)Aimed at: China · Export or import rule · In force, in force 3 Jan 2020 (order adopted 22 Nov 2019)
Source: Federal Register 2019-27610 English text
Dutch decree lets the minister require operators to use only approved suppliers in sensitive parts of their networks
Besluit veiligheid en integriteit telecommunicatieAimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, in force 6 Dec 2019; ministerial regulation Stcrt. 2021, 42618
Source: Staatsblad 2019, 457 Dutch text
France makes the use of 5G network equipment subject to the Prime Minister's prior authorisation
Not read in the source
Loi n° 2019-810 du 1er août 2019 visant à préserver les intérêts de la défense et de la sécurité nationale de la France dans le cadre de l'exploitation des réseaux radioélectriques mobilesThe official site refused our reader, so this row rests on the drafted summary until a person opens the text.
Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, decree 2019-1300 of 6 Dec 2019; upheld by the Constitutional Council, 5 Feb 2021
Source: Sénat, dossier of the bill (JORF n° 0178, 2 Aug 2019) French text secondary source Low confidence
A Chinese telecoms-equipment maker and 68 of its affiliates added to the Entity List
Addition of Entities to the Entity List (84 FR 22961)Aimed at: China · Entity or end-user list · In force, effective 16 May 2019
Source: FR Doc. 2019-10616 English text
Emergency declared over foreign adversaries' telecoms and IT: Commerce may bar transactions in their equipment and services (EO 13873)
Executive Order 13873: Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply ChainAimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, signed 15 May 2019; emergency renewed each year (latest renewal not checked)
Source: 84 FR 22689 English text
Australia tells carriers that vendors likely to be subject to foreign-government directions put 5G networks at risk
Government Provides 5G Security Guidance To Australian CarriersAimed at: all destinations · Other · In force, guidance to carriers under the 2017 sector security reforms
Source: Joint media release, 23 Aug 2018 (copy in the ANU repository) English text secondary source Low confidence
US agencies barred from buying, or contracting with firms that use, telecoms and video-surveillance equipment from named Chinese makers (FY2019 NDAA s.889)
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Sec. 889: Prohibition on Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or EquipmentAimed at: China · Other · In force, agency ban from 13 Aug 2019; contractor ban from 13 Aug 2020
Source: Public Law 115-232, sec. 889 English text
This page lists official actions on telecoms networks since 2018. They cover who may supply network equipment, which equipment may be sold or licensed, who may own or run a carrier, and the subsea cables that carry data. Most come from the United States, Europe and their partners. Many rules name no country; we show the country a rule is aimed at only where the text names one. Rules aimed at no other country carry a Rule at home mark.
- Rule at home
- Aimed at no other country. Listed here, never counted on the map or in a tally.
- Low confidence
- Rests on a secondary source, such as a news report or a law-firm note.
- Not read in the source
- The official site refused our reader; a person has yet to open the text.
How this area is counted
- What counts
- An official action by a government, a regulator or a parliament that limits or eases who may supply, sell, license, own or run telecoms networks, equipment or services. This takes in laws, regulations, licence conditions, orders that refuse or revoke a carrier's licence, lists of barred equipment, and rules on subsea cables and their landing stations. A non-binding plan or recommendation counts when a government body adopts it; it shows with the words "not binding".
- What does not count
- Spectrum auctions with no security condition. Company decisions to drop a supplier. Court rulings, unless they change what a rule does. Subsidies and investment plans, unless they come with a bar on certain suppliers. Data-protection and general cyber rules go to the cyber area. Chip rules aimed at a telecoms firm stay here only when the owner rules so; otherwise they go to chips.
- Aimed at
- We show the country a rule is aimed at when its text names one. Many telecoms rules name no country but let a minister bar "high-risk" suppliers; we mark these as aimed at any country and say so. Rules that only bind a government's own operators or agencies, and are aimed at no other country, carry a Rule at home mark and are left out of the map's tallies.
- Sources checked
- The US Federal Register, the FCC's document pages and Covered List, Congress.gov and GovInfo; the EU Official Journal and the Commission's digital-strategy pages; GOV.UK and legislation.gov.uk; the Dutch Staatsblad and Staatscourant; Germany's Federal Law Gazette; Légifrance and the French Senate; Japan's Cabinet Office and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; China's Cyberspace Administration and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; Canada's ISED; India's Department of Telecommunications; Poland's Journal of Laws. We link the text in its original language.
- Checked less often
- Sweden, Australia, Taiwan, Korea, India, Canada, Poland and other EU member states are checked less often than the United States, the EU, the UK, China and Japan. Rows for them may come later and may rest on a news report until we find the official text; those rows carry a visible low-confidence mark.
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Sources: each government’s own publication, linked on every row with its language; where a government text could not be read, the press or a law-firm summary, marked low confidence. Rule level only: no firm or person is named.