Quantum: export lists in Europe, investment rules in the US
22 steps on record since Nov 2021: 11 aimed at another country, 11 rules at home. 8 restrictive steps in force or suspended count on the map.
Updated 3 Nov 2026 · Strong on controls; 1 low confidence, 4 not read in the source
Every step, newest first
US order sets federal post-quantum deadlines: key establishment by 2030 and signatures by 2031 for the most sensitive systems
Rule at home
Official title not yet availableThe official title uses a word this site does not print; the source link stands in.Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, signed 22 Jun 2026; OMB guidance within 90 days; most sensitive civilian systems to use post-quantum key establishment by 31 Dec 2030 and signatures by 31 Dec 2031; FAR rule for contractors to be proposed within 180 days (comply by 31 Dec 2030)
Source: Federal Register 2026-12909 (91 FR 38483) English text
Federal agencies told to file post-quantum migration plans and move their most sensitive systems in phases (M-26-15)
Rule at home
M-26-15: Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum CryptographyAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, in force on issue; agency migration plans due within 120 days; phases to 2035, with key establishment 2028-2030 and signatures 2031
Source: OMB Memorandum M-26-15 English text
France repeals its national quantum export order
Eases Not read in the source
Arrêté du 10 mars 2026 portant abrogation de l'arrêté du 2 février 2024The official site refused our reader, so this row rests on the drafted summary until a person opens the text.
Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, in force 5 May 2026
Source: Légifrance JORFTEXT000053958746 French text Medium confidence
EU dual-use list updated: quantum computers, chip tools and a new EU-only 500 series
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003 of 8 September 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the list of dual-use itemsAimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, in force 15 Nov 2025
Source: Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003, OJ L 14.11.2025 English text
EU member states publish a coordinated roadmap for the move to post-quantum cryptography
Rule at home
A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum CryptographyAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, roadmap; not binding
Source: European Commission, Shaping Europe's digital future English text
Spain adds quantum computing, integrated circuits, additive-manufacturing, chip-tool and AI-related items to its export controls
Orden ECM/551/2025, de 30 de mayo, por la que se modifican los anexos I.1, III.1, III.3, III.4 y III.5 del Reglamento de control del comercio exterior de material de defensa, de otro material y de productos y tecnologías de doble uso, aprobado por el Real Decreto 679/2014, de 1 de agostoAimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, in force 5 Jun 2025
Source: BOE-A-2025-10778 Spanish text
France amends its quantum export list, setting thresholds by qubit count
Not read in the source
Arrêté du 27 mars 2025 modifiant l'arrêté du 2 février 2024 relatif aux exportations vers les pays tiers de biens et technologies associés à l'ordinateur quantique et à ses technologies habilitantesThe official site refused our reader, so this row rests on the drafted summary until a person opens the text.
Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · Revoked, repealed by the March 2026 order
Source: Légifrance JORFTEXT000051393234 French text Medium confidence
UK sets post-quantum migration milestones: plans by 2028, priority systems by 2031, all systems by 2035
Rule at home
Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptographyAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, guidance; not binding
Source: NCSC guidance English text
US transition plan: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035 under NIST standards (NIST IR 8547)
Rule at home
NIST IR 8547: Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography StandardsAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, final published 27 Oct 2026 (draft 12 Nov 2024); guidance under NIST standards
Source: NIST CSRC, IR 8547 (final) English text
Netherlands requires a licence to export certain quantum computers (34 or more qubits), their parts and other emerging-technology items not on the EU list
Regeling van de Minister voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingshulp van 11 oktober 2024, nr. BZ2405833, houdende invoering van een vergunningplicht voor de uitvoer van producten die niet zijn genoemd in bijlage I van Verordening 2021/821 (Regeling aanvullende controlemaatregelen op de Verordening producten voor tweeërlei gebruik)Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, signed 11 Oct 2024; in force 1 Dec 2024
Source: Staatscourant 2024, 33838 Dutch text
Quantum items, gate-all-around chip technology and other advanced items added to the Commerce Control List
Commerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent With Controls Implemented by International PartnersAimed at: all destinations · Export or import rule · In force, in force 6 Sep 2024
Source: Federal Register 2024-19633 English text
First three US post-quantum cryptography standards issued (FIPS 203, 204, 205)
Rule at home
Announcing Issuance of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) FIPS 203, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, in force 14 Aug 2024
Source: Federal Register 2024-17956 English text
Germany adds quantum-computer and AI systems and components to its national export list (21st amendment of its foreign-trade ordinance)
Official title not yet availableOfficial gazette text not found.Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, in force 23 Jun 2024
Source: law-firm note English text secondary source only: a news or law-firm note Low confidence
Canada requires a permit to export quantum computers of 34 or more qubits, cryogenic chips and certain chip technology, to all destinations but the US
Notice to exporters No. 1129: Amendment to the Export Control List: Quantum computing and advanced semiconductorsAimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, in force 20 Jul 2024
Source: Global Affairs Canada, Notice to exporters No. 1129 English text
Commission asks member states for a coordinated roadmap to post-quantum cryptography
Rule at home
Commission Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (C(2024) 2393)Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, recommendation; not binding
Source: Commission C(2024) 2393 English text
UK adds quantum, cryogenic, chip, additive-manufacturing and advanced-material items to its export controls
The Export Control (Amendment) Regulations 2024 (SI 2024/346)Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · In force, in force 1 Apr 2024
Source: UK SI 2024/346 English text
France requires a licence to export quantum computers, enabling technologies and advanced chip equipment outside the EU
Not read in the source
Arrêté du 2 février 2024 relatif aux exportations vers les pays tiers de biens et technologies associés à l'ordinateur quantique et à ses technologies habilitantes et d'équipements de conception, développement, production, test et inspection de composants électroniques avancésThe official site refused our reader, so this row rests on the drafted summary until a person opens the text.
Aimed at: all destinations · Licensing · Revoked, authorisation needed from 1 Mar 2024; repealed by the March 2026 order
Source: Légifrance JORFTEXT000049120866 French text Medium confidence
Law orders federal guidance on inventories of quantum-vulnerable IT and, after NIST standards, on agency plans to migrate to post-quantum cryptography
Rule at home
Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act (Public Law 117-260)Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, signed 21 Dec 2022
Source: Public Law 117-260 English text
Federal agencies told to inventory their cryptography and plan the move to post-quantum methods (M-23-02)
Rule at home
M-23-02: Migrating to Post-Quantum CryptographyAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, in force on issue
Source: OMB Memorandum M-23-02 English text
Quantum-resistant algorithm suite and timelines set for US national security systems (CNSA 2.0)
Rule at home Not read in the source
Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0The official site refused our reader, so this row rests on the drafted summary until a person opens the text.
Aimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, advisory for national security systems
Source: NSA cybersecurity advisory, CNSA 2.0 English text Medium confidence
US security memorandum sets 2035 as the goal for cutting quantum risk to US cryptographic systems as far as feasible, and orders plans to protect US quantum technology (NSM-10)
Rule at home
National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic SystemsAimed at: No other country: a rule at home · Other · In force, signed 4 May 2022
Source: White House archive, NSM-10 English text
27 entities added to the Entity List, 12 of them in China, among them 3 Chinese quantum bodies listed for seeking US items for military uses
Addition of Entities and Revision of Entries on the Entity List; and Addition of Entity to the Military End-User (MEU) ListAimed at: China, Japan, Pakistan, Singapore · Entity or end-user list · In force, in force on issue
Source: Federal Register 2021-25808 (86 FR 67317), govinfo text English text
Linked, not counted here
- Order sets up a US outbound-investment programme for chips, quantum and AI in China 11 Aug 2023 · on AI (models and compute), counted there
- Outbound-investment rules proposed under the new statute: quantum, AI and chips kept, biotechnology among the sectors added 26 Oct 2026 · on AI (models and compute), counted there
- US investors barred from, or must notify, certain AI, chip and quantum deals in China 15 Nov 2024 · on AI (models and compute), counted there
Quantum computers could one day break the codes that protect today's data. Governments act in two ways. Some limit who can buy quantum computers, their parts and the know-how behind them, through export licences, investment rules and lists of named bodies. Others set dates to move their own systems to new, quantum-safe codes. This page lists both kinds of action since 2021. Rules aimed at no other country carry a "Rule at home" mark.
- Rule at home
- Aimed at no other country. Listed here, never counted on the map or in a tally.
- Low confidence
- Rests on a secondary source, such as a news report or a law-firm note.
- Not read in the source
- The official site refused our reader; a person has yet to open the text.
How this area is counted
- What counts
- An official act by a government that limits the export, sale, investment or transfer of quantum items or know-how, or that lists bodies for their quantum work. We also count binding or official rules and plans that tell a government's own systems to move to quantum-safe codes, and the standards those plans rely on. Each act is one row.
- What does not count
- Research funding, national quantum strategies with no duties, company or university choices, and bills that have not passed. A standard that only names an algorithm, with no duty or date, is not counted.
- Rule at home
- A rule aimed at no other country, such as a migration plan for a government's own systems, shows here with a "Rule at home" mark. It is left out of the map's tallies.
- Overlap with the main tracker
- Quantum rows already in the tracker (the US Commerce Control List rule of September 2024 and the EU dual-use list update of November 2025) are shown once, from the tracker. They are not counted twice.
- Sources checked
- The US Federal Register, the Bureau of Industry and Security, the Treasury and the White House archive; NIST and the NSA; the EU Official Journal and the Commission; Global Affairs Canada; the UK government and its National Cyber Security Centre; Legifrance (France); the Spanish official gazette; the Dutch government and Staatscourant; Japan's METI; Korea's MOTIR; China's Ministry of Commerce.
- Checked less often
- Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia and China are checked less often than the United States, the EU and the UK. Some French official pages and one US defence page refused our reader; those rows say they were not read in the source.
More
Every area in one tracker, with the filter
Other areas: AI (models and compute) Telecoms and subsea cables Drones and uncrewed systems Batteries
Sources: each government’s own publication, linked on every row with its language; where a government text could not be read, the press or a law-firm summary, marked low confidence. Rule level only: no firm or person is named.